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WITHOUT PAUSE BUT WITHOUT HASTE: 
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN CUBA 
 
 
 Developments in US-Cuba relations in December of 2014 impelled a renewed interest in 
Cuban affairs amongst academics, business professionals, and the general population in the 
United States. But very substantial reforms were taking place in Cuba since about 2007 –years 
before the US and Cuba decided to initialize a normalization of relations. This thesis provides an 
overview and analysis of these recent reforms. It also provides an overview and analysis of 
Cuba’s past reform cycles, mainly through a theoretical lens developed by Carmelo Mesa-Lago, 
which characterizes Cuban reform cycles as either “pragmatist” (towards the market) or “idealist” 
(away from the market). Also contained in this thesis is an analysis of Cuba’s monetary duality; 
Cuba’s potential for further inserting into the Cuban economy; a history of US-Cuban relations, 
with particular emphasis on the United States embargo against the island. This thesis concludes 
that the Cuban economy has entered a permanent pragmatist period, characterized by a shift 
towards marketization and privatization on the island. Regarding US-Cuba relations, this thesis 
provides an explication of recent moves by the Obama administration, but stresses that the 
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 Developments in December of 2015 impelled a renewal of interest in Cuban affairs 
amongst academics, business professionals, and the general population in the United States. I 
was lucky enough to be wrapping up this thesis when the United States and Cuba, at the end of 
2015, announced a forthcoming normalization of relations. Indeed, at the time this happened, I 
was in the process of writing this thesis’s chapter on US-Cuba relations. Such developments 
imbued this thesis with a certain degree of topical relevance.  
But long before the two states decided to engage in diplomatic normalization, since about 
2007, the island had been engaged in substantial economic reforms. This thesis provides an 
overview and analysis of these recent reforms. It also provides an overview and analysis of 
Cuba’s past reform cycles, mainly through a theoretical lens developed by Carmelo Mesa-Lago, 
which characterizes Cuban reform cycles as either “pragmatist” (towards the market) or “idealist” 
(away from the market). Also contained in this thesis is an analysis of Cuba’s monetary duality; 
Cuba’s potential for further inserting into the Cuban economy; a history of US-Cuban relations, 
with particular emphasis on the United States embargo against the island. This thesis concludes 
that the Cuban economy has entered a permanent pragmatist period, characterized by a shift 
towards marketization and privatization on the island. Regarding US-Cuba relations, this thesis 
provides an explication of recent moves by the Obama administration, but stresses that the 
Embargo has not ended, as only Congress has the authority to fully abrogate the Embargo. 
 Chapter one provides a literature review and theoretical framework for analyzing past 
periods of reform in Cuba. Past periods of marketization and privatization – “pragmatist” cycles 
– occurred when economic exigencies required Cuban authorities to allow a larger role for the 
market, while “idealist” cycles were launched when economic conditions had been ameliorated 
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sufficiently to allow for a halting or scaling back of pragmatist policies. It must be emphasized 
that this framework does not necessarily apply to recent reforms, since current reforms are 
occurring under Raul Castro, who seems to be much more pragmatic than his brother. Hence, the 
theoretical framework that applies to reform cycles that occurred between 1959 and 2007 is not 
applicable for current reforms. 
 The second chapter provides an overview and analysis of periods of reform in Cuba: the 
idealist cycle of 1959-1971; the pragmatist cycle of 1971-1985; the idealist cycle of 1986-1990; 
the pragmatist Special Period of 1991-1996; the deceleration of Special Period policies from 
1996-2001; and the island’s “holding pattern” of 2001-2007.  
 Because of the significance of the Special Period in shaping Cuba’s current reforms and 
approach to marketization and privatization, the Special Period is allocated the entire third 
chapter in this thesis.  
 The fourth chapter focuses on a peculiarly Cuban issue: monetary duality. The Cuban 
economy uses the Cuban Convertible Peso (CUC) and the Cuban Peso, along with the dollar and 
other currencies in its foreign invested sector. These currencies hold different exchange rates, 
depending on which sector of the economy in which they are exchanged. This arrangement has 
led to significant distortions and accounting problems in the Cuban economy, as some entities 
appear more profitable, others less profitable, than they actually are. This chapter gives a rough 
outline of how the Cuban economy can unify its currency. 
 The fifth chapter addresses the issue of Cuba’s insertion into the world economy. Cuba is 
already an open economy with a significant amount of interaction with the international 
economy. This chapter identifies Cuba’s highly educated population and biotech sector as its 
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comparative advantage, and argues that the island should further exploit these advantages when 
engaging with the world economy.  
 The sixth chapter focuses on reforms that occurred on the island between 2007-2010, 
including substantial liberalizations in the area of agriculture, and analyzes shortcomings 
regarding these reforms. Such shortcomings include bureaucratic and administrational flaws in 
the way certain agriculture liberalization measures were introduced and implemented. 
 The seventh chapter provides an overview and analysis of reforms that have occurred 
sine 2010. Many of these measures were meant to address flaws that obtained in 2007-2010 
reforms. The main point to be taken away from chapters six and seven is that Cuban authorities 
are sincere in their determination to move towards the market and privatization, but are doing so 
at an incremental, deliberate pace, in an attempt to avoid the affects of shock therapy capitalism. 
 Chapter eight provides a history of US-Cuban relations since the Cuban Revolution of 
1959. It provides an overview of relations through each American presidency, and gives an 
account of the steadily increasing power of Congress in US-Cuba relations. The authority 
Congress holds in US-Cuba relations makes this bilateral relationship very unique, as foreign 
policy is traditionally the prerogative of the Executive Branch. This chapter is largely composed 
of a history and analysis of the Embargo the United States maintains with Cuba. Most of the 
thesis focuses on domestic politics and economics in Cuba, without focusing on the Embargo. 
This is not due to any kind of irrelevance regarding the Embargo and its effects on domestic 
issues. Rather, the Embargo is such an important topic that it seemed much more appropriate to 
devote a large portion of a single chapter to it.   
 Chapter eight also gives an account of recent developments in US-Cuban relations, 
specifically the decision by US and Cuban officials to initiate a normalization of relations. This 
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chapter overviews what changes have been made to US policy, as well as what changes are not 
allowed under current law, due to Helms-Burton. 
 There are surely many important facts, developments, and concepts that have been left 
out of this thesis. The scope of this thesis was ambitious, which explains why, as of February 
2015, I have been researching and writing on the topic for two-and-a-half years. When the scope 
was so extensive, omissions were a foregone conclusion. However, I hope that I was able to 
achieve my goal, which was to implement, and expand upon, Carmelo Mesa-Lago’s theoretical 
framework for analyzing Cuban reform cycles, as well as apply it to Cuba’s current reforms. 
This thesis should also provide a thorough, concise account of recent developments in US-Cuba 
relations for anyone who is curious as to what changes have occurred, and which changes have 
not yet occurred, but are desirable. 
 I would like to provide a brief note on economic and political ideology in this thesis. As 
Dr. Braunstein pointed out, much of the thesis seems to evince a neoliberal bent. For instance, 
the sections of this thesis that cover FDI and capital account liberalization seem to suggest that 
neoliberal approaches to these issues are more rational or optimal than other approaches. The 
explanation in this lies largely in the resources that were available to me when constructing this 
thesis. I do not speak Spanish, and it happens to be the case that most economists who write on 
Cuban issues are somewhat neoliberally inclined. As such, my writing on these topics was 
unavoidably influenced by their writing. I am much more inclined to agree with the lenses of 
authors such as Ilene Grabel, who advocate capital controls/alternative approaches to 
international economic integration, but the writing of this persuasion that is available on Cuban 





Theoretical Overview of General Pattern of Reform & Literature Review 
 
The General Pattern of Reform in Cuba: A Theoretical Overview 
 
This chapter provides a theoretical overview of the general pattern of reform and 
retrenchment in Cuba. It cannot be overstated that this theoretical framework applies to previous 
(pre-Raul) periods of reform. Current reforms represent a permanent shift towards relative 
privatization and marketization in Cuba, and thus do not comport with the pattern of pragmatist 
reform and idealist retrenchment that is proffered in this chapter.  
The general pattern of reform in Cuba may be characterized as follows. First, material 
exigencies, often a result of previous “ideological” cycles, necessitate political and economic 
reforms (usually economic). Often, pragmatic “reforms” are simply the legalization of practices 
that have already been ubiquitous in the island’s informal economy for some time (Pumar on 
NPR, 08-09-12).1 The question in such instances is why some practices are formally legalized, 
while others are penalized. A possible answer is that small-scale economic activities, such as 
buying and selling vehicles, are allowed, since they pose little political threat to the Cuban 
government, while more politically threatening behavior, particularly by state officials, is not 
brooked. This view garners further support in light of recent economic reforms. As explained in 
a recent New York Times article on Cuban capitalism, personal enterprise and initiative is 
tolerated only insofar as it does not pose a political or ideological threat. Describing the 
experience of one Cuban entrepreneur, Héctor Higuera Martínez, the New York Times article 
explains: 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Regarding the recent legalization of private/self-employment, of the roughly 350,000 people licensed to be self-
employed under the new laws by the end of 2011, 67 percent had no prior job affiliation listed — which most likely 
means they were running underground businesses that then became legitimate (Cave/New York Times 12-01-12).	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(Hector Higuera) was about as capitalist as it gets. But will his ideas ever be adopted? Like 
everyone else, he faces severe limits. He can hire no more than 20 employees, for example. He 
does not have access to private bank loans, and the government has shown little inclination to let 
people like Mr. Higuera succeed on a grand scale.  
Instead, when success arrives, the government seems to get nervous. This past summer, 
officials shut down a thriving restaurant and cabaret featuring opera and dance in what had been a 
vacant lot, charging the owner with “personal enrichment” because he charged a $2 cover at the 
door. A news article from Reuters had described it as Cuba’s largest private business. A few days 
later, it was gone, along with 130 jobs (Cave, 2012). 
 
 The above excerpt illustrates that not only does the Cuban government take measures to 
discourage private enterprise when sought on a substantial scale, but that the government also 
has laws that can be implemented to shut down businesses when they garner too much capital. 
Such policies help illustrate what Ted Henken refers to as the “schizophrenic” nature of the 
Cuban leadership: they promote yet discourage capitalist reforms simultaneously (Cave, 2012). 
Similarly, Archibald Ritter has referred to recent conditions in Cuba as “handcuffed capitalism”: 
a system of “highly regulated competitive markets for low-skilled, small family businesses.” 
Ritter argues that the Cuban government has insured a restricted role for micro-enterprise 
through “a tough regulatory environment and an onerous tax regime, both designed to reduce 
incomes and restrict growth in the microenterprise sector” (in Ritter, 2004: 15). What economic 
freedom there is has mostly accrued to those whose main ambition is making and selling pizza” 
(in Ritter, 2004: 15). Hence, capitalism is tolerated at an innocuous, small scale; such tolerance is 
not usually extended to large-scale endeavors. Importantly, Dani Rodrik argues that this 
schizophrenic tendency of Cuban policy must be amended in the future if Cuba wishes to 
experience gains in policy reforms: “If the private sector gets mixed signals about the direction 
of reform, no amount of policy tinkering will have much effect. The government needs to make 
up its mind, and communicate its strategy clearly. Will it foster private markets and private 
entrepreneurship, or not?” (in Dominguez et. al, 2012a: 57).  
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Some authors implement social-psychological and cultural concepts to explain this 
ambivalence towards capitalism, and the Cuban population’s proclivity to brook it. Jose Azel 
argues that Cubans behavior illustrates the phenomenon of “dual consciousness,” in which 
“individuals hold one set of beliefs based on the mainstream culture and a contradictory set of 
beliefs based on their actual experience” (2012: 3). Gomez (2012) argues that any “transition” in 
Cuba may be difficult for similar reasons: Cubans have been indoctrinated against the market, 
but are now being told to embrace it. Hernandez (2010) argues that there is ensconced amongst 
the population a cultural ambivalence regarding the desirability of reforms. On the one hand, 
Cubans have garnered substantial social gains from the Revolution’s achievements. On the other 
hand, Cubans have witnessed firsthand the shortcomings of Cuban socialism: hyper-
bureaucratization, decreased efficiency and productivity, and diminished freedoms. Because of 
these somewhat contradictory experiences, Cubans advocate changes that would allow for 
greater political and economic freedoms, while simultaneously being suspicious of the effects 
that potential reforms will have on their prized social programs. Regardless of the explanation, it 
should be understood that Cuba’s politicians and general population suffer from a pronounced 
ambivalence to marketization and privatization reforms. 
Second, while reforms are underway, they must be justified, so as to not contravene 
Cuban socialism. They are often justified through either a reconceptualization of socialist 
ideology, or an explanation that the measures are only temporary expedients to achieve material 
goals. Alternatively, if reforms allow for state-level, rather than individual-level, market 
liberalization, then reforms may be justified on pragmatic, rather than ideological, grounds. 
Generally, to justify reforms, constitutional amendments are necessarily introduced.  
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When the first route, reconceptualization of socialist ideology, is chosen, Cuban 
socialism is amended to comport with necessary reforms, which obviates, or at least alleviates, 
problems of cognitive dissonance between socialist ideology and pragmatic policy. Campbell has 
recognized the central role of such reconceptualization in Cuban reforms in recent decades:  
Sometimes the transition from one period to the next involved fundamentally different re-
conceptualizations of what was actually central to socialism. In all cases, the policies of successive 
periods implemented significant changes in emphasis to achieve what was necessary at that 
moment to promote a socialist economy in Cuba. The continuity through all the changes has been 
exactly that commitment to building a socialist economy, even though discussions have never 
ceased in Cuba about exactly what that means and how best to do it (Campbell, 2013: 1).2  
 
The above excerpt illustrates a very important fact on the island, which is that, while economic 
reform has always been, to varying extents, both necessary and real in Cuba, abrogation of 
Cuban socialism has never been an option. As such, when reforms are necessary, and they 
contravene Cuban socialism, it is the very idea of socialism itself that has been necessarily 
amended. This is the essence of reconceptualization of Cuban socialism at different times in 
Cuba’s history. 
Such was the case in the 1990s, when Cuba, in desperate need of hard currency after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, introduced foreign investment reforms that allowed for protection 
from nationalization, repatriation of profits, and one hundred percent private foreign ownership 
(Jatar-Hausman 1999: 81). Lopez-Levy explains that such measures had hitherto been denigrated 
as facets of neoliberalism (Abrahams and Lopez-Levy, 2011). To justify its much-needed 
reforms, Cuba altered its stance on such measures, and instead of characterizing all forms of 
foreign capital as capitalist Trojan Horses, the discourse shifted to strategies of responsibly 
managing globalization (Abrahams and Lopez-Levy, 2011: 84).3 Hence, globalization, per se, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  While	  I	  began	  my	  research	  on	  the	  Cuban	  political	  economy	  in	  2011,	  and	  developed	  my	  idea	  of	  reconceptualizing	  Cuban	  
socialism	  shortly	  thereafter,	  it	  is	  not	  	  surprising	  that	  others	  writing	  on	  Cuba	  have	  written	  about	  essentially	  the	  same	  
concept.	  However,	  I	  did	  not	  come	  across	  Campbell’s	  writing	  on	  the	  subject	  until	  June	  2013.	  	  
3	  A	  similar	  process	  has	  begun	  with	  current	  economic	  reforms:	  “as	  a	  recent	  gathering	  of	  Cuba’s	  Communist	  Party	  earlier	  
this	  year	  included	  a	  session	  on	  overcoming	  prejudices	  against	  entrepreneurs”	  (Cave/New	  York	  Times	  12-­‐01-­‐12).	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stopped being demonized, and instead it was neoliberal globalization that became the target of 
umbrage. Moreover, the Cuban constitution was amended so as to “limit the state monopoly to 
the ‘fundamental means of production’ instead of the previous ‘means of production,’ which was 
more expansive” (Arnavat in Ed. Lopez-Levy 2007: 84). This allowed for a reconceptualization 
of Cuban socialism through a constitutional amendment, so as to avoid logical and legal 
contradictions.  
A very important aspect of the reconceptualization of socialist ideology so as to brook 
necessary aspects of globalization regarded who determined the nature of the discourse on the 
topic. Prior to the 1990s, the Trade Union Central held an ideological monopoly in this regard, 
and this group’s meeting on the subject (globalization) was titled “Workers Meeting against 
Globalization and Neoliberalism” (Lopez-Levy 2011: 85). However, beginning in the 1990s, 
meetings regarding globalization started being held by the Economists Union, with Fidel’s full 
support; the conference title of the meeting held by this group was “Globalization and 
Development,” which was much more neutral. This group, in these meetings, showed “less 
hostility toward all market-based systems and attack(ed) more narrowly what was called 
‘neoliberal globalization’.” (Lopez-Levy 2011: 85). 
A general model of ideological justification can be taken from the above account. First, 
for socialist ideology to be most effectively redefined, so as to comport with reforms, it is 
important that the meaning of “dirty words” be narrowed. In the above case, this entailed 
narrowing the definition of unacceptable forms of global capital from globalization per se, to 
neoliberal globalization. It also required a constitutional amendment that redefined the necessary 
purview of state ownership. By narrowing the facets of capitalism to which socialism is opposed, 
Cuba was able to obtain much-needed hard currency, while allowing for a greater role for foreign 
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private ownership. Moreover, the circle of actors discussing the issues must be widened if 
socialist ideology is to be effectively redefined to comport with reforms. In the above case, this 
entailed including the Economists Union in a debate that was previously the sole purview of the 
Trade Union Central. This last point is important to recent reforms, as “new” actors in the Cuban 
government, including Raul Castro, may be more amenable to limited marketization on the 
island 
If reforms are presented as temporary expedients, then there is not as much of a need for 
ideological justifications and redefinition. Rather, the reforms can be introduced as necessary to 
achieve a material goal, and the public understands that the reforms will likely be repealed once 
their purpose has been served. An instance of such a strategy is currently occurring in Cuba’s 
cooperative sector, in which 200 non-agricultural cooperatives are being introduced, with an 
explicitly “experimental character” (Peters, 2012). Such a law is a very large step towards 
liberalization, and allows new cooperatives to be self-governing entities that are not attached to 
state ministries (Peters, 2012). However, by describing such entities as “experimental,” the 
Cuban government reserves the right to dissolve any entity that it deems unacceptable in the 
future, without any ideological justification. This does not necessarily mean that such reforms 
will be abrogated; it simply means that the Cuban government leaves itself an exit route if such 
reforms become politically jeopardous.  
However, there are times when reforms are justified on pragmatic, rather than ideological, 
grounds, even when they are not intended to be temporary expedients. For instance, in 1995, 
foreign investment reforms were justified in terms of efficiency, and no contradiction with 
socialist ideology was acknowledged by the leadership (Jatar-Hausman 1999: 122). One 
plausible explanation for this phenomenon lies in Cuba’s schizophrenic approach to state-level 
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and foreign capitalism versus micro-level capitalism: Cuban authorities have accepted the former 
two as legitimate (Jatar-Hausman 1999: 118), while the latter necessitates ideological 
justification, since Cuban socialism perceives individual level capitalism as anathema, both 
because it contravenes Cuban socialism and because it poses political risks. In other words, 
market reforms are accepted at the state level for their potential to rationalize state enterprises, 
while Cuban authorities have hitherto been suspicious of small-scale market reforms that grant 
individual Cubans more economic power. This is because private enterprise in Cuba is difficult 
to manage, and has the ability to substantially exacerbate inequalities, while state capitalism 
allows for greater control over the economy, while not posing the same implications for 
inequities (Jatar-Hausman 1999: 117-9). Importantly, while this stylized model has applied in the 
past, this dynamic is currently changing, as Cuban authorities seem more willing to brook 
(constrained) individual level entrepreneurship. 
Third, once reforms have had the intended effect, in terms of ameliorating material 
exigencies, Cuban authorities must decide whether or not the reforms should be retained or 
repealed. Reforms are implemented for as long as is necessary to mitigate the material conditions 
that necessitated the reforms. The argument that material exigencies drive (often temporary) 
reforms is illustrated by the fact that reforms are often scaled back once material conditions have 
improved sufficiently for reforms to become unnecessary. For instance, Special Period market 
reforms of 1993-94, ranging from dollarization to self-employment, were halted (not scaled back, 
as will be explained below) once economic conditions had improved in the late 1990s (Perez-
Lopez in Ed. Perez-Stable 2007: 171). If reforms were not being driven by material exigencies, 
then they would have greater staying power once conditions improved, but this has not been the 
case in Cuba. 
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Often, when reforms create unsustainable political and ideological tensions, authorities 
opt for their repeal: “the Cuban government has a history of switching signals on its citizens, 
encouraging private enterprise and then pronouncing it counterrevolutionary and shutting it 
down again” (Gorney, National Geographic online, 11-12). Or, as Jatar-Hausman states,  
The island has flirted with capitalism since the revolution and has seemed to alternately embrace 
and reject limited economic openings throughout the socialist period. The result: a perennial, 
politically charged balancing act between the drive for efficiency and loyalty to socialist principles. 
Freedom versus equality has been the ever-present political trade-off in Cuba’s revolutionary 
history (1999: 27).  
 
This was the case in 1986, when it became clear that market reforms were introducing nascent 
inequalities, as well as creating the conditions for ideological tensions between nascent 
capitalists and orthodox Cuban socialists (Jatar-Hausman 1999: 37). Hence, Cuba entered its 
“Rectification Process, which aimed to renew socialism and rejected many of the capitalistic 
openings of the late 1970s and early 1980s” (Jatar-Hausman 1999: 37). The regime at this time 
was so concerned about the negative political and ideological implications of 1970s reforms that 
it chose to roll many of them back, despite their recognition that these very reforms had allowed 
for greater productivity and efficiency, including higher food production (Jatar-Hausman 1999: 
36-8).  The repeal of reforms at these junctures is easier to understand when one recognizes that 
Fidel Castro often showed, at most, minimal support for the actions when they were being 
implemented – the reforms are often not meant to be permanent, but are presented as temporary 
expedients to achieve material goals (Jatar-Hausman 1999).  
 It is important to recognize that reforms are not scaled back out of pure political self-
interest on the part of Cuban authorities. Rather, reforms are often repealed because they 
engender conditions that are diametrically opposed to Cuba’s tradition of social justice and 
equity. For instance, the legalization of the use of US dollars in 1993 has been characterized by 
one analyst as “the most successful reform undertaken in the 1990s” (Perez-Lopez in Ed. Perez-
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Stable 2007: 178). Dollarization created a substantial source of hard currency, surpassing sugar 
exports and revenue generated from tourism. However, the use of dollars has also generated or 
exacerbated significant inequalities on the island, as dollar-denominated sectors of the economy, 
and participants therein, have been flourishing, while those outside of these sectors have 
experienced relative and absolute declines in income (Perez-Lopez in Ed. Perez-Stable 2007: 
178).4 Hence, it is not surprising that the Cuban government has such a schizophrenic attitude 
towards reform: if incredibly “successful” reforms, such as dollarization, can have such negative 
implications for Cuban socialism, then Cuban authorities are justifiably suspicious of the 
consequences of further reforms. 5 
Importantly, reforms are not always formally repealed; instead, Cuban authorities often 
find ways to effectively scale back reforms, while maintaining their formal legality. For instance, 
the reforms of the 1970s were not completely abrogated, but rather the Cuban government found 
other ways to regulate nascent capitalists. For instance, instead of an outright repudiation of self-
employment, the government chose instead to require privately employed individuals in many 
sectors to purchase all inputs from state enterprises, which effectively reduced the number of 
self-employed from 52,100 in 1985 to 43,200 in 1987 (Jatar-Hausman 1999: 38). Hence, Cuban 
authorities were able to achieve their goal of garnering greater control over the private sector, 
without completely repealing previous reforms. This is an important point, because it illustrates 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  Hence	  why	  Fidel	  Castro	  admits	  that	  the	  legalization	  of	  American	  dollars	  in	  Cuba’s	  economy	  is	  one	  of	  his	  biggest	  regrets	  
(Castro	  and	  Ramonet	  2006).	  It	  is	  also	  illustrative	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  reforms	  have	  had	  unintended	  consequences,	  and	  have	  
created	  conditions	  that	  must	  be	  addressed,	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  a	  legitimate	  political	  and	  economic	  transformation	  in	  Cuba,	  if	  
the	  island	  hopes	  to	  maintain	  its	  tradition	  of	  social	  justice.	  Erikson	  (in	  Ed.	  Perez-­‐Stable	  2007:	  228-­‐9)	  argues	  that	  
dollarization	  was	  largely	  responsible	  for	  the	  culture	  of	  corruption	  that	  has	  emerged	  in	  Cuba	  since	  the	  1990s	  –	  as	  
disparities	  emerged,	  the	  social	  contract	  of	  egalitarianism	  was	  shattered,	  and	  Cuban	  citizens	  have	  evinced	  fewer	  qualms	  
about	  stealing	  from	  the	  state.	  
5	  The	  introduction	  of	  a	  foreign-­‐currency	  sector	  in	  Cuba’s	  economy	  has	  caused	  an	  effective	  devaluation	  of	  education,	  since	  
much	  more	  money	  can	  be	  earned	  driving	  a	  taxi	  than	  being	  a	  doctor.	  Hence,	  the	  foreign	  currency	  sector	  in	  Cuba	  has	  
engendered	  two	  conditions	  anathema	  to	  Cuban	  socialism:	  inequality,	  along	  with	  a	  devaluation	  of	  education,	  which	  has	  




another general pattern in Cuba’s struggle with reforms: when Cuban authorities realize that 
erstwhile necessary reforms have come to pose political and ideological threats to Cuban 
socialism, and hence desire to effectively repeal such reforms, they very often opt for heightened 
regulations that allow for an effectual abrogation of reforms, while maintaining those reforms in 
formal terms. One explanation for this approach may be as follows – when ideological 
redefinitions have already been made in defense of reforms, to make socialism comport with 
material exigencies, authorities may find it to be too politically costly to once again redefine 
socialist ideology in such a short time period6 (the Cuban people are understanding, but their 
patience has limits, and they are anything but stupid).   
It is also important to understand that Cuba often implements contradictory policies 
simultaneously. For instance, regulations on self-employment have often been introduced, while 
at the same time prohibitive taxes and informal regulations are levied on those very same 
businesses (Jatar-Hausman, 1999). Jatar-Hausman characterizes such practices as common in 
Cuba: “what the Cuban government gives with one hand, it takes with the other” (Jatar-Hausman, 
1999: 97). As an example of the Cuban government’s ambivalence regarding reforms, the 1990s 
reforms promoting greater liberalization of paladares (restaurants run out of Cuban homes) were 
met with restraints on their size, as well as prohibitive fees. As a result, the number of these 
establishments fell from 600 in 1995 to 150 in 2003 (Perez-Lopez in Perez-Stable, 2007:	  176-­‐7).	  
Similar	  constraints	  were	  simultaneously	  placed	  on	  other	  forms	  of	  formally	  legalized	  self-­‐
employment,	  causing	  the	  number	  of	  self-­‐employed	  workers	  to	  fall	  “from	  a	  peak	  of	  about	  
208,500	  in	  1995	  to	  152,900	  in	  2002	  and	  to	  an	  estimated	  150,000	  in	  2004”	  (Perez-Lopez in 
Ed. Perez-Stable 2007:	  177).	  Thus	  Cuban	  authorities	  often	  do	  not	  even	  wait	  for	  reforms	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  This	  would	  be	  an	  area	  of	  study	  in	  the	  future.	  This	  explanation	  is	  simply	  offered	  here	  as	  conjecture.	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pose	  real	  political	  and	  ideological	  threats;	  rather,	  they	  introduce	  restrictions	  on	  the	  very	  
sectors	  that	  they	  are	  liberalizing,	  thus	  mitigating	  the	  potential	  for	  undesired	  effects	  of	  such	  
reforms.	  Current	  reforms	  regarding	  self-­‐employment,	  private	  enterprise,	  and	  travel,	  and	  
their	  contradictory	  restrictions,	  can	  more	  easily	  be	  understood	  within	  this	  context.7	  	  
If authorities choose to retain the reforms, then they are likely to provide further 
justification for the reforms in ideological terms, while also attempting to allow the state a 
stronger hand in affected sectors, so as to consolidate control and prevent nascent capitalists 
from garnering too much influence.  
 
In sum, the reform process in Cuba can be stylized as follows: 
 
1. Material exigencies necessitate political and/or economic reforms 
2. Such reforms are justified through: 
a) Redefinition of socialist ideology, so as to comport with reforms. Even if 
socialist ideology is not explicitly redefined, Cuban authorities nonetheless 
argue that necessary reforms do not contravene Cuban socialism. Either way, 
socialism must at least be acknowledged, and sometimes modified to comport 
with reforms. 
b) An explanation that such reforms are only temporary expedients to cope with 
material conditions. 
c) Either way, reforms are usually accompanied by constitutional reforms, given 
Cuba’s long history of constitutionalism (Arnavat , in Ed. Perez-Stable 2007: 
72-95) 
d) Healthcare has never been on the table for serious reductions, but education has 
undergone a significant reduction in expenditures. 
3. Once reforms have achieved their intended goal (or not), the government has to make 
a choice: 
a) Repeal/scale back the reforms 
i. This can be done either through formal or effective means, or both. 
Importantly, the Cuban government often chooses to mitigate the effects 
of reforms by implementing informal measures; the explanation for this 
may be that the Cuban government does not want to change formal 
ideological course in a short period of time, once an instance of 
reconceptualization of socialist ideology has already occurred. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  For	  instance,	  see	  Yoani	  Sanchez,	  You	  Can	  Check	  Out	  Any	  Time	  You	  Like	  (11-­‐13-­‐12),	  in	  which	  she	  argues	  that	  formal	  
liberalization	  of	  Cubans’	  ability	  to	  travel	  will	  simply	  be	  alloyed	  with	  passport-­‐related	  restrictions,	  and	  that	  those	  who	  
have	  the	  greatest	  need/desire	  to	  leave	  will	  likely	  be	  those	  who	  are	  not	  allowed	  to	  leave.	  However,	  despite	  Sanchez’s	  
predictions	  that	  she	  would	  not	  be	  allowed	  to	  leave	  the	  country,	  she	  visited	  Miami	  in	  early	  April	  of	  2013.	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b) Retain the reforms, in which case further ideological justification for the 
reforms may follow.  
i. Reforms of the state capitalist variety are much more likely to be retained 
than are micro-level reforms 
 
It cannot be stressed enough that the above model regarding Cuban reforms applies 
mainly to reforms during Fidel’s regime. Under Raul’s government, legitimacy is, more and 
more, being based on pragmatism and performance (Abrahams and Lopez-Levy, 2011: 217). 
Hence, less rhetorical adherence to socialist ideology is likely to be necessary under Raul. This 
will especially be the case if Raul’s regime succeeds in adapting the Chinese model of political 
economy (state capitalism) to the island’s particular needs. Under such circumstances, the Cuban 
government’s claim to legitimacy would rest, to a large extent, on their achievement of economic 
growth, and reforms will not need to be justified in socialist rhetoric, as long as such reforms 
engender increased living standards on the island.  
Literature Review 
Integrating Cuba into the World Economy 
A key question that Cuba must address as it moves forward with reforms is how the 
island nation can integrate into the world economy in a politically and socially responsible 
manner. While most economists in the developed world pushed for capital account liberalization 
during the period when the Washington Consensus was prominent, a much more nuanced 
approach has since been adopted. This approach, while recognizing the need to attract foreign 
capital, also recognizes that the composition/term structure of such foreign capital is important. 
Such an approach stresses the necessity of attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) and long-
term debt and equity (preferably equity) investments, while avoiding volatile, short-term capital 
flows that can easily be reversed, as in the case of the Asian financial crisis. Hence, economists 
such as Ilene Grabel (2003; 2004) have emphasized the need for developing countries to adopt 
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development policies similar to the “Chilean Model,” which maintained strong controls on 
capital flows, while still attracting foreign investment. Grabel argues that the model that Chile 
developed in the second half of the twentieth century, which included reserve requirements for 
investments and taxes on capital inflows, engendered a much more stable flow of capital. 
Importantly, such a model changes the composition, not the amount of capital flows, which is the 
very point of the Chilean model. While some economists (Forbes, 2007) have argued that 
microeconomic analysis reveals the inefficiencies created by the Chilean model, proponents of 
the model counter that inefficiencies are preferable to volatility (Grabel, 2004). Indeed, 
development economists have argued that “inefficiency” need not be a dirty word when dealing 
with developing countries; in fact, inefficiencies can actually be a good thing, since they protect 
domestic markets and mitigate volatility (Rodrik, 2011).  
Cuba’s best policy option moving forward may well be to adopt policies similar to the 
Chilean Model. While integrating into the world economy, Cuba will have to take political and 
social considerations into account. The Chilean Model allows both of these concerns to be 
addressed and satisfied. By maintaining capital controls, in multiple forms, Cuban authorities 
will be able to determine the pace and composition of foreign investments, thus avoiding volatile 
capital flows that can have politically destabilizing effects. Moreover, Cuba’s integration must 
occur with social considerations in mind if Cuba wishes to develop economically but not 
abandon its tradition of social equity. By maintaining controls in the financial sector and the real 
economy, Cuba can develop while still protecting its citizens from the vagaries, and to a lesser 
extent, the competition, of the world market. This will give Cuba’s infant industries a chance to 
develop, while introducing a certain measure of competition into the economy. The last thing 
Cuba wants is a repeat of the pre-1959 era economy, in which dependence on world market 
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demand for sugar caused massive swings in Cuba’s net exports. To be successful, Cuba must 
combine diversification with growth, which may necessitate protection of its infant industries for 
a time. Cuba will not be alone in adopting such policies, as other developing countries, including 
China, have adopted, and continue to maintain, similar controls. 
One aspect to keep in mind, however, is that Chile was able to adopt its model of capital 
controls, and still attract foreign investment, because it had something that foreign markets 
desired: commodities. The extent to which Cuba will be able to adopt the Chilean Model will 
depend on what the Cuban economy has to offer. The island has a highly educated workforce, 
which will be a significant attraction, particularly when combined with the low relative wages 
that Cuban workers will likely accept from foreign employers. Discovering oil reserves will also 
be a significant attraction; however, Cuba has thus far been disappointed in its search for oil. 
Cuba’s ability to adopt the Chilean Model will also be determined by the quality of its 
institutions moving forward, and whether foreign capital trusts future Cuban governments not to 
nationalize their investments. Cuba’s experience in its tourist sector is a good representation of 
how Cuba will treat foreign capital moving forward. 
In sum, if Cuba wants to develop, it must integrate more completely into the world 
economy. However, the character of the Cuban regime is such that integration must be 
accomplished in a politically and socially acceptable manner. Chile’s development over the past 
three decades suggests one promising avenue of integration. By adopting a development 
approach similar to the Chilean Model, one that maintains strong financial controls, Cuba may be 
able to mitigate the volatile effects of foreign capital, while still attracting investment. Moreover, 
by protecting infant and/or state industries for a time, as China still does, Cuba may be able to 
diversify its economy while it grows.  
19	  
	  
Democracy in Cuba 
One of the main questions that arises in Cuban studies is, “to what extent does democracy 
obtain in Cuba?” Essential to a sufficient response to this question is a coming to terms, 
semantically, amongst analysts, regarding the meaning of “democracy.” Perhaps more than any 
other aspect of Cuban political economy, a definition of democracy is important, because 
diametrically opposed answers may emerge without such a definition.  
The facet of equality, and equal rights, is one of the most important to understand 
regarding Cuban democracy, because it is perceived by some analysts (Lambie 2010, for 
example) as being the essential component of what makes Cuba democratic. Cubans themselves, 
argue such analysts, have since the Revolution viewed democracy as being synonymous with 
equality. Such a perception of democracy as equality has historical roots, dating to pre-
Revolution Cuba, in which “Cuba’s underdevelopment had produced a highly unequal society, 
and those who constituted the mass support of the Revolution were mainly from the poor, 
undereducated, disadvantaged sector” (Lambie, 2010: 126). Once the Revolution transpired, “the 
dissolution of the old system opened up possibilities for a dramatic redistribution of wealth, and 
created new opportunities for a wide range of the population,” and as a result, “Democracy, 
which had been meaningless to most people previously, came to be understood as equality, 
participation, national unity and meeting society’s needs, rather than a concept dealing with 
competing political parties and remote representation” (Lambie, 2010: 126).  
At a more basic level, the debate about whether Cuba is a democracy is really a debate 
about whether liberal democracy is the only legitimate definition of democracy. Analysts such as 
Lambie argue that Cuba’s pursuit of economic equality, and thus equality of rights for its citizens, 
indeed makes the island more democratic than polities such as the United States (Lambie, 2010: 
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79). While advocates of liberal democracy place primacy on individual rights and political 
democracy, developmentalists/structuralists argue that economic democracy should take 
precedence (Lambie, 2010: 79). For instance, Richard Wolff argues that true democracy cannot 
exist without democracy in the workplace. For Wolff, this entails workers composing, or at least 
democratically electing, boards of directors of corporations (Wolff, 2012). When assessed 
according to criteria of striving for economic equality, Cuba fairs pretty well: its healthcare and 
educational levels are redoubtable among Latin American nations. In terms of according with 
Wolff’s conceptualization of democracy, in terms of workplace democracy, the island still falls 
short, but no more so than western countries, such as the United States. 
Tovar argues that equality of rights requires equality of opportunity, and that equality of 
opportunity requires equality of education (1997: 20). In this respect, Tovar argues that Cuba has 
been exceptional: “When the Cuban government takes pride in stating that it has eradicated 
illiteracy, it means exactly that: illiteracy has been extirpated, rooted out” (Tovar, 1997: 21). 
Along with, and causal of, this achievement, Cuba has ensured that access to quality education is 
not contingent on economic means (Tovar, 2997: 22). Hence, in terms of equality of education, 
and thus equality of rights, Cuba can be considered more “democratic” than a country like the 
United States. This dedication to education and literacy dates back to the Cuban Revolution, of 
which one of the main goals was eradication of illiteracy and the promotion of education as a 
Revolutionary ideal (Castro and Ramonet 2006). A tangible example of this goal was the 
Literacy Campaign of 1961, “in which educated Cubans taught reading and writing skills to the 
illiterate” (Lambie, 2010: 154). 
Tovar also argues that if one includes the right to work and the right to health care in 
one’s definition of “equal rights,” then Cuba unequivocally fulfills the requirements of such a 
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definition. Regarding work, Tovar argues, “The conquests gained by Cuban workers are among 
the most advanced in the world” (Tovar, 1997: 43). While an active project has been promoted in 
Cuba to encourage Cuban citizens to fight for workers’ rights, it is trade unions in particular who 
“have an obligation and a duty to ensure that labor legislation is complied with” (Tovar, 1997: 
44).  
Regarding health care, Tovar argues that Cuba has reached a truly democratic standard: 
“Cuba provides a powerful health care system working on behalf of all the people, who have free 
access to medical check-ups and examinations,” amongst myriad other medical services (Tovar, 
1997: 58). Importantly, Tovar argues that it is the characterization of health care as a democratic 
right and public good that has allowed this small island, with its relative lack of economic 
resources, to obtain such exemplary health outcomes:  
The effectiveness and quality of the Cuban medical system lies in the fact that public health care is 
no longer a market commodity. In Cuba, doctors are not businesspeople, and in order to fully 
understand these achievements, one has to grasp the material and spiritual changes in a society 
where doctors, divested of mercantilism, identify with a community all the more generous for 
being free of the petty selfishness that corrodes societies divided into antagonistic social classes. 
When their basic needs are covered, people regain their humanity (Tovar, 1997: 58-9). 
 
 Regarding democracy in Cuba, vis-à-vis elections, Tovar holds a rather favorable view, 
arguing that democracy does not necessitate multiple parties. Rather, Tovar argues that political 
parties can often do more harm than good, in terms of representing the general will of the people, 
and that Cuba serves as an alternative to such party-induced fracturing: “Cuba has demonstrated 
that it is not necessary to fragment the country to hold truly democratic elections in the interest 
of the nation” (Tovar, 1997: 146). Tovar emphasizes the fact that candidates to the National 
Assembly of People’s Power are not nominated by the Communist Party; hence, it is “possible 
for any citizen, worker, student, farmer, employee, soldier or housewife to be nominated without 
being a member of the Party” (Tovar, 1997: 147).  
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Other analysts are not so sanguine about the record of, or prospects for, democracy in 
Cuba. Abrahams and Lopez-Levy argue that while Cuba’s political system approaches 
democracy at the municipal level, democracy is constrained at the national level: “Today, unlike 
nominations to the municipal assemblies, where two or more candidates must stand for each 
position, in elections for the National Assembly there is only one candidate for each position” 
(2011: 110-111). Moreover, contrary to Tovar, who argues that the Party does not interlope in 
the electoral process, Lopez-Levy and Abrahams argue that the Communist Party, effectively, if 
not formally, intervenes to a significant degree in the electoral process: 
The list of candidates for National Assembly elections is made by a commission of 
organizations controlled by the party and the trade unions. Defenders of the system say 
the party does not intervene but this is very hard to believe. In fact, the party gives clear 
directions about how they should run the show. Therefore, one of the most important 
reforms being proposed is that more than one candidate must run for each seat in the 
National Assembly. Candidates should compete against each other and explain their 
positions to the people. This is presented by some as appealing to the complexity of 
society in Cuba (Abrahams and Lopez-Levy, 2011: 111).  
 
Hence, while recognizing that “Multiparty elections are indeed essential to a modern democracy” 
(Abrahams and Lopez Levy, 2011: 103) Abrahams and Lopez-Levy also argue that intraparty 
political competition is more likely, but that the Cuban electoral system is currently lacking in 
this category. Abrahams and Lopez-Levy argue that, in the short term, in terms of impelling 
political reforms, intraparty competition will be more significant than pressure from outside the 
party, since “dissidents in Cuba actually constitute a fairly small, dispersed, and divided segment 
of the population” (Abrahams and Lopez-Levy, 2011: 98). Moreover, these authors argue that 
any political changes that eventuate in Cuba will mirror the gradual nature of economic reforms 
on the island (Abrahams and Lopez-Levy, 2011: 103). It is important to note that Abrahams and 
Lopez-Levy argue that intraparty reforms will only be sufficient in the short-term; in the long-
term, these authors argue, multiple parties will emerge in Cuba, though not necessarily 
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engendering the disappearance of the Communist Party from the political scene (Abrahams and 
Lopez-Levy, 2011: 103).  
 Regarding the potential for multiparty democracy in Cuba, Abrahams and Lopez-Levy 
argue that there are four main impediments to reforms (2011: 104-5). First, historically, Cuba did 
not have a favorable experience with democracy between 1902 and 1952. Regarding Cuba’s 
fraught experience with democracy, Marc Frank gives a basic overview of what the island 
endured during its approximately fifty years of “democracy”: a 1901 electoral law that extended 
suffrage only to a few hundred thousand literate, land-holding, or war veteran males; the Platt 
Amendment of 1901, which, although not a facet of Cuban democracy, was a concomitant of its 
introduction, and thus may have negatively affected Cubans’ perception of democracy, since 
Cuban policy was often directed, in all actuality, by US interests; electoral fraud and graft, 
accompanied by the United States’ reoccupation of the island from 1906-9; Cuban governments 
that focused on Havana, neglecting the countryside, relinquishing its control to large landholders 
(often from the United States); the brutal and vindictive rule of General Gerardo Machado, who, 
after his election in 1925, proceeded to orchestrate death squads to suppress his political rivals, 
often implementing such drastic measures as castration, while the United States feigned 
ignorance; the twenty-four-hour presidency of Carlos Manuel de Cespedes in 1933, followed by 
the Grau San Martin presidency, which only lasted until January of 1934, at which time he was 
replaced by Carlos Hevia, who was then pushed out of office after only a few days; and the 
seizure of the presidency in 1952 by Fulgencio Batista, who faced near-certain defeat in his licit 
bid for the presidency (Frank, 2013: 10-12).  
Second, Abrahams and Lopez-Levy explain that, because sovereignty is a prerequisite for 
true democracy on the island, Cuba’s potential for true democracy is constrained by the United 
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States’ attempts to impinge on Cuba’s sovereignty, both politically and economically. Third, 
high levels of political indoctrination against multiparty democracy act as an impediment to 
multiparty democracy. Lastly, nationalism plays a significant role in Cuban political culture, and 
many Cubans prefer a political system that paternalistically manages differences between 
Cubans, so as to avoid divisions that may vitiate nationalist fervor (Abrahams and Lopez-Levy, 
2011: 104-5).  
 As to Cuba’s political future, vis-à-vis democracy, Perez-Stable (2007) analyzes the 
likelihood of three different scenarios: party consolidation, democracy, or a hybrid regime. She 
predicts that party consolidation, similar to what has occurred in China and Venezuela, is 
unlikely to occur in Cuba, since “the Cuban Communist Party has been so dependent on [Fidel 
Castro] for direction and so incapable of taming him…that its fate as a governing party without 
him is in question” (Perez-Stable, 2007: 41). However, she does recognize that party 
consolidation may eventuate if elites are able to reach a consensus on economic reforms, and if 
those reforms can achieve positive effects quickly enough to gain legitimacy in the eyes of the 
Cuban populace (Perez-Stable, 2007: 41). Importantly, the Communist Party in Cuba will gain 
legitimacy in such a scenario by claiming that market reforms are a necessary step for the 
improvement of living standards, similar to the strategy that has been implemented by the 
Communist Party in China (Perez-Stable, 2007: 41).  
Regarding the likelihood of full-fledged democracy in Cuba, Perez-Stable sees such a 
prospect as being unlikely. However, the author does recognize that if Castro’s successors are 
unable to “stabilize a new order,” then they may be forced to engage in a democratic opening, 
out of self-interest, to avoid external intervention (Perez-Stable, 2007: 42). In such a scenario, 
the National Assembly would emerge as a less impotent, and more legitimate, national 
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legislature.  However, in such a situation in which elites adopt a democratic inclination, Perez-
Stable argues that it will still be incredibly difficult to foster democracy at the civic level, since a 
long history of political culture in Cuba has engendered patrimonialism and clientelism on the 
island, as well as a passive/docile demeanor amongst Cuban citizens (Perez-Stable, 2007: 44).   
Because of the above difficulties regarding the consolidation of democracy on the island, 
Perez-Stable sees the likelihood of a hybrid regime as having the most potential in Cuba: “As 
Cuba moves away from authoritarianism, it would more likely emerge as a hybrid regime than 
one more or less clearly tracked toward full democratization” (Perez-Stable, 2007: 20). 
Importantly, Perez-Stable argues that support for sovereignty and social justice amongst the 
Cuban elites may engender successful populist movements, and that as a result, “Building checks 
and balances to consolidate democracy would then be an uphill battle, and hybridity may settle 
over Cuban politics” (Perez-Stable, 2007: 44).  
The Cuban Economy 
 Many scholars and commentators have provided analyses on the state of the Cuban 
economy, since Cuba’s economy has been in a state of significant flux for the last ten years. For 
instance, writing as far back as 2004, Dominguez stated, “Today the dynamic sectors in Cuba’s 
economy operate increasingly on market principles, even if the state enterprise sector still 
employs the largest number of people” (Dominguez et al., (ed.) 2004: 1).  
Perhaps one of the reasons so much attention has been paid to the Cuban economy is its 
sheer resilience since the Special Period began after the fall of the Soviet Union. Perez 
Villanueva notes that, despite experiencing a recession in which gross domestic product (GDP) 
fell by 35% between 1989 and 1993, Cuba was able to rebound by 1994. The island did so 
through “a series of economy policy measures aimed at reactivating economic growth…[such as] 
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the reforming of state enterprises, the opening of the economy externally and decentralizing 
functions” (Dominguez et al., 2004: 49).  
 Addressing the issue of what Cuba’s comparative advantage is, or could be, multiple 
analysts argue that Cuba must take advantage of the investment that it has made in human capital 
for the past several decades (Dominguez et al., 2004: 1). In other words, Cuba, rather than 
relying on tourism and raw materials, must substitute knowledge-intensive, service sector 
exports, and should “harvest a half century of investment in human capital to emphasize high 
value-added economic activities in an open economy” (Dominguez et al., 2004: 1).  
 As to what models Cuba may be able to implement as it develops, Dominguez, among 
other analysts, argues that the island would do well to learn lessons from China and Vietnam, as 
these two countries were able to marketize their economies while still maintaining a strategic 
role for the state during their development (Dominguez et al., (ed.) 2012: 7). Particularly 
appealing to Cuban officials should be the fact that both China and Vietnam “maintain a 
‘socialist’ regime, a single party, and a mixed economy, which began from a relatively low level 
of development. Each has achieved favorable results after transforming its economic system” 
(Dominguez et al., 2004: 198). Hence, since Cuban officials have stressed the need to transform, 
rather than abandon, socialism, while gradually opening the Cuban economy, the Chinese and 
Vietnamese models would seem rather felicitous for the island’s development.  
 As to what lessons Cuba can glean from China’s transition experience, William Ratliff 
(2004) argues the following. First, Fidel Castro, drawing from Deng Xiaoping’s tactic, should 
peacefully transfer power to a successor, particularly Raul Castro. Such a tactic would allow for 
the establishment of a precedent, vis-à-vis peaceful power transfers, for future regimes in Cuba. 
Such a power transfer has transpired since Ratliff first made this argument; moreover, the 
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establishment of a precedent of peaceful transition seems to have successfully occurred, as Raul 
Castro recently stated that he will abide by his term limit and leave office in 2018 (CNN, 02-26-
13).  
Second, Ratliff argues that even if Fidel does not fully relinquish control, he should allow 
for the consolidation of (relatively) pro-market sentiment amongst the Cuban military and the 
Communist Party. If such a tactic is followed, then, similar to the Chinese experience, market 
reforms can be introduced with socialist modifications. Hence, market reforms can be spun in a 
“realist” manner, and Ratliff believes that “if the [Cuban] people believe…that their lives will on 
balance improve as a result, the vast majority may well be disposed to giving the new leadership 
a chance” (2004: 25). Thus, Ratliff is arguing that pragmatic market reforms, if properly sold to 
the Cuban people, can be a means through which the next generation of Cuban leaders can 
acquire legitimacy in the eyes of the populace. This second lesson seems to have been learned by 
the Cuban government, and is already being implemented, as market reforms are well underway.  
 Lastly, Ratliff argues that Cuba can implement China’s lesson regarding reconciling with 
ex-pats, so as to attract investment from them. Ratliff does note, however, that such investments 
will not be as important for Cuba as they were for China, and that the difficulties of obtaining 
such investment may be more difficult than was the case for China (Ratliff, 2004: 36).  
 Importantly, Ratliff notes that many officials in the Cuban government, most prominently 
Fidel Castro, have been opposed to “learning” from China. Indeed, such opposition dates back to 
the early days of the Cuban Revolution, as Fidel Castro chose to build a narrow, rather than a 
broad, political base, the latter being the path which was implemented by the United Front in 
China (Ratliff, 2004: 12). Then, during the 1990s, Fidel Castro continued to voice his opposition 
to Chinese policies, this time regarding China’s market reforms. Particularly, Fidel (and other 
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Cuban communists) was opposed to the dismantling of China’s social security system as state-
owned enterprises were rationalized (Ratliff, 2004: 13). Fidel saw such rationalization as “a 
blatant sacrifice of equality to efficiency” (Ratliff, 2004: 15). It is important to note that Raul 
Castro has a track record of finding more appeal in China’s political and economic strategies. For 
instance, Ratliff notes that,  
When Raul Castro went to China [in 1997] he spent long hours talking to Zhu [Rongji] (the key 
architect of many of China’s economic reforms) and his principal adviser, something that was not 
reflected in the Cuban media. Raul Castro invited this key adviser to visit Cuba, where he lectured 
hundreds of Cuban executives and leaders, causing a tremendous impact. Among the points that 
most interested the Cuban audience were ideas on economic reforms and the critically important 
involvement of the overseas Chinese community (2004: 13-4).  
 
Because Fidel Castro’s opposition has historically stood as an impediment to Cuba’s adoption of 
Chinese style market reforms, and because Raul Castro seems much more willing (maybe even 
eager) to adopt aspects of Chinese reforms, it would seem that the next five years, during which 
Raul will hold the presidency, will give an indication as to what path the island will take in the 
near future.  
Some analysts are more skeptical regarding the China Model. Barry Naughton (2010), for 
instance, argues that phrases such as the “China Model” and the “Beijing Consensus” are 
vacuous, and upon dissection lose their meaning. For instance, Naughton, similar to Kennedy 
(2010) argues that there is far from a “consensus” regarding China’s model of development, and 
that the very phrase “Beijing Consensus” is an oxymoron (Naughton, 2010). Moreover, 
Naughton argues, 
In order to achieve the level of a paradoxical truth – as opposed to a simple logical contradiction – 
its proponents [of the Beijing Consensus) would need to demonstrate (a) why the distinctive 
approaches of Chinese policy-makers were the key to China’s remarkable rapid growth; and (b) 
why those distinctive approaches are also applicable to other, dramatically different, contexts. So 
far, nobody has come anywhere close to demonstrating either one of those propositions (2010: 
437). 
 
In addition, Naughton argues that there were three unique conditions in China that must 
be taken into account when attempting to draw comparisons with other countries’ economies. 
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First, China’s size meant that it had a very large internal market that could attract foreign 
investment (Naughton, 2010: 438-9). Second, although China was pursuing a capital-intensive 
socialist development strategy, “it had already been investing in human resources, and its 
relatively healthy and well-trained labor force increased its comparative advantage in labor-
intensive activities…When China finally shifted to a labor-intensive development strategy, the 
results were explosive” (Naughton, 2010: 439). Third, Naughton notes that while China was 
transitioning, it “rebuilt a hierarchical authoritarian political system which it actively deployed in 
the new market economy” (Naughton, 2010: 439). It should be noted that while the first 
condition in China could be an impediment to Cuba’s adoption of the “China Model,” the second 
and third conditions are very similar to current Cuban conditions, insofar as Cuba has a great 
wealth of human capital and has a very strong, hierarchically oriented, authoritarian political 
structure. 
Despite the three conditions listed above, Naughton still argues that other countries can 
learn a few lessons from the Chinese experience. First, China has taught us that public ownership 
may be preferable to regulation of a private sector, particularly for countries that have little 
experience regulating a private sector (Naughton, 2010: 442-3). Second, Naughton argues that 
competition, rather than public vs. private ownership, is what matters for developing economies. 
He notes that China’s size afforded it an advantage in this respect, as “China’s regional markets 
are generally open to product competition from numerous other locales” (Naughton, 2010: 445). 
Naughton argues that a third lesson that can be gleaned from China’s experience is that public 
ownership can be exploited to generate revenues for investment and public goods’ creation 
(Naughton, 2010: 446).  
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Fourth, Naughton argues that China has taught us that investment-led growth is essential. 
He argues that the area of China’s development strategy that has diverged most from 
conventional economic wisdom is its investment tactics, insofar as China often invested (and 
continues to invest) far ahead of demand. China has encouraged high levels of investment by 
allowing state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to retain after-tax profits (100% of after-tax profits until 
2007 and 95% since 2008). By allowing SOEs to retain after-tax profits, and discouraging non-
investment uses of profits (using profits for oversized bonuses or managerial compensation can 
get state firms in trouble), China has ensured that its SOEs maintain a high level of investment, 
thus avoiding bottlenecks as the Chinese economy grows (as is a problem in India, which has not 
historically invested ahead of demand) (Naughton, 2010: 448-9). Cuba is now in the process of 
implementing a similar system, under which many SOEs will be allowed to retain fifty percent of 
profits for investment and increased wages (Rodriguez, 07/09/13).  
Naughton’s fifth lesson from China is that the dividing line between public and private 
benefits need not be so distinguished, and that the state can actively champion private entities 
(Naughton, 2010: 451). Lastly, Naughton argues that many developing states can learn from the 
Chinese experiencing of tying compensation of public enterprise managers to asset-value growth 
(Naughton, 2010: 453). 
Analysts also argue that there is much Cuba can implement from the Chinese model, vis-
à-vis how to attract foreign direct investment (FDI). For instance, Perez Villanueva notes that 
prior to 1979 when Deng Xiaoping decided to open the Chinese economy, there was virtually no 
FDI to speak of in China (Dominguez et al., 2012: 198). However, after implementing an FDI-
attraction strategy that includes allowances for equity joint ventures, cooperative businesses, 
wholly foreign-owned companies, and joint exploration contracts, among other forms of FDI, 
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China, in 2008, received the most FDI of any developing country ($108 billion) (Dominguez et 
al., 2012: 195, 198). Hence, China has been able to enjoy the benefits of such large amounts of 
FDI, which include “technology transfer, economic and job growth, and acceleration of both 
economic development and integration into world markets” (Dominguez et al., 2012: 193), all of 
which Cuba is currently pursuing.  
It should be noted that Cuba has, since the early 1990s, maintained policies to attract FDI 
(this will be addressed below). However, Cuba should, in an expanded effort to further attract 
FDI, take some lessons from China. Cuban officials should note two key facets of China’s Joint 
Venture Law (the legislation that allowed for FDI into China – see Dominguez et al., 2012: 198). 
First, policies for attraction of FDI were adopted in a gradual, experimental fashion, both in 
terms of kinds of investment allowed, and in terms of geographic regions that allowed for FDI 
(Dominguez et al., 2012: 198; Naughton 2007). Second, China adopted policies to attract FDI in 
a purely pragmatic fashion, regardless of “whether or not these policies were consistent with 
Communist ideology” (Dominguez et al., 2012: 206). Hence, an important question in Cuba will 
be how such policies can be made to comport with Cuban socialism, particularly since, “as a 
historical fact, in the socialist economies that have existed up until now, foreign investments 
were long identified as bearers of bourgeois penetration during the imperialist phase of the 
capitalist system. For years this was the reigning view of the presence of foreign capital within 
such economies” (Dominguez et al., 2012: 193). This should not act as too much of an 
impediment in Cuba, as the island has already created a significant foreign-invested sector, 
particularly in tourism. However, the major question is whether Cuba can open the rest of its 
domestic economy to FDI, and whether it can do so in a manner that does not infringe to too 
large of an extent on the ideals of Cuban socialism.  
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As to the role that FDI has historically played in Cuba, Perez Villanueva notes that “In 
the early 1990s, Cuba faced a serious economic crisis that gave rise to a reform period 
characterized as a process of adjustment, management of the crisis, and opening to the 
international economy,” and that “the most important aspects of the economic opening to the 
outside world were the promotion and acceptance of foreign capital investment, the restructuring 
of foreign trade, and the accelerated development of international tourism” (in Dominguez et al., 
2012: 213-4). To attract FDI during that time, Cuba enacted Law 77 of 1995 and Resolution 
5290, the goals of which were to complement domestic efforts to develop, technologically and 
economically, in strategic sectors; find new export markets, technologies, and financing; 
substitute imports, stimulate exports, and stimulate domestic production (Villanueva in 
Dominguez et al., 2012: 214).  
The incentives that Cuba introduced in 1995 to attract FDI remain in effect, and have 
been supplemented. Such incentives include: tax-free repatriation of dividends; taxes capped at 
30% on profits and 25% on payroll; and other incentives that depend on the individual investor 
and the sector in which an investment occurs (Villanueva in Dominguez et al., 2012: 215).  
Perez Villanueva stresses that the amount of FDI that Cuba has been able to attract has 
been limited by the US embargo on the island nation: “As a result of the U.S. embargo, Cuba is 
subject to the impediments posed by a foreign law that restricts its access to FDI resources. 
Consequently, Cuba is rated a ‘risk country’” (Villanueva in Dominguez et al., 2012: 218). 
Moreover, this author notes that the incentives Cuba offers foreign capital could be expanded if 
the U.S. embargo were loosened, but that because of the embargo, “many foreign businesses 
have left Cuba after merging with companies based in the United States” (Villanueva in 
Dominguez et al., 2012: 215).  
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Despite the embargo, Cuba’s foreign investment laws have allowed foreign capital to 
play an important, and successful, role in the Cuban economy in the last two decades. As Perez 
Villanueva explains, joint ventures, while declining in number over the last decade, have 
continued to increase in efficiency and productivity, increasing their total sales of goods and 
services. As of 2008, such ventures reached nearly $5.3 billion in total sales, their exports 
reached $1.9 billion, and direct income to Cuba from such ventures totaled $1.07 billion. Hence, 
this author states, “In almost all the productive areas in which Cuba has shown its best 
production or export results, foreign capital is present in one form or another. This should point 
toward the potential for further developing such businesses” (Villanueva in Dominguez et al., 
2012: 218-9). Some of the sectors in which Cuba has actively attracted FDI include tourism, 
mining and petroleum, geological surveys, infrastructure, agriculture, packaging, and renewable 
energy (Villanueva in Dominguez et al., 2012: 219-220).  
Notwithstanding the benefits that have accrued to Cuba as a result of FDI, Perez 
Villanueva argues more that more substantial levels of FDI will not occur without an active 
effort on the part of the Cuban government to 1) increase domestic investment, and 2) stimulate 
domestic economic growth. In other words, FDI growth must be achieved as a result of, and as a 
part of a more general, strategy of economic reform (Villanueva in Dominguez et al., 2012: 224).  
Dollarization and the Cuban Economy 
 Analyses of the Cuban economy often include analyses of Cuba’s social policy, as, 
historically, Cuban authorities have attempted to ensure that economic reforms are reconcilable 
with the island’s goals of equality.  
Prieto argues that the story of the Cuban economy is one of Cuba’s attempts to meet 
crises with economic reforms, and that these reforms often have a deleterious effect, vis-à-vis the 
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island’s desired social goals (Dominguez et al., 2004: 209-243). Particularly, she argues that 
Cuba’s response to the collapse of the Soviet Union “produced social vulnerability and poverty” 
(in Dominguez et al., 2004: 217). Prieto explains that one of the most, if not the most, impressive 
achievement of the Cuban Revolution was the reduction in inequality that was achieved in a 
relatively short period of time: in 1953, the top 10 percent of Cubans received 38 percent of total 
income, while the bottom 20 percent received 2.1 percent; by 1978, the top 20 percent of Cubans 
received 27 percent of total income, while the bottom 20 percent received 11 percent (Prieto in 
Dominguez et al., 2004: 218). This reduction in poverty was achieved through the state’s 
takeover of the economy: in 1953, government workers composed 8.8 percent of the total 
workforce; this figure rose to 86 percent in 1970 (Prieto in Dominguez et al., 2004: 218). One of 
the most tangible manifestations of Cuba’s dedication to income equality came with the 1983 
General Salary Reform, under which the Cuban government established 13 different pay scale 
groups, which could not exhibit a difference in salary ratio greater than 4.5 to 1 (Prieto in 
Dominguez et al., 2004: 219). As a corollary of Cuba’s revolutionary social policy, the island’s 
Gini coefficient in 1984 stood at .24 (Prieto in Dominguez et al., 2004: 219). 
In contrast, by 2002, Cuba’s Gini coefficient had reached .38, largely as a result of 
Special Period policies, argues Prieto (in Dominguez et al., 2004: 221). Moreover, the proportion 
of the Cuban population “at risk” (very poor) increased from 6.3 percent in 1985 to 14.7 percent 
in 1995 (in Dominguez et al., 2004: 223).  
Many analysts point to the dollarization of the Cuban economy as one of the largest 
contributors to Cuba’s burgeoning inequality during the Special Period. Essentially, one’s wealth 
on the island is, in large part, determined by one’s access to foreign exchange: “In contemporary 
Cuban society the main source of inequality is determined by those having a source of income in 
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foreign exchange. That reflects the appreciated exchange rate ($1US: $26Cuban) in effect along 
with the fact that meeting some essential household needs requires foreign exchange” (Prieto in 
Dominguez et al., 2004: 223). Togores and Garcia concur with this argument when they state,  
Access or the lack of access to hard currency guarantees or limits consumption of a certain number 
of products. Moreover…some of these products available only in U.S. dollars are essential goods, 
which are no longer available in sufficient supply through the rationed market. As a result, these 
measures have created differences across social strata which were previously nonexistent (in 
Dominguez et al., 2004: 286). 
 
Interestingly, there is some ambivalence amongst analysts about the effects of dollarization on 
the Cuban economy, since dollarization has had both positive and negative impacts, 
socioeconomically. For instance, Perez-Lopez argues that dollarization was the most successful 
achievement of the Cuban economy during the 1990s, as it allowed the island to obtain much-
needed hard currency. However, the same author simultaneously recognizes the deleterious 
effects dollarization has had on the Cuban economy, vis-à-vis inequality, as those with access to 
US dollars have flourished, while others have struggled (Perez-Lopez in Perez-Stable, 2007: 
178). Togores and Garcia also recognize the complicated effects of dollarization. As stated above, 
these two authors recognize the effects of dollarization, vis-à-vis increased inequality on the 
island, but they also recognize the positive effects that dollarization has had on the Cuban 
economy: 
The opening of the domestic market in U.S. dollars has had multiple positive effects. Net income 
guaranteed by US dollar sales is basically allocated to finance the very consumption of households 
that rationed goods target.8 Thus, this source of stable financing has enabled the restitution of 
supply for some goods and improvement in their distribution. This market has also served as 
platform for reviving Cuba’s manufacturing sector via import substitution and prevented the 
subsequent job loss in the manufacturing sector. Access to this market makes it possible to 
improve the quality of the consumer goods basket and exposure with the most modern trends in 
these categories. The existence of this market and the incentives in U.S. dollars introduced through 
stimulus packages in some prioritized activities has triggered improved job performance and 
greater productivity (in Dominguez et al., 2004: 288). 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  This	  is	  because	  dollar	  must	  be	  spent	  in	  state-­‐sanctioned	  dollar	  stores.	  Sales	  in	  these	  stores	  are	  then	  diverted	  to	  funding	  
rationing	  shortfalls	  for	  those	  without	  access	  to	  dollars.	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As to sources of foreign exchange, Prieto notes that the sources, in order of importance, 
for obtaining foreign exchange, are “remittances, employment in work with special advantages 
such as tourist-connected dining and sales in the black market” (in Dominguez et al., 2004: 224).  
Post-Fidel Predictions and Analyses 
Multiple authors have attempted predictions at Post-Fidel Cuba, while others have simply 
offered analyses of what are likely to be the most salient impediments facing future regimes. In 
the vein of the latter, Edward Gonzales and Kevin F. McCarthy, in Cuba After Castro: Legacies, 
Challenges, and Impediments (2004), analyze the structural and institutional distortions that 
emerged in Cuba as a result of Soviet aid and central planning. Moreover, they analyze how 
these distortions will pose problems for future, post-Fidel regimes. Gonzales and McCarthy 
argue that the Cuban government has a history of subordinating economic pragmatism to 
socialist ideology and power politics: “the regime remains unwilling to allow economic 
objectives to interfere with its ideological predispositions and power imperatives” (Gonzales and 
McCarthy, 2004: 107).9  It is important to note that the authors were basing this conclusion on 
the recent reversal of Special Period liberalizations that had been promulgated during the 1990s 
(Gonzales and McCarthy, 2004). Hence, they may have arrived at a different conclusion had they 
been writing as of 2013, given the significant liberalization that the Cuban economy has 
experienced. However, they may also argue that current reforms are temporary expedients, and 
that such reforms will be rolled back as soon as is economically possible.  
As to specific institutional and structural distortions that will pose problems for future 
regimes in Cuba, Gonzales and McCarthy identify a few main problems that must be addressed: 
low productivity in the labor force; an undersized private sector; corruption; absence of the rule 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that,	  temporary	  or	  not,	  economic	  liberalization	  measures	  are	  proof	  that	  the	  Cuban	  government	  has	  
not	  always	  placed	  socialist	  ideology	  above	  economic	  pragmatism.	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of law; the need to make the island’s economy more competitive in world markets; and a rapidly 
aging population (and shrinking work force) (Gonzales and McCarthy, 2004: 109-113). First, 
because of the Cuban government’s policy of promoting full-employment, even at the expense of 
underemployment, and the practice of basing work compensation on a national pay schedule, 
low productivity has been a chronic problem on the island, due to lack of incentives for labor 
(Gonzales and McCarthy, 2004: 110-111). Hence, the island faces the paradox of high education 
but low productivity amongst its work force (Gonzales and McCarthy, 2004: 111). These authors 
argue that this is one of the most salient issues regarding reform on the island, since increasing 
worker productivity (particularly to compensate for the shrinking work force) will require the 
introduction of more significant compensation incentives, which will inevitably increase income 
inequality (Gonzales and McCarthy, 2004: 110).  
Second, the island faces the problem of an undersized private sector. The authors argue 
that the first structural problem (low productivity) can actually be addressed by taking steps to 
expand the private sector, since higher pay could be introduced in the private sector, thus 
providing the incentives needed to spur productivity (Gonzales and McCarthy, 2004: 111-112). 
The authors explain, however, that the Cuban government, despite introducing measures to 
legalize self-employment, has simultaneously done everything possible to discourage any 
significant growth in the private sector (Gonzales and McCarthy, 2004: 112). This seems to be 
changing currently, as the Cuban government has progressively taken steps to allow self-
employment. However, the authors, writing in 2004, would still be correct if writing today that, 
“the Cuban government has actively discouraged the development of a wholesale market” 
(Gonzales and McCarthy, 2004: 112). Indeed, the introduction of an actual wholesale market is 
one of the most pressing needs currently facing Cuban entrepreneurs.  
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Third, regarding corruption, Gonzales and McCarthy argue that the combination of 
Cuba’s centrally planned economy, along with Special Period policies, has engendered the 
growth of a significant black market (Gonzales and McCarthy, 2004: 112-113). Transactions in 
the black market have become necessary for both Cuban citizens and government employees. 
Hence the authors come to the fourth shortcoming in Cuba: the absence of the rule of law. As 
illegal dealings have become more and more necessary, and thus more common, in the last two 
decades, the development of institutions to ensure the rule of law has become increasingly 
difficult and unlikely (Gonzales and McCarthy, 2004: 113).  
Fifth, future regimes in Cuba will have to address the task of making the island’s 
economy more competitive in world markets (Gonzales and McCarthy, 2004: 113). Gonzales 
and McCarthy argue that Fidel Castro’s decision to tie the fortunes of the Cuban economy to 
those of the Soviet Union, through favorable terms of trade for Cuban sugar, led to 
overdependence on sugar production on the island. Moreover, the Cuban industrial sector 
became far too dependent on imports of inferior Soviet industrial inputs (Gonzales and 
McCarthy, 2004: 113). Importantly, although beginning in the 1990s the Cuban government 
sought to diversity its sources of hard currency through exports in the tourist, nickel, and tobacco 
industries, it has refused to rationalize its sugar industry. In other words, although the Cuban 
government has shuttered sugar mills, it has refused to lay off the workers that were employed in 
those mills – hence, the creative destruction that is needed in the island’s economy has been 
avoided/postponed (Gonzales and McCarthy, 2004: 113-4). It should be kept in mind, however, 
that these authors were writing in 2004. Since then, the Cuban government has introduced 
significant steps toward rationalization, including the laying off of at least 500,000 state 
employees in inefficient enterprises (Azel, 2010). Justifying these layoffs, Cuban authorities 
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stated, "Our	  state	  cannot	  and	  should	  not	  continue	  supporting...	  state	  entities	  with	  inflated	  
payrolls,	  losses	  that	  damage	  the	  economy,	  are	  counterproductive,	  generate	  bad	  habits,	  and	  
deform	  the	  workers'	  conduct”	  (Azel, 2010: 109). 
Finally, Cuba faces the structural problem of a rapidly aging population, along with the 
decrease in the size of its workforce (Azel, 2010: 109-110). Gonzales and McCarthy estimate 
that the graying of Cuba’s population will cause a fifty percent increase in pension expenditures 
in the near future (Azel, 2010: 109). Because the pension system in Cuba has been such an 
integral facet of the Revolution, it will be politically difficult (to say the least) to introduce 
necessary reforms, such as raising the retirement age, reducing pension amounts, or forcing 
future retirees to pay into the pension system (Azel, 2010: 109). Moreover, decreasing other 
social expenditures will be difficult because, in the simplest of terms, Cuba does not have 
adequate resources in the first place. For instance, if expenditures were to be taken away from 
education spending and diverted to pension spending, the necessary increase in pension spending 
would undoubtedly exceed resources available in the educational realm (Azel, 2010: 110). 
Moreover, because Cuba has a shrinking workforce, it will need to rely on highly productive, 
efficient workers, rather than a large amount of workers. Hence, the island cannot and should not 
divert resources from educational spending to help fund pensions (Azel, 2010: 110).  
Brian Latell (2005) offers a rather skeptical prediction regarding Cuba’s post-Fidel future. 
Latell argues that the most likely post-Fidel regime will be a “praetorian regime,” dominated by 
Raul and his generals (Latell, 2005: 241). He contends that the military, owing to its substantial 
personnel and economic resources, is the “most powerful, competent, and influential institution 
in Cuba. It is also the richest” (Latell, 2005: 242). Because of the military’s control of tourist – 
and other – enterprises, this institution has access to hard currency that other institutions lack. 
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Hence, Latell asserts, “Civilian elites, individually or in any conceivable alliances, will be unable 
to challenge the military as long as it remains united” (Latell, 2005: 241).  
Latell believes that Raul Castro is the “practical brother,” and as such, will move towards 
reconciliation with the United States on a number of matters (Latell, 2005: 246). Latell notes that 
Raul, who was actually viewed by many as being the more doctrinaire brother in the early days 
of the Revolution, adopted a much more practical stance after the fall of the Soviet Union (Latell, 
2005: 247). Importantly, Latell notes that Raul has already shown an alacrity to cooperate with 
the United States on some issues, particularly the issue of Al Qaeda detainees at Guantanamo: 
“Raul told reporters that if Al Qaeda detainees were to escape into Cuban territory, he would be 
sure they were returned to Guantanamo” (Latell, 2005). There are a couple main, ultimate goals 
that Latell believes Raul is seeking through potential cooperation with the United States. First, 
Raul is seeking for an end to the embargo that has plagued the Cuban economy, particularly the 
facets of Helms-Burton that further tightened the embargo (Latell, 2005). Second, Latell argues 
that Raul has an affinity for the China Model of political and economic management; hence, he 
believes that Raul is seeking the United States’ acceptance of a China-style political and 
economic model on the island (Latell, 2005).  
As to the difficulties that Raul and the members of his regime will face, Latell argues that 
once Fidel has passed, the Cuban government will have to deal with a revival of Cuban civil 
society (Latell, 2005: 248-9). Some of the demands that are being proffered by Cubans include 
the freedom to travel, and the freedom to own property and businesses (Latell, 2005: 248). Latell 
argues that the post-Fidel regime’s ability to maintain political stability on the island will depend 
on how well it is able to address these demands without introducing reforms too rapidly – which 
would pose risks to the island’s stability (Latell, 2005: 248-9). Interestingly, many of these 
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demands are already being addressed by Raul’s regime, as it has liberalized travel, property, and 
business policies on the island.  
Anna Louise Bardach (2009) concurs with Latell’s (2005) assertion that Raul Castro is 
the more “practical” of the Castro brothers, and that his pragmatism was engendered by the fall 
of the USSR: “Raul’s evolution to Marxist-Leninist to wary pragmatist owed its origins to the 
collapse of Soviet communism” (Bardach, 2009: 257). However, Bardach cautions against 
misinterpreting Raul’s pragmatism for any kind of wholesale endorsement of unalloyed 
capitalism. Because the global financial crisis occurred two years into Raul’s tenure, Bardach 
notes that Raul will be rather wary of capitalist reforms on the island, and thus will implement 
them in a tentative fashion (Bardach, 2009: 257).  
Regardless of his qualms with capitalism, Bardach explains that Raul has already 
implemented significant marketization measures, and that he has evinced a significant skepticism 
of traditional socialism: in 2007, he issued a two-hundred page decree to the effect that many of 
Cuba’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were to be rationalized, and run according to the 
management style of private sector enterprises. The goal of such measures was to attack 
inefficiencies in Cuba’s SOEs. Importantly, these reforms introduced merit and achievement into 
calculation of pay. Bardach notes that “Conceptually, at least, it was revolutionary – a system 
Fidel Castro would once have castigated as counter-revolutionary” (Bardach, 2009: 260). 
Justifying these reforms, and even going so far as to deprecate socialism when decrying the sad 
state of the Cuban economy, Raul stated, “We cannot hope that two plus two are five. Two plus 
two are four,’ he said, setting up his punch line. ‘Sometimes, actually, in socialism, two plus two 
comes out to three’” (Bardach, 2009: 260).  
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Bardach overviews some of the reforms that have already been promulgated under Raul. 
For instance, recent reforms have liberalized home ownership for the first time since the 
Revolution (Bardach, 2009: 267). Also, caps on salaries have been removed, so as to provide 
incentives for increased productivity amongst Cuban workers (Bardach, 2009: 267). Moreover, 
“individual farmers are now permitted to cultivate up to ninety-nine acres of government land 
and keep their profits” (Bardach, 2009: 268). Raul has also removed the ban on Cuban citizens’ 
access to hotels and tourist facilities, long one of the island’s “thorniest issues” (Bardach, 2009: 
268). Bardach takes all of these reforms into account when predicting that significant reforms are 
likely to occur under Raul. However, she cautions that such reforms will have to occur “under 
the radar” until Fidel leaves the picture (Bardach, 2009: 270).  
Bardach agrees with Latell (2005) that the army will continue to play a significant role in 
the Cuban political economy. She argues that Raul’s regime will be one of institutions, rather 
than personality (as was the case under Fidel) (Bardach, 2009: 270), and that the army will be the 
most important institution in the regime: “Of these institutions, Raul’s Army, the FAR, will 
remain the central organ of the government and the prototype for other businesses. It is now 
Cuba’s über-company” (Bardach, 2009: 273). Although this literature review will not provide a 
list, Bardach’s work is interesting and unique insofar as she provides a list of important 
individuals to watch for during Raul’s regime (Bardach, 2009: 274-8).  
While not specifically offering predictions for Cuba, Harlan Abrahams and Arturo 
Lopez-Levy (2011) offer one of the most recent, and most thorough, analyses of Raul Castro’s 
regime, and the reforms that have been promulgated during his tenure. Such an analysis gives an 
idea as to what policies will be pursued in the near future.  
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One “prediction” that Abrahams and Lopez-Levy proffer is more of an attempt on their 
part to confute what they call “the single most persistent myth when it comes to Cuba” – the 
notion that Cuban ex-pats will be able to reclaim their land once Fidel is deceased (2011: 154). 
The authors argue that this “fantasy” has – through voting power of Cuban ex-pats in Florida – 
shaped American foreign policy that deleteriously affected not only Cuban elites, but all people 
on the island (Abrahams and Lopez-Levy, 2011: 154). Abrahams and Lopez-Levy argue that 
Cuban ex-pats should abandon such hopes. Because the military in Cuba is highly 
institutionalized, and because opposition forces on the island have no military capability and do 
not control any of Cuba’s national territory, it is essentially impossible that any significant 
change regarding land ownership will transpire with the passing of Fidel (Abrahams and Lopez-
Levy, 2011: 154-5). Hence, these authors agree with Bardach (2009) and Latell (2005) that the 
military in Cuba is highly institutionalized.  
As to the nature of market reforms, and how they comport with Cuban socialist ideology, 
Abrahams and Lopez-Levy argue, “the succession from Fidel to Raul completed a regime change 
from totalitarianism to post-totalitarianism…Since the 1980s significant trends toward social, 
cultural, and even economic pluralism have emerged.” Furthermore, “communist ideology has 
weakened within the limits of the single-party system, driving a shift toward more pragmatic 
decision-making” (Abrahams and Lopez-Levy, 2011: 210). The authors argue that in Cuba’s 
post-totalitarian system, nationalism has replaced communism as the source of legitimacy 
amongst many of Cuba’s moderate elites (Abrahams and Lopez-Levy, 2011: 217). Hence, in 
contemporary Cuba, “legitimacy relies more on performance than on ideology” (Abrahams and 
Lopez-Levy, 2011: 217). This is important, vis-à-vis the island’s potential model for future 
development, because basing legitimacy on economic performance, rather than on socialist 
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ideology, gives Cuban officials more latitude in implementing mixed-market reforms (this is 
very similar to the shift in legitimacy that has occurred in China in recent decades, where 
nationalism similarly replaced communism as the defining aspect of politicians’ and policies’ 
legitimacy).  
Abrahams and Lopez-Levy analyze the potential that Cuba will adopt China-style 
political and economic reforms. The authors concur with Bardach (2009) that the recent financial 
collapse has reinforced the legitimacy of those in Cuba who have been most wary of market 
fundamentalist reforms. Indeed, The authors argue that the crisis has completely refuted the 
legitimacy of market fundamentalism, not just in Cuba, but everywhere (Abrahams and Lopez-
Levy, 2011: 177). However, the authors argue that what has not been completely discredited is 
the idea of capitalism itself, particularly well-regulated capitalism. Hence, market reforms, per se, 
have not fallen out of favor on the island. They believe that Chinese-style market reforms hold 
particular appeal for Cuban officials, since “Adopting the Chinese model would do the least 
violence to [Cuba’s] present ideology,” and “It would keep the one-party system in power during 
a protracted period of economic liberalization” (Abrahams and Lopez-Levy, 2011: 179). 
However, Lopez-Levy believes that there are particular facets of the China Model that will not 
be sufficiently palatable to Cubans. For instance, Cubans are wary of the dismantling of China’s 
health care system that occurred during reforms (Abrahams and Lopez-Levy, 2011: 179). Thus, 
these authors believe that the China Model will be implemented in Cuba, but with significant 
modifications, so as to comport with Cuban ideology and culture (Abrahams and Lopez-Levy, 
2011: 179). 
Redefining Socialism for the Long Run 
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 A major issue Cuba will have to address as it moves forward with reforms is what a 
viable form of socialism should actually look like on the island in the twenty-first century. 
Ostensibly, it may seem that Cuban socialism cannot exist alongside measures of privatization 
and marketization, similar to those that the island is recently undergoing. This is because, 
conventionally, we characterize socialism as being a combination of central planning and state 
ownership of the means of production, while we characterize capitalism as being a combination 
of market mechanisms and private ownership of the means of production. However, these are 
antiquated and misleading definitions. When we implement a more appropriate definition, one 
that focuses on class structure and the production/appropriation of economic surplus, we arrive at 
a definition of socialism that Cuban officials could adopt and apply more felicitously to Cuba’s 
particular situation.  
Richard Wolff (2012) proffers a definition of socialism that is much more readily applicable to 
Cuba’s current conditions than the tradition definition that emphasizes state ownership and 
planning. Wolff’s definition emphasizes the importance of “workers’ self-directed enterprises,” 
or WSDEs. According to this definition, socialism is defined by which social groups produce, 
appropriate, and distribute, the economic surplus within a society. Simply put, according to this 
definition, a capitalist system is one in which there is not synonymy between those who produce, 
and those who appropriate and distribute, the economic surplus within enterprises; a socialist 
system is one in which such synonymy obtains.   
 Rafael Hernandez (2010) is less clear about the specific form that a new socialism would 
take in Cuba, but nonetheless argues that Cubans must adopt a new socialism that is better-suited 
to the current needs of the island’s population, and responds to the population’s demands. 
According to Hernandez, a new socialism could indeed a much larger role for private actors and 
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the market, which would comport with the Cuban population’s desire for the continuation and 
expansion of reforms that extend greater freedoms to Cuban enterprises and individuals 
(Abrahams and Lopez-Levy, 2011: 25). However, Cubans have hitherto been unable to 
formulate a complete economic model to replace the Revolution’s form of socialism, which 
emphasizes the equation of social ownership with state ownership. Regardless of the new form 
that Cuban socialism adopts, Hernandez argues that a comprehensive reformulation of “socialism” 
must take place amongst the current generation of Cubans: 
In summary, there is not one truth about socialism, nor can we take for granted ideas that, with the 
benefits of half a century of experience, are accepted in the present. Only from a multiplicity of 
ideas, and especially of questions, of problems, can the younger generations build that new society. 
Their ability to do so, of course, does not come from a linear logic associated with their youth and 
the possibility of living 50 years, but from the political will to contemplate socialism and to pursue 
it on new terms, different from those of their fathers and grandfathers. This changeover does not 
consist of passing the baton, so to speak, but of a change in batons, of roles for all the runners, and 
of running styles (Hernandez, 2010: 29).  
	  
 To understand current conditions in Cuba, it is necessary to understand how and why the 
island arrived at its current state. For such an understanding, we must briefly overview the 
periods of reform and retrenchment since 1959, which is the topic of our next chapter. 
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Chapter Two:  
Overview of Periods of Reform in Cuba: 1959-2007 
 
Introduction 
 Since 1959, Cuba has undergone alternating periods of pragmatist (market-oriented) 
reforms, followed by periods of retrenchment of those reforms (idealist cycles).10 Market-
oriented reforms have been driven by economic exigencies on the island, as Cuban authorities 
attempt to remedy material shortcomings by implementing policies that move towards 
marketization and privatization. Once these reforms achieve their purpose, vis-à-vis ameliorating 
economic conditions on the island, Cuban authorities halt or scale back these reforms, usually in 
an attempt to steer the island’s policies back into line with traditional Cuban socialism, and to 
curb the economic power that was garnered by nascent capitalists during periods of liberalization. 
Such was the pattern until the dissolution of the Soviet Union, at which point Cuba lost its largest 
trading partner and political ally. Since then, while Cuban authorities have at times chosen to 
halt liberalization measures, they have not had the option to scale back such policies in earnest, 
because international economic conditions have changed. Cuban authorities, due to the 
uncertainty that surrounds Venezuela’s socialist status, and its ability to provide favorable terms 
of trade to Cuba, have been forced to conduct economic policy in a manner that comports with 
pragmatist (market-oriented), rather than idealist (anti-market), cycles on the island. Hence, the 
island entered a holding pattern during the 2000s, in which few reforms or retrenchments 
occurred on the island, until the late 2000s, when international conditions compelled Cuban 
authorities to introduce significant measures of liberalization. This chapter provides an overview 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  Drawn	  from	  Carmelo	  Mesa-­‐Lago’s	  framework	  of	  pragmatist	  and	  idealist	  economic	  cycles	  in	  Cuba	  (see	  Mesa-­‐Lago	  and	  
Perez-­‐Lopez,	  2013,	  for	  instance).	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of economic periods/cycles from 1959 until the late 2000s, while recent reforms on the island are 
analyzed in a separate chapter.11 
1959-1971  
 Font emphasizes that a very unique form of socialism emerged on the island after the 
Revolution of 1959. After affirming its embrace of socialism between 1961-1963, Cuba assessed 
available models of socialism that could be implemented, and eventually decided upon the 
ideological/moral approach to communism, favored by China (rather than the pragmatic 
approach of the USSR) (in Centeno and Font, 1998: 109-10). According to Mesa-Lago, rapid 
collectivization, along with the declaration of the socialist nature of the Cuban Revolution in 
1961, led Cuban authorities to attempt the implementation of a Soviet-style economy, based on 
rapid industrialization and agricultural diversification (in Ritter, 2004: 30). However, conditions 
on the island proved infelicitous for Soviet-style industrialization. In a general sense, Cuba 
experienced difficulties with economic planning because of an exodus of managers, a lack of 
previous planning experience, and a dearth of economic data (which is imperative when 
attempting to allocate resources in a planned economy, whereas the price mechanism would 
allocate resources in a market economy) (in Ritter, 2004: 30). Moreover, Cuba’s economy was 
largely based on sugar production, hence, the above problems related to data and management 
meant authorities’ attempt to diversify Cuban agriculture simply led to a drop in sugar 
production, along with a deficit in the island’s trade balance (in Ritter, 2004: 30).  
 As a result of the failure in Cuba’s attempt at Soviet-style central planning, there was a 
two-year (1964-66) debate between Guevarists, who advocated “an idealist antimarket approach,” 
and the pro-Soviet pragmatists, who favored “a timid market-oriented reform” (in Ritter, 2004: 
31). Particularly, Guevarists advocated “forging a New Man with moral stimulation, voluntary 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  See	  Chapter,	  “Recent	  Reforms.”	  
49	  
	  
labor and mobilization, and further collectivization, egalitarianism, and free social services,” 
while pragmatists, led by Rafael Rodriguez, favored “use of selected market tools with more 
reliance on material incentives, some decentralization in decision making, and a halt in 
collectivization, egalitarianism, and free social services” (in Ritter, 2004: 31).  
Mesa-Lago notes that Fidel Castro remained silent during the debate, but that by 1965 he 
was playing a central role in steering the direction of the economy, since Che Guevara had left 
for South America12, and Rodriguez had resigned as director of the Institute of Agrarian Reform 
(in Ritter, 2004: 31). Starting in 1966, at the behest of Fidel Castro, the Cuban economy took a 
substantial turn towards the Guevarist model, though “in a more idealist manner and distorted 
with [Fidel Castro’s] own additions” (in Ritter, 2004: 31). Some of Fidel’s “additions” included 
the following: abrogation of any tangible budget, strengthened centralization, and exaggerated 
use of moral incentives (in Ritter, 2004: 31). During this period, which lasted from 1966-71, 
Cuba’s development strategy shifted away from import substitution industrialization (ISI), and 
towards sugar exports, as illustrated by the 1970 Sugar Plan, which set a production target of 10 
million tons (in Ritter, 2004: 32). Moreover, during this period the Cuban economy experienced 
its “most dramatic shift away from the market under the revolution” (in Ritter, 2004: 32), as 
illustrated by the 1968 Revolutionary Offensive. Under this initiative, there was a further push 
towards collectivization/abrogation of free peasant markets and family spots in state farms; the 
elimination of 58,000 small businesses; penalization of self-employment; the continued ban on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  It	  is	  believed	  by	  many	  that	  Fidel	  sent	  Che	  to	  Bolivia	  at	  the	  behest	  of	  the	  generals	  in	  the	  Cuban	  military,	  who	  had	  grown	  
increasingly	  intolerant	  of	  Che’s	  aggressive	  and	  opinionated	  stances	  on	  many	  issues.	  Che	  himself	  believed	  that	  he	  had	  been	  
abandoned	  by	  Fidel,	  according	  to	  	  General	  Gary	  Prado	  Salmon,	  the	  Bolivian	  soldier	  who	  captured	  	  Che	  in	  Boliva	  (Kennard,	  
“Fidel	  Abandoned	  Che…”,	  2010).	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foreign investment; expansion of rationing; and labor mobilizations to reach sugar production 
targets, among other facets (in Ritter, 2004: 32).13  
 The adoption of this idealist/Guevarist approach to socialism led Cuba to have “one of 
the most collectivized forms of socialism the world had known,” and an economy that was 
particularly non-market-based (Font in Centeno and Font, 1998: 110). Such collectivization and 
central planning engendered exceptionally large economic units, particularly in the sugar and 
nickel industries, with investments contributing to further collectivization and consolidation of 
state enterprises as the 1960s progressed (Font in Centeno and Font, 1998: 111). Even in 
agriculture, which was “the least collectivized sector, land reforms gave state farms 76 percent of 
all agricultural lands by 1963 – a figure that increased to 83 percent by 1993.” (Font in Centeno 
and Font, 1998: 111). Small-scale, private operators were allowed to continue producing in the 
agricultural sector, but were continually pressured to collectivize or join the state sector. Hence, 
notwithstanding the allowance for small-scale agricultural operations, by 1988 the agricultural 
sector “claimed only 8 percent of all land against 80 percent for state farms and 12 percent for 
cooperatives” (Font in Centeno and Font, 1998: 111).  
 Mesa-Lago notes that this “idealist” cycle is difficult to assess economically because of 
deficiencies in data, but that available information indicates mostly negative outcomes (in Ritter, 
2004: 32). Economic growth in 1970 was either stagnant or negative, as the sugar production 
target fell short of its 10 million ton target by 15%. Moreover, liquidity ballooned in the 
economy, resulting in a significant devaluation of the currency, which prompted worker 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  A	  more	  complete	  list	  of	  initiatives	  during	  1966-­‐70	  includes	  the	  following:	  “a	  further	  push	  in	  collectivization	  with	  the	  
elimination	  of	  free	  peasant	  markets	  and	  family	  plots	  in	  state	  farms,	  the	  nationalization	  of	  fifty-­‐eight	  thousand	  small	  
businesses,	  and	  penalization	  of	  self-­‐employment	  (foreign	  investment	  continued	  to	  be	  banned;	  huge	  labor	  mobilizations	  
and	  voluntary	  work	  to	  help	  in	  the	  sugar	  harvest	  for	  ideological	  reasons;	  expansion	  of	  rationing	  and	  virtual	  elimination	  of	  
scarcity	  prices	  as	  allocating	  tools;	  significant	  emphasis	  in	  egalitarianism,	  such	  as	  reduction	  in	  wage	  differentials,	  gradual	  
substitution	  of	  material	  incentives	  by	  moral	  stimulation,	  and	  further	  expansion	  of	  free	  social	  services;	  and	  more	  
centralized	  decision	  making	  but	  with	  a	  decline	  in	  the	  central	  plan,	  substituted	  by	  sectorial	  plans	  (sugar,	  cattle)	  directly	  
controlled	  by	  Castro	  (the	  state	  budget	  disappeared	  for	  a	  decade)”	  (Carmelo	  Mesa-­‐Lago	  in	  Ritter	  (Ed.)	  2004:	  32).	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absenteeism (reaching approximately 25% of the workforce). The economy also experienced an 
expansion of the trade deficit (in Ritter, 2004: 32). However, income inequality narrowed, and 
open unemployment dropped substantially (though at the cost of underemployment and 
decreased productivity) (in Ritter, 2004: 32).  
 Mesa-Lago, utilizing his idealist/pragmatist cycle framework, actually divides the period 
1959-1970 into two periods: 1959-1966, which was largely an idealist cycle, with some 
pragmatics aspects; and 1966-1970, which he classifies as a “strong idealist cycle” (Mesa-Lago 
and Perez-Lopez, 2013: 2). The important point to keep in mind regarding the period 1959-1970 
is that it was mostly characterized by some of the general facets of idealist cycles: movement 
away from the market, and towards collectivization and centralization. Moreover, there was a 
strong emphasis on moral incentives during this period, as Cuban authorities, along Guevarist 
lines, attempted to forge a “socialist ‘new man’,” that would operate on idealist, rather than 
pragmatist, imperatives (Mesa-Lago and Perez-Lopez, 2013: 8) 
1971-1985 Period of Liberalization  
 Significant changes, largely impelled by the 1970 sugar harvest debacle, were introduced 
in the Cuban economy in the 1970s. Fidel Castro predicted that the Cuban sugar harvest would 
surpass 10 million tons in 1970, and when it fell short of its target by 15% (Mesa-Lago in Ritter, 
2004: 32), the entire Cuban economy experienced a substantial disruption, since significant 
resources had been diverted from other areas of the economy to achieve the 10 million ton 
harvest (Font in Centeno and Font, 1998: 111). Fidel took responsibility for the shortfall, and 
liberalization measures were introduced into the economy, thus initiating a new “pragmatist” 
cycle (Mesa-Lago in Ritter, 2004: 33; Mesa-Lago and Perez-Lopez, 2013).  
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 During this time period (1971-1985), a more pragmatic, market-oriented form of 
socialism was promoted on the island, similar to the model that had been implemented by the 
Soviet Union (Font in Centeno and Font, 1998: 112). Mesa-Lago characterizes this shift as a 
virtual reversal of all previous policies, as the Cuban leadership moved “timidly” towards the 
market (Mesa-Lago in Ritter, 2004: 33; Mesa-Lago and Perez-Lopez, 2013: 8). The state 
continued to gradually reduce state farms and expand state-controlled cooperatives during this 
time, but it also engaged in significant liberalization reforms. For instance, the state reintroduced 
free peasant markets, allowed family plots in state farms, allowed self-employment, allowed 
private farmers to hire workers, allowed private home construction and swaps, and allowed 
foreign investment (though foreign investment was effectively non-existent, due to burdensome 
restrictions) (Mesa-Lago in Ritter, 2004: 33). Moreover, previously advocated initiatives, such as 
egalitarianism, voluntary labor, and moral incentives, were scaled back and denigrated as 
“idealistic errors,” and “wage differentials were defended and material incentives were reinstated 
and expanded” (Mesa-Lago in Ritter, 2004: 33). While the state reinforced the central planning 
apparatus, there were also significant decentralization initiatives during this period, such as 
increased decision-making capabilities at the enterprise level (Mesa-Lago in Ritter, 2004: 33). 
One of the most salient illustrations of liberalization in this period came with the introduction of 
farmers’ markets in 1980. Font notes that the introduction of farmers’ markets was a result of the 
emergence of a “reformist coalition involving agencies in the state system, farmers, and 
consumers” (Font in Centeno and Font 1998: 112).   
 As noted above, these reforms were defended by officials through a denigration of 
previous idealist reforms, defining such idealist measures as “errors” (Mesa-Lago in Ritter, 2004: 
33).  However, Fidel Castro, who was opposed to 1970s liberalization measures (Mesa-Lago in 
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Ritter, 2004: 33), framed these reforms as a “retreat into socialism,” presumably, as Font 
explains, “from the more ‘advanced’ earlier pursuit of communism” (Font in Centeno and Font, 
1998: 111-2). It seems that, recognizing the necessity of liberalization measures during the 1970s, 
Cuban officials found it necessary to frame previous idealist reforms as being ill-suited to current 
exigencies, while Fidel Castro, who was opposed to such reforms, chose to characterize them as 
“socialist” reforms, to effect public solidarity, even though they were clearly marketization 
measures.14 
Regarding outcomes, Mesa-Lago argues that, economically, the reforms of 1971-85 were 
highly successful, with economic growth reaching its highest rates under the Revolution (Mesa-
Lago in Ritter, 2004: 34). During this time, liquidity and inflation were kept under control, the 
government ran fiscal surpluses from 1978-1985, and the island experienced either static or 
declining trade deficits (largely as a result of large Soviet subsidies) (Mesa-Lago in Ritter, 2004: 
34). However, open unemployment also emerged during this period, and Mesa-Lago notes that 
inequality “probably rose” (data deficiencies preclude a definitive conclusion) (Mesa-Lago in 
Ritter, 2004: 34).  
 The are three main points to take away from this period, which Mesa-Lago notes was the 
longest continuous reform cycle since 1959. First, it was initiated as a result of the economic 
failures of the previous idealist cycle. Second, it was mainly composed of policies that moved 
the island away from collectivization and moral incentives, and towards the market and material 
incentives. Finally, there was a significant reconceptualization of socialist ideology on Fidel’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  As	  noted	  previously	  (see	  literature	  review),	  marketization	  measures	  do	  not	  contravene	  socialist	  principles,	  if	  socialism	  
is	  conceptualized	  as	  an	  organization	  of	  class	  structure,	  specifically	  the	  organization	  of	  who	  produces,	  appropriates,	  and	  
distributes	  corporations’,	  and	  the	  larger	  society’s,	  economic	  surplus	  (See	  Wolff	  2012).	  However,	  Cuban	  socialism	  has	  
traditionally	  been	  synonymous	  with	  soviet	  socialism,	  insofar	  as	  it	  there	  has	  been	  a	  disparity	  between	  those	  who	  produce	  
the	  surplus	  (laborers)	  and	  those	  who	  appropriate	  and	  distribute	  the	  surplus	  (the	  state).	  In	  this	  sense,	  marketization	  
measures,	  which	  move	  away	  from	  the	  state’s	  monopoly	  on	  distribution,	  necessitates	  a	  rationalization	  on	  Fidel’s	  part.	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part, as he characterized moral incentives and voluntarism as “idealist errors,” ostensibly to 
garner public support for new pragmatist policies.  
The Period of Rectification: 1986-1990  
 According to Mesa-Lago, “the significant economic recovery in [the pragmatist cycle of 
1971-85] solved the crisis of 1970 and led to a noticeable improvement in living conditions on 
the island, and yet both domestic and external forces conspired against the continuation and 
strengthening of market-oriented policies” (in Ritter, 2004: 34). At the domestic level, economic 
conditions had improved to a level that was sufficient to allow the scaling back of 1971-85 
reforms. This is just one illustration of the tendency on the island to scale back reforms once they 
have achieved their purpose of ameliorating material exigencies. Moreover, Fidel and the “Old 
Guard” had grown increasingly disconcerted by the following: the emergent economic power of 
Cuba’s planning technocracy; rising levels of inequality; the abrogation of specific revolutionary 
institutions, such as voluntary labor; and the emergence of a nascent, wealthy class of “peasants, 
middlemen in the free peasant markets, self-employed, and housing traders” (in Ritter, 2004: 34). 
Castro paved the way for the scaling back of liberalization measures by criticizing these groups 
with accusations of greed and corruption, and by threatening and actually imposing new taxes on 
them (in Ritter, 2004: 34).  
 Regarding external pressures, with Gorbachev’s assumption of power in the USSR in 
1985, along with the launching of Glasnost and Perestroika, “pressure in the USSR began to 
mount on Cuba to reduce the trade deficit and better use Soviet economic aid” (in Ritter, 2004: 
34). Moreover, Reagan and Bush both continued the Embargo on Cuba, “giving an excuse to the 
Cuban leadership to tighten control as a defense against imperialism and capitalism” (in Ritter, 
2004: 35). Arturo Lopez-Levy argues that Perestroika was particularly poignant for Fidel, as he 
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felt a need to “reaffirm his communist ideology,” as a reaction against Soviet market reforms 
(Lopez-Levy and Abrahams, 2011: 85). 
The confluence of internal pressure from Fidel Castro and the Old Guard, combined with 
external pressures from the US and the USSR, led Cuban authorities (read: “Fidel Castro”) to 
launch a new idealistic cycle, “The Rectification of Errors and Negative Tendencies.” The 
purported goal of this campaign/cycle was to find a balance between the “idealist errors of 1966-
70 and the economic mistakes of 1971-85” (in Ritter, 2004: 35). As a practical and a symbolic 
measure, the head of the planning agency during the previous liberalization/pragmatist cycle was 
fired and put on trial, “accused of mechanically copying a model not suitable for Cuba” (in Ritter, 
2004: 35). Although these reforms were supposedly meant to achieve “balance,” Mesa-Lago 
argues that reforms of the Rectification period decidedly resembled the “antimarket” tendencies 
of 1966-70, though without reaching the extremes of that period (in Ritter, 2004: 35).  
 In terms of substance, the idealist reforms of the Rectification period included the 
following (listed in their entirety, from Mesa-Lago): 
The process of elimination of private farms was accelerated, free peasant markets and self-
employment were abolished and their functions expected to be performed by the state, and private 
housing construction and swaps were considerably restricted; voluntary labor was reintroduced 
with the creation of military-style construction brigades and massive use of labor mobilization in 
agriculture; material incentives were sharply reduced and moral incentives reinstated; the 
emphasis on egalitarianism and free social services came back (there was a resurrection of the 
Guevarist ideals); rationing expanded again and the parallel market was eliminated; and 
decentralization measures were halted and decision making retaken by the political leadership but 
with a decline in planning and lack of an integrated model of organization to substitute both the 
central plan and the market. A new development strategy was based on a food program with 
unrealistic targets that optimistically foresaw that in five years the island would be self-sufficient 
in food and generate a surplus for export (in Ritter, 2004: 35). 
 
In 1986, farmers’ markets in Cuba were shut down by the state. At the same time, raids 
on prosperous intermediaries and farmers were conducted (Font in Centeno and Font, 1998: 112). 
Lopez-Levy notes that the campaign of “rectification” was particularly draconian as it was 
applied to agriculture, as “the state went after the private farmers markets, emphasizing 
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voluntarism and support for state farms” (Lopez-Levy and Abrahams, 2011: 85). The termination 
of farmers’ markets was part of a larger shift to “rectification,” which focused on “rectification 
of errors and correction of deviant trends, with respect to the presumably correct and coherent 
socialist strategy or path chosen in the 1960s” (Font in Centeno and Font, 1998: 112). Under the 
project of rectification, the state sought to eliminate, among other things: gains made by 
independent producers; illegal use of state resources; tax evasion; and the reluctance of farmers 
to sell to the state (Font in Centeno and Font, 1998: 112-3). Moreover, there was a renewed 
emphasis on centralization and moral incentives during the rectification period (Centeno and 
Font, 1998: 113). It was also during this period that Cuba stopped servicing its foreign debt, thus 
precluding its access to international credit markets (Mesa-Lago in Ritter, 2004: 34).  
 Font notes that multiple analysts, who approach Cuban questions from a political 
economy perspective, have argued that the Rectification process was a rational response to 
“mounting fiscal problems and the need to control slack resources to address them” (Centeno and 
Font, 1998: 113). Hence, according to this viewpoint, the scaling back of 1971-85 reforms could 
be seen as a necessary response to material exigencies – in this case, fiscal shortfalls, combined 
with anticipation of reduced Soviet aid after Gorbachev assumed power. As a result, the state 
engaged in a period of substantial centralization to regain control over expenditures and revenue. 
To justify such Rectification processes, the state invoked egalitarianism, and an effort to combat 
inequalities that had emerged during the liberalization process (Centeno and Font (ed.) 1998: 
113). This political economy explanation contrasts with another school of thought, which 
stresses the predominance of socialist ideology in driving changes on the island. Drawing a strict 
dichotomy between these two approaches, particularly in Cuba, may be ill advised, though, since 
both arguments seem to have explanatory power. A political economy perspective seems to be 
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applicable to the initiation of policies that are meant to be foster economic “responsibility,” 
while ideological explanations seem to be more applicable to the promulgation of idealist cycles.  
 Regarding outcomes, Mesa-Lago argues that the Rectification period was a disaster: “this 
cycle provoked a recession and virtually all indicators of performance deteriorated” (Ritter, 2004: 
35). Economic growth was negative; liquidity expanded, the state experienced fiscal and trade 
deficits, and open unemployment increased (whereas it had decreased during the last idealist 
cycle of 1966-70) (Ritter, 2004: 35). Moreover, as a result of Rectification policies, the island in 
general experienced “material deprivations,” and labor, in particular, was presented with 
austerity demands between 1985-1990 (Eckstein in Centeno and Font, 1998: 136). To justify 
such austerity measures, which were necessary to remedy Cuba’s mounting hard-currency debt 
and domestic budget deficit, Cuban authorities invoked “Guevarist and Marxist principles” 
(Eckstein in Centeno and Font, 1998: 135-6). Font notes that “resentment of and resistance to 
new material deprivations and demands on labor at the time might have been greater had the 
government not defended new austerity policies in the name of fundamental revolutionary 
objectives” (Eckstein in Centeno and Font, 1998: 136). Hence, the government was able to 
maintain social and political stability by submitting that fiscal exigencies were aligned with the 
island’s Marxist ideology.  Unfortunately, the austerity measures that were implemented left 
Cuba’s fiscal problems unresolved, as its external debt and domestic budget deficits continued to 
increase (Eckstein in Centeno and Font, 1998: 136).  
Structural problems in the Cuban economy, largely the result of dependence on Soviet aid, 
also began to emerge in the late 1980s. Between 1960 and 1990, the island received a total of 
approximately $65 billion in rents, in the form of discounted oil and other inputs, in exchange for 
Cuban sugar, on very favorable terms of trade (Font in Centeno and Font, 1998: 114). Centeno 
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and Font argue that it was Cuba’s ability to obtain such favorable terms of trade, and thus be 
shielded from market forces during this period, that allowed Cuban authorities to maintain 
“disdain for the market,” and make decisions within the country without concerns of economic 
efficiency (Font in Centeno and Font, 1998: 115). Such dependence on Soviet subsidies also had 
a deleterious effect, however. Because Cuba relied on favorable terms of trade (Cuban sugar for 
discounted Soviet oil being the most salient example), Cuban officials focused allocation of 
resources towards the sugar sector in the Cuban economy. Believing that the USSR provided a 
long-term export market for sugar harvests, “sugar continued to account for roughly 80 percent 
of exports and a third of economic activity (27 percent of arable land and 12 percent of the 
workforce) while overall diversification and industry received a lower priority” (Font in Centeno 
and Font, 1998: 116). As a result of Cuba’s status as a Soviet subsidiary, it not only became 
dependent on inputs from other socialist states, but also failed to diversify its economy, as stated 
above (Font in Centeno and Font, 1998: 116).  
 In sum, The Rectification Period was impelled by factors both internal and external to 
Cuba. The economic success of the 1971-85 pragmatist cycle allowed for material exigencies on 
the island to be mitigated sufficiently to allow for the scaling back of those reforms. Although 
this may seem counterintuitive, it must be stressed, once again, that reforms on the island have 
historically only been maintained until they relieve the economic and political strains they were 
meant to address. Moreover, the nascent power of Cuba’s planning technocracy, along with 
incipient inequality, caused Fidel Castro and the Old Guard to drastically scale back reforms, so 
as to obviate threats to their political power. At the external level, Gorbachev’s assumption of 
power in the USSR, along with Reagan and Bush’s continuation of the Cuban Embargo, 
provided pressure for scaling back of reforms on the island. These reforms were justified in 
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Guevarist/Marxist rhetoric, with Cuban authorities explaining that Rectification measures 
comported with revolutionary ideology. When problems began to mount as a result of 
Rectification policies, Cuban authorities justified necessary austerity policies as having their 
roots in Marxist ideology.  
The Special Period (1991-1996)15,16  
 The “Special Period in Time of Peace,” as the period of time associated with 1990s 
market reforms and austerity measures came to be known, has largely set the stage for Cuba’s 
current economy, including in terms of its structure and its social implications. In the period 
leading up to 1990, external and internal developments converged, leaving Cuba with no other 
option than to “integrate into the world capitalist market”; hence, “a new, pragmatist cycle was 
launched and labeled the ‘Special Period in Time of Peace,’ a euphemism for an emergency 
structural adjustment program to save the economy and the regime” (Mesa-Lago in Ritter, 2004: 
36). 
 This period, for academic purposes, formally began on June 23rd, 1990, when the Cuban 
Communist Party announced, “The solid stability of the country, together with intelligent 
policies, attract the confidence of foreign investors and open the way for cooperation in the form 
of joint ventures. This does not clash with our socialist system; rather it means speedier use of 
potential resources” (Dominguez in Dominguez et. al. (Ed.) 2004: 17). This statement illustrates 
the shift towards marketization and attraction of foreign capital that was to characterize the 
Special Period. Moreover, the statement that such reforms do not contravene Cuban socialism 
illustrates the Cuban government’s insistence during the Special Period that market reforms and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  This	  is	  an	  abbreviated	  description	  of	  the	  Special	  Period.	  For	  a	  full	  overview	  of	  the	  Special	  Period,	  see	  the	  chapter	  
dedicated	  to	  the	  Special	  Period.	  	  
16	  The	  Special	  Period	  is	  often	  considered	  to	  be	  ongoing	  on	  the	  island	  (Perez	  Villanueva	  in	  Dominguez	  et.	  al.	  (ed.)	  2012(a):	  
38).	  However,	  the	  halting	  of	  these	  reforms	  began	  in	  1996/97,	  according	  to	  Mesa-­‐Lago	  (in	  Ritter	  (Ed.)	  2004),	  so	  the	  




socialism could be reconciled.17 Hence, the Special Period was to be characterized by a confused, 
ambivalent stance by the Cuban government regarding the relationship between Cuban socialism 
and market mechanisms. As is explained in the chapter devoted to the Special Period, even 
analysts of Cuban economics and politics seemed to be confused as to whether Cuban officials 
were adhering to socialist rhetoric, or shifting away from such rhetoric, towards more 
nationalistic justifications of reforms on the island. Special Period reforms, which lacked a 
cohesive long-run plan and were implemented in an ad-hoc fashion, were decelerated in 1996, 
according to Mesa-Lago, though many analysts still refer to Cuba as currently experiencing the 
Special Period (in Ritter, 2004: 36). 
Decelerating Special Period Reforms (1996-2001) 
 According to Mesa-Lago, the pragmatic reforms of the Special Period halted Cuba’s 
economic decline, saving the regime from the crisis it was experiencing in 1993. At the same 
time, the enactment of the Helms-Burton Act in 1996 led to renewed fears of US intervention on 
the island. Hence, because Fidel and the Old Guard felt sufficiently secure that the economic 
recovery would allow them to slow down reforms that had cost them economic power, and 
because fears of US intervention reemerged, the reforms of the Special Period began to be 
decelerated in the mid-1990s (in Ritter, 2004: 38). Perez-Lopez concurs with Mesa-Lago’s 
assessment: “in the second half of the 1990s, the economy’s relative recovery strengthened the 
hand of hard liners within the ruling elite who favored the status quo. Consequently, the reform 
process ground to a halt as the government postponed essential but politically sensitive changes” 
(in Perez-Stable (Ed.) 2007: 171).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  Once	  again,	  the	  coexistence	  of	  market	  mechanisms	  and	  socialism,	  in	  terms	  of	  synonymy	  between	  producers,	  
appropriator,	  and	  distributors	  of	  economic	  surplus,	  is	  not	  an	  oxymoron.	  However,	  the	  existence	  of	  market	  mechanisms	  
with	  traditional	  Cuban	  socialism	  seems	  to	  be,	  and	  is,	  a	  contradiction.	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 Mesa-Lago proffers a speech by Raul Castro in March of 1996 as an indication of the 
shift that would characterize the following years. In that speech, Raul Castro: 
Criticized the negative effects of all the market policies introduced since 1993; denounced some 
Cuban academic institutions and scholars favorable to stronger economic reforms as being 
ideologically penetrated by the enemy; threatened more state regulations, higher taxes, and 
tougher sanctions on the emerging nonstate sector; and called for an ideological campaign to 
strengthen the revolutionary spirit (Mesa-Lago in Ritter, 2004: 38).  
 
It is important to note, though, that the period of 1996-2001 is not characterized as an 
idealist cycle by Mesa-Lago, because Special Period reforms (except self-employment) were not 
scaled back or reversed – their implementation was simply decelerated or halted. For example, 
the dismissal of 500,000-800,000 redundant workers in the state sector was postponed, and 
advances in agricultural markets and decentralization were halted (Mesa-Lago in Ritter, 2004: 
38). However, Mesa-Lago notes that Fidel Castro was “forced” to accept the reality that while 
the growth of agricultural markets could be slowed, their presence was not going to recede on the 
island (Mesa-Lago in Ritter, 2004: 39).  
The only area of policy that experienced a retrenchment of reforms was self-employment, 
but even in that area, retrenchment was achieved by imposing restrictions and taxes on self-
employment; “there [was not] a virtual banning of self-employment as happened in the two 
idealist cycles” (Mesa-Lago in Ritter, 2004: 39). This is not to say that Cuban authorities were 
not able to significantly curtail private employment through such a strategy. Indeed, regulations 
and taxes were able to reduce the number of self-employed significantly beginning in the mid-
1990s. The 1990s reforms promoting greater liberalization of paladares (restaurants run out of 
Cuban homes) were met with restraints on their size, as well as prohibitive fees. As a result, the 
number of these establishments fell from 600 in 1995 to 150 in 2003 (Perez-Lopez in Perez-
Stable (Ed.) 2007: 176-7). Similar constraints were simultaneously placed on other forms of 
formally legalized self-employment, causing the number of self-employed workers to fall “from 
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a peak of about 208,500 in 1995 to 152,900 in 2002 and to an estimated 150,000 in 2004” 
(Perez-Lopez in Perez-Stable (Ed.) 2007: 177). 
Mesa-Lago argues that during this period, retrenchment of pragmatist reforms became 
much more difficult, for two main reasons. First, the disappearance of the USSR from the scene 
meant that Cuba had no partner that was willing to subsidize its socialist policies. Second, Mesa-
Lago argues that the Cuban people have simply become “exhausted with more than four decades 
of experimentations and promises” (in Ritter, 2004: 39-40). Hence, according to this author, 
Fidel Castro and the Old Guard had to content themselves with slowing, rather than reversing, 
pragmatist cycle reforms of the Special Period.  
Regarding the effects that the deceleration of these reforms had on the Cuban economy, 
Mesa-Lago argues that the data “mostly show deterioration” (Mesa-Lago in Ritter, 2004: 38). 
Growth slowed in 1997-98, increased in 1999-2000, and slowed in 2001 (Mesa-Lago in Ritter, 
2004: 38). Liquidity on the island rose significantly between 1998-2001 and the trade deficit 
steadily increased. Open unemployment did decrease, but there were indicators of a growing 
labor surplus on the island (Mesa-Lago in Ritter, 2004: 39).  
In sum, the period that spanned from approximately 1996 to the early 2000s can be 
characterized as a Deceleration, but not a reversal, of previous market-oriented policies of the 
Special Period. Cuban authorities seemed satisfied with the economic improvements that Special 
Period policies produced on the island, but were cognizant of the change in international 
condition that had actuated since the late 1980s. Specifically, Cuban authorities recognized that 
the absence of the Soviet Union meant that the island was much less capable of introducing 
idealist cycles in earnest. Hence, the Cuban government had to content itself with the 
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deceleration of reforms, but large-scale abrogation of pragmatist policies would be ill advised, 
without the benefits of a trading partner such as the USSR. 
The Island, Approximately 2001-2007 (Cuba’s Holding Pattern) 
Writing in 2004, Mesa-Lago speculated that another idealist cycle was unlikely, given the 
absence of any international patron that could provide economic support to the island. Moreover, 
he argued that economic conditions were not likely to improve enough on the island to allow for 
a further retrenchment of pragmatic reforms (Mesa-Lago in Ritter, 2004: 40). Mesa-Lago’s 
predictions seem to have been confirmed. Until reforms that would be introduced in the late 
2000s, there were no notable economic developments in Cuba. Writing in 2007, Perez-Lopez 
stated, “No significant reforms have been adopted since 1997” (in Perez-Stable (Ed.) 2007: 
171).18 In other words, until further market reforms were introduced in the late 2000s, no notable 
reforms or retrenchments occurred in Cuba.  
The absence of significant market reforms until the late 2000s can be attributed, in part, 
to the emergence of an outside player that was willing and able to provide resources to the Cuban 
government: Hugo Chavez. Dominguez argues that Cuban leadership shifted their policies in 
response to this “external shock,” the shock being Hugo Chavez’s willingness to supply Cuba 
with substantial oil resources, below market prices, in exchange for Cuban health care and other 
services (in Dominguez et. al., 2012(a): 2). Hence, Cuban officials were able to continue their 
postponement, and halting, of needed reforms, since economic pressures were sufficiently 
alleviated to obviate needed policy amendments. Thus, Dominguez states, “The government 
could seemingly afford to misallocate resources, subsidize bankrupt enterprises, and turn its back 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	  This	  assessment	  depends	  on	  what	  one	  deems	  as	  “significant”	  reforms.	  Beginning	  in	  2007,	  reforms	  were	  introduced	  that	  
increased	  prices	  paid	  to	  agricultural	  producers,	  among	  other	  things	  (Dominguez	  in	  Dominguez	  et.	  al.	  (ed.)	  2012(a):	  4-­‐5),	  




on efficiency and markets. Even well-recognized problems, unrelated to the choice of an 
economic model, remained unaddressed…Venezuela’s money freed Cuban leaders from having 
to think about changes that should have been adopted long ago” (in Dominguez et. al., 2012(a): 
2-3).  
The question arises, regarding Cuba’s trade relationship with Hugo Chavez, why another 
idealist cycle was not launched, since it would seem that Venezuela’s beneficial terms of trade 
with the island would have allowed for such a policy cycle. The likely answer to this question is 
manifold. First, while Venezuela has provided favorable terms of trade to Cuba, it did so in an 
international landscape in which socialism was not nearly as tenable as it was during the idealist 
cycle of the Rectification Period (1970-1985). Hence, the viability of Venezuela’s socialist 
regime has likely always been seen as dubious in Cuba. Second, similar to the first explanation, 
the favorable nature of Venezuela’s trade with Cuba was often viewed as being contingent on 
Hugo Chavez’s personal position in Venezuela; the precarious nature of this relationship has 
come into sharp relief since Chavez’s death in 2013, as the stability of his successor’s – Nicolas 
Maduro’s – government in Venezuela has increasingly come under attack from public pressure 
(Silme, The Guardian, 04/08/2014). Hence, cognizant of the repercussions of the collapse of the 
USSR, Cuban officials are preparing for a “Plan B” scenario, in which Venezuela is not 
politically capable or willing to provide favorable terms of trade on oil to Cuba. Such a plan has 
entailed the fostering of relationships with other countries, particularly in Latin America 
(Chambraud, The Guardian, 5/27/2014). Third, while Venezuela has been able to provide oil to 
Cuba at favorable rates, it simply cannot provide the scale of inputs that a partner the size of the 
USSR was able to provide. Finally, as Mesa-Lago argues, the Cuban people are simply 
exhausted with cycles of reform and retrenchment. Cuban authorities are attuned to the needs 
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and sentiments of the Cuban population, and are likely aware that they must tread carefully, 
regarding the scaling back of market-oriented measures.  
In sum, the period that spanned approximately 2001 to the late 2000s can be 
characterized as one in which Cuban authorities engaged in a political and economic holding 
pattern. Favorable trade relations with Venezuela allowed Cuban authorities to delay much 
needed market reforms, but the precarious status of Venezuela’s socialist regime also precluded 
the introduction of another idealist cycle on the island.   
This holding pattern lasted until approximately 2009, when Cuba would confront a crisis 
that would engender a new pragmatist cycle. The ultimate cause of this crisis was the global 
financial crisis that began in 2008. The crisis had a sizable negative impact on Venezuela’s 
resources, and as a result, Venezuela’s aid to Cuba “seemingly vanished” (in Dominguez et. al., 
2012(a): 3). Dominguez argues that the global crisis forced Cuba to confront “the accumulated 
legacies of a malfunctioning economy whose structural problems had gone unaddressed for the 
bulk of a decade” (in Dominguez et. al., 2012(a): 3). As a result, the Communist Party held its 
Sixth Party Congress in April of 2011 – its first since 1997 – in which the agenda was limited to 
the discussion of economic reforms and the selection of new leadership (in Dominguez et. al., 
2012(a): 1).  
Before analyzing current reforms, though, it is important to engage in a more thorough 
overview of the Special Period, since it was this reform cycle that largely set the stage for the 




Chapter Three:  
The Special Period (1990-1996)19 
 
Introduction 
The “Special Period in Time of Peace,” as the period of time associated with 1990s 
market reforms and austerity measures came to be known, has largely set the stage for Cuba’s 
current economy, in terms of its structure and its social implications. In the period leading up to 
1990, external and internal developments converged, leaving Cuba with no other option than to 
“integrate into the world capitalist market”; hence, “a new, pragmatist cycle was launched and 
labeled the Special Period in Time of Peace, a euphemism for an emergency structural 
adjustment program to save the economy and the regime” (Mesa-Lago in Ritter, 2004: 36). This 
period formally began on June 23rd, 1990, when the Cuban Communist Party announced: “The 
solid stability of the country, together with intelligent policies, attract the confidence of foreign 
investors and open the way for cooperation in the form of joint ventures. This does not clash with 
our socialist system; rather it means speedier use of potential resources” (Dominguez in 
Dominguez et al., 2004: 17). This statement illustrates the shift towards marketization and 
attraction of foreign capital that was to characterize the Special Period. Moreover, the statement 
that such reforms do not contravene Cuban socialism illustrates the Cuban government’s 
insistence during the Special Period that market reforms and socialism could be reconciled. 
Hence, the Special Period was to be characterized by a confused, ambivalent stance by the 
Cuban government regarding the relationship between Cuban socialism and market mechanisms. 
As will be explained below, even analysts of Cuban economics and politics seemed to be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  The	  Special	  Period	  is	  often	  considered	  to	  be	  ongoing	  on	  the	  island	  (Perez	  Villanueva	  in	  Dominguez	  et.	  al.	  (ed.)	  2012(a):	  
38).	  However,	  the	  halting	  of	  these	  reforms	  began	  in	  1996/97,	  according	  to	  Mesa-­‐Lago	  (in	  Ritter	  (Ed.)	  2004),	  so	  the	  
duration	  of	  this	  period	  for	  this	  thesis’s	  purposes	  is	  1991-­‐96.	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confused as to whether Cuban officials were adhering to socialist rhetoric, or shifting away from 
such rhetoric, and towards more nationalistic justifications of reforms on the island.  
The Crisis and its Impact  
Substantial problems were apparent in the economies of the Soviet bloc, as well as within 
the Cuban economy, beginning in the mid 1980s. Dominguez notes that the Cuban economy was 
stagnant in the second half of the 1980s, as GDP, imports, and exports all failed to grow 
(Dominguez in Dominguez et al., 2004: 18-9). However, Cuban authorities chose to maintain 
their course, at least regarding the internally oriented economy, until 1993. At the earliest, 
“Special Period” reforms began, as mentioned above, on June 23rd, 1990. It is important to 
understand two facts that allowed the Cuban government to postpone reforms. First, Soviet 
subsidies to the island were not discontinued until 1991; hence, “the Cuban economy of 1989-
1990 did not look very different from that of 1986 or before” (Centeno in Centeno and Font, 
1998: 117). Second, and partly as a corollary of Soviet subsidies, Cuba was able to preserve 
through 1990 its main achievements, particularly health care and education (Centeno in Centeno 
and Font, 1998: 117). Hence, Cuba’s crisis was partially kept in check until 1991.  
 Although economic contraction began in 1990 (3.1%), it was in 1991 that the Cuban 
economy began to experience a recession in earnest. The economy shrank in 1991 by 25%, in 
1992 by 14%, and in 1993 by 10%. In all, the Cuban economy shrank 35-50% between 1989 and 
1993 (with most of the contraction occurring between 1991-1993) (Centeno in Centeno and Font, 
1998: 118). Moreover, Cuba’s imports and exports between 1993-5 were, respectively, 25% and 
33% of 1989 levels (Centeno in Centeno and Font, 1998: 118). The island’s main industry, sugar, 
experienced a substantial contraction, with the harvests between 1993-1996 being less than half 
of the average of 7.927 million tons for the period 1987-1990 (Centeno in Centeno and Font, 
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1998: 118). The decline in the sugar industry can be explained by the fact that the market price 
of sugar that Cuban producers received was only 1/3 the price that the USSR had been providing 
for sugar (Eckstein in Centeno and Font, 1998: 140). 
 Arguing that the role of the U.S. trade embargo, particularly the Toricelli Act of 1992, 
has very minimal explanatory power when analyzing Cuba’s recession between 1989-1993, Font 
argues that “the collapse of the Cuban economy after 1989 is traceable to Cuba’s loss of trading 
and economic partners with the coming apart of the Eastern European socialist camp” (Font in 
Centeno and Font, 1998: 119; Mesa-Lago concurs with the minimal effect of the Toricelli Act 
during this time (in Ritter, 2004: 36)). In 1989, trade accounted for approximately half of Cuba’s 
national product, and the Soviet bloc accounted for approximately 85% of Cuba’s foreign trade. 
A more detailed, but not exhaustive, list of Soviet aid to Cuba is as follows: 
The Soviet Union had subsidized the price it paid for Cuban sugar by several multiples of the 
prevailing international sugar price and the price that Cuba paid for Soviet sales of petroleum. 
These subsidies amounted to outright grants to the Cuban economy. The Soviet Union supplied all 
weapons free of charge to the Cuban Armed forces. It provided loans at low interest rates to cover 
the bilateral trade deficits that emerged notwithstanding those very high trade subsidies. The 
Soviets awarded low-interest-bearing loans for major economic development projects, such as the 
construction of a nickel ore processing plant and a nuclear power plant, among others, as well as 
many scholarships to train Cubans in the USSR in various professional endeavors. Most of these 
assistance programs were ending late in the Soviet period; they all ended with the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union (Dominguez in Dominguez et al., 2004: 20). 
 
Hence, the collapse of the Soviet bloc, combined with significant deficiencies in Cuban 
labor productivity, presented Cuba with a substantial collapse in national product that it was 
unable to quickly correct (Eckstein in Centeno and Font, 1998: 136). The severe contraction of 
the Cuban economy began immediately following the end of Soviet subsidies in 1991 (Centeno 
in Centeno and Font, 1998: 119). However, Cuba’s economic crisis had its ultimate beginning 
before 1989. Eckstein explains that Cuba was experiencing a financial crisis before 1989, a result 
of the particular socialist economic model that Cuba maintained, in which inefficiencies, cradle-
to-grave healthcare and employment, and soft-budgetary constraints obtained (in Centeno and 
69	  
	  
Font, 1998: 135). Ritter notes that “the impact of the Soviet Union’s collapse and the end of the 
special relationship with the Soviet bloc actually followed a five-year period of worsening 
economic difficulties from about 1985 to 1990” (Ritter, 2004: 4). Thus, it should be understood 
that Cuba’s economic crisis has its roots in the pre-1989 economy, but was substantially 
exacerbated (or “detonated,” to use Dominguez’s term) by the collapse of the USSR.  
 The extent of Cuba’s economic crisis was substantial. Between 1990 and 1996, caloric 
intake decreased by 27% (Dominguez in Dominguez et al., 2004: 21). Access to food and 
medical care suffered declines. By 2002, the caloric intake of the working age population was 57% 
below recommended levels, and its protein intake was 68% below recommended levels 
(Dominguez in Dominguez et al., 2004: 21). Enrollments in higher education were cut by the 
government by 45% between 1991-1995, while access to books and other educational materials 
diminished in elementary schools (Dominguez in Dominguez et al., 2004: 21). In terms of macro 
conditions, by 2000, Cuba’s GDP still remained 26% below its 1985 level (Dominguez in 
Dominguez et al., 2004: 21).  
However, it should be stressed that Cuban authorities realized that, politically, all 
resources and energy had to be allocated towards preserving some key Revolutionary 
achievements and principles. Fidel Castro, in particular, was dedicated to maintaining the 
island’s main achievements. Hence, Castro “took pride in not closing a single school, day-care 
center, or hospital, and in not leaving a single person destitute, despite dire Special Period 
circumstances” (Eckstein in Centeno and Font, 1998: 138). According to Dominguez, the Cuban 
government, all things considered, did an exemplary job of maintaining social indicators on the 
island throughout the crisis: the infant morality rate in 2002 was 6.5 (better than in Washington, 
D.C.); the ratio of citizens to doctors was at 168; upwards of 97% of children ages six to fourteen 
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were enrolled in school; low levels of illiteracy were maintained; and the quality of education on 
the island, relative to other Latin American countries, was maintained (in Dominguez et al., 2004: 
21). 
Response to the Crisis 
 Cuban authorities responded to the crisis by first promulgating reforms aimed at 
restructuring Cuba’s externally oriented economy. They avoided, until 1993, reforms that would 
stabilize Cuba’s internally oriented economy. Cuban authorities also addressed the crisis using 
both market-based and socialist strategies (Eckstein in Centeno and Font, 1998: 137).  
 Notwithstanding a pragmatic emphasis on survival, socialist principles were not 
completely abandoned during the Special Period. In fact, Cuban officials implemented strategies 
that comported with socialist ideology, where practical. Moreover, Cuban officials continued in 
their renunciations of the market, stressing that the role of the state in the Cuban economy would 
not recede (Eckstein in Centeno and Font, 1998: 128). Such renunciations of the market would 
prove to be largely a maquillage, as the state increasingly relied on the market during the Special 
Period, but such rhetoric showed that Cuban officials were still devoted to socialism on an 
ideological, if not practical, level. 
Attempts at Modifications that were Compatible with Socialism 
 Cuban officials tackled Special Period exigencies with a combination of socialist and 
market-based strategies. Initially implemented were the former. Eckstein explains that the 
original tactics implemented to combat the crisis were initiatives that “might be expected of a 
regime committed to socialist principles” (Eckstein in Centeno and Font, 1998: 137). First, a 
Food Program was initiated, in which the government attempted to become agriculturally self-
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sufficient. Second, the government rationed both durable and nondurable consumer goods, which 
allowed for “equality of sacrifice,” which comported with socialist ideology.  
Third, Cuban officials initiated labor mobilizations, in which workers labored very long 
hours, and were compensated with above-average wages (a necessary incentive) (Eckstein in 
Centeno and Font, 1998: 137). Under such mobilization, urban workers were diverted to rural 
labor, to aid in agricultural production. Lastly, the military began to play a substantial role in the 
Cuban economy. Eckstein notes that this is not an inherent facet of socialism, but “it reflects a 
government effort to rely on administrative rather than market mechanisms that is characteristic 
of socialism in its ‘statist’ form” (Eckstein in Centeno and Font, 1998: 137). During this time, 25% 
of the defense industry was diverted to civilian production, becoming particularly active in 
agriculture (Eckstein in Centeno and Font, 1998: 137-8). New recruits to this military during this 
period were even allowed to choose whether to enlist in defense or agricultural units (Eckstein in 
Centeno and Font, 1998: 138).  
While introducing these socialist-based initiatives, Cuban authorities also engaged in 
fiscal practices that were deliberately meant to avoid internal stabilization, since, “In the Cuban 
leadership’s estimation, success at political stabilization required deferring economic 
stabilization” (Dominguez in Dominguez et al., 2004: 22). Hence, while fiscal revenues shrank 
by 22%, expenditures increased by 2.5% between 1990-1993 (Dominguez in Dominguez et al., 
2004: 23). During this time, outlays for subsidies to cover losses in state enterprises increased by 
83% (Dominguez in Dominguez et al., 2004: 23). Public health expenditures rose by 15% during 
the same period. By 1990, the budget deficit had reached 10% of GDP, and 33% by 1993 
(Dominguez in Dominguez et al., 2004: 23). The implications of budget deficits for Cuba were 
particularly severe, since the island had been shut out of international credit markets for failure to 
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service its debt (Dominguez in Dominguez et al., 2004: 8, 19). Hence, to finance its deficits, 
Cuban officials had no option but to print money, thus contributing to significant inflation in the 
economy (Dominguez in Dominguez et al., 2004: 24). Dominguez notes that, although 
economically unsound, these principles achieved their goal, in terms of buying Cuban authorities 
“political time and helping to keep the communist party in power” (Dominguez in Dominguez et 
al., 2004: 23).  
Externally-Oriented Reforms 
When original market-based reforms were introduced, they were externally oriented 
(until 1993, which will be explained below), aimed at promoting joint ventures with foreign 
capital in the tourist and biomedical sector (Font in Centeno and Font, 1998: 120). In particular, 
Cuba introduced a new investment law – “Law 77” – which replaced its original “Investment 
Law 50,” which had only had modest success in attracting foreign capital (Font in Centeno and 
Font, 1998: 122-3). Law 50 offered some incentives to foreign investors, such as tax exemption, 
labor market liberalizations (ability to hire and fire), and full repatriation of profits (Font in 
Centeno and Font, 1998: 122-3), but the law fell short of garnering sufficient FDI. In 1995, Cuba 
introduced Investment Law 77, which introduced stronger guarantees to private investors, and 
introduced a framework for a more robust market economy (Font in Centeno and Font, 1998: 
123). Law 7720 introduced a few main amendments to Cuba’s foreign-invested sector. First, it 
legalized full foreign ownership in invested sectors, whereas Law 50 had only allowed for joint 
ventures under “operating rights,” rather than legal title (Font in Centeno and Font, 1998: 123). 
Secondly, Law 77 granted control over firm-level operations to foreign capital (Eckstein in 
Centeno and Font, 1998: 139). Third, it expanded the scope of foreign operation and ownership 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




to real estate, free trade, and export-processing zones (Font in Centeno and Font, 1998: 123). 
Although legalizing full foreign ownership, Cuban authorities argued that such ownership would 
remain the exception to the rule of joint ventures (Font in Centeno and Font, 1998: 123). 
Font notes that the official rationale for Law 77 was a pressing need to attract hard 
currency to the island, as foreign investment was “the only possible source of large amounts of 
capital, modern technology, and trading opportunities” (Font in Centeno and Font, 1998: 123). 
Importantly, while Law 77 was a significant step towards liberalization, Cuban authorities 
continued to stress that the purpose of the law was to “aid the development of state socialism” 
(Font in Centeno and Font, 1998: 123). Hence, even in situations in which marketization was 
clearly transpiring, Cuban authorities were likely to frame occurrences as promoting socialism.   
Internally-Oriented Reforms 
While externally-oriented reforms allowed infusion of capital into the tourist sector, and 
prevented Cuba’s recession from transforming into a general collapse, it became clear by 1993 
that internally oriented reforms had become necessary (Font in Centeno and Font, 1998: 120). As 
Mesa-Lago states, “The Cuban leadership first unsuccessfully tried to cope with the unexpected 
catastrophe and urgent need of hard currency relying on external policies only…but these did not 
stop the economic decline. The desperate situation in the summer of 1993 forced the introduction 
of domestic market reforms” (Mesa-Lago in Ritter, 2004: 36). Mesa-Lago explains that from 
1991-93, economic indicators declined substantially, the economy shrank by 35%; liquidity, 
inflation, and the fiscal deficit increased. The only indicator to improve during this period was 
the trade deficit, which declined; the reduction in the trade deficit occurred despite a drop in 
exports, since imports sank even more (in in Ritter, 2004: 37). Hence, the decline in the trade 
deficit was simply a corollary of decreased overall economic activity. 
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At this juncture, fiscal and monetary imbalances in the Cuban economy compelled Cuban 
authorities to introduce marketization and stabilization measures into the domestic economy. Just 
before 1993 reforms were introduced, the operational deficit of the government’s budget had 
risen to 40 percent of GDP, and this deficit was largely financed by monetary expansion (Font in 
Centeno and Font 1998: 127). Such monetary expansion caused liquidity on the island to jump 
121% between 1990-1993, causing prices in informal markets (where many necessities were 
procured) to skyrocket (Dominguez in Dominguez et al., 2004: 24).  
In an effort to reign in deficits by decreasing payrolls, the Cuban government 
implemented a number of institutional reforms: it transformed collectivized state farms into 
cooperatives, legalized self-employment in a number of occupations, legalized dollar holdings 
and transactions, and once again legalized farmers’ markets, along with industrial goods markets 
(in 1994) (Font in Centeno and Font 1998: 125). The government also introduced incentive pay 
in prioritized sectors of the economy, introduced yield-related wages in the agricultural sector, 
and gave autonomy to firms to freely negotiate trade deals, transforming many stage agencies 
into semiautonomous units (Eckstein in Centeno and Font, 1998: 140).  
The reintroduction of farmers’ markets was meant to address what Raul Castro identified 
as one of the island’s most pressing issues: food (Eckstein in Centeno and Font, 1998: 146). 
Farmers’ markets were meant to address more than just the island’s food crisis, though – it was 
hoped that the introduction of such markets had the potential to ameliorate problems related to 
liquidity, production, and fiscal shortfalls (Eckstein in Centeno and Font, 1998: 146). According 
to reforms introduced in 1994, farmers were allowed to sell, on the market, “any surplus they 
produced beyond their commitment to the state” (Eckstein in Centeno and Font, 1998: 146). 
Importantly, farmers’ sales were taxed, so increased production and sales, achieved through 
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incentivization, would bring more cash into the government’s coffers, thus addressing fiscal 
problems (Eckstein in Centeno and Font, 1998: 146). While recognizing, and being upset with, 
the high prices that farmers were charging at farmers’ markets, Cuban officials argued that such 
prices were still lower than black market prices; indeed, Cuban officials hoped that farmers’ 
markets would drive the black market, which contributed to continuing declines in state revenue, 
out of operation (Eckstein in Centeno and Font, 1998: 146).  
The legalization of dollar holdings and transactions was also meant to address fiscal 
shortfalls. An increasing amount of Cuban activity was being conducted in dollars, on the black 
market. Hence, Cuban officials decided to legalize dollar transactions, so that such transactions 
could be regulated by the state, and conducted through state-owned dollar stores, thus allowing 
the state to procure much-needed hard currency (Eckstein in Centeno and Font, 1998: 148). As 
Alejandro argues, dollarization should also be understood as a corollary of Cuba’s fiscal policy 
during the early Special Period years (in Dominguez et. al. (ed.) 2012(a): 40-1). Essentially, 
budget deficits between 1990-93 had to be financed through the printing of money, since Cuba 
did not have access to credit markets. The printing of money caused substantial inflation on the 
island. To avoid such volatility in its emerging, externally-oriented sectors (tourism, etc.), the 
government chose to use dollars in those sectors. Hence, the monetary policy of dollarization 
was a corollary of the earlier fiscal policy of not reducing spending when state revenues 
decreased (budget deficits). Hence why Rowe and Faya characterize monetary policy in Cuba as 
being subordinate to fiscal policy (in Ritter, 2004: 45-58). 
In addition to marketization measures, the government introduced significant austerity 
measures into the internal economy, so as to address the island’s fiscal and monetary (liquidity) 
problems. Cuba had experienced significant fiscal deficits since 1989, due largely to 
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expenditures increasing faster than revenues (Eckstein in Centeno and Font, 1998: 143). Officials 
met these shortfalls by increasing the money supply, thus exacerbating the island’s excess 
liquidity (Eckstein in Centeno and Font, 1998: 143). Excess liquidity on the island was partly a 
corollary of the dollarization of the Cuban economy, which led to a decrease in the purchasing 
power of the peso (Eckstein in Centeno and Font, 1998: 143).21 As a result in price increases, 
Cubans were unable to cover basic needs with money they earned, so incentives to work declined, 
thus contributing to a further decline in production, exacerbating inflation even further (Eckstein 
in Centeno and Font, 1998: 143).  
To reduce liquidity (and fiscal deficits), the Cuban government introduced measures that 
were meant to decrease state expenditures while increasing revenue. First, the government raised 
prices at state retail outlets (though seemingly paradoxical in light of inflation, the goal of this 
policy was to remove money from the economy, thus combating inflation) (Eckstein in Centeno 
and Font, 1998: 143). In particular, the government increased prices for nonessential goods 
(tobacco and alcohol, mainly) (Eckstein in Centeno and Font, 1998: 143). Second, the 
government began to charge for erstwhile free services, and increase the cost of select services. 
For instance, the government began to charge for meals at work centers and schools, which it had 
previously provided free of charge (Eckstein in Centeno and Font, 1998: 143). Also, the 
government pegged electricity charges to use, which it was able to justify as a progressive 
measure, since the poor used less electricity (Eckstein in Centeno and Font, 1998: 143). The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21	  This	  statement	  may	  seem	  counterintuitive,	  since,	  in	  the	  previous	  paragraph,	  I	  stated	  that	  dollarization	  was	  an	  attempt	  
to	  prevent	  already	  extant	  inflation	  on	  the	  island,	  and	  prevent	  such	  inflation	  from	  reaching	  the	  foreign-­‐invested	  sectors	  of	  
the	  economy.	  In	  this	  sense,	  dollarization	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  result	  and	  a	  cause	  of	  inflation:	  increased	  fiscal	  deficits	  on	  the	  
island	  led	  to	  higher	  inflation,	  which	  caused	  Cuban	  authorities	  to	  dollarize	  the	  economy,	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  insulate	  the	  
external	  sectors	  from	  inflation-­‐addled	  internal	  sectors.	  Once	  the	  dollar	  was	  legalized,	  though,	  it	  presumably	  cause	  a	  
further	  increase	  in	  peso-­‐inflation,	  as	  Cubans	  desired	  dollars	  over	  Pesos.	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government also terminated student stipends, requiring students to obtain financing through 
loans, which would have to be repaid (Eckstein in Centeno and Font, 1998: 143).22  
The government also flirted with amendments to its employment/unemployment policy. 
The government attempted to end all but short-term unemployment compensation, but did not 
follow through because such a reform was politically impossible (Eckstein in Centeno and Font, 
1998: 144). The government also contemplated firing redundant laborers, but this reform was 
also determined to be politically infeasible, and the government chose instead to keep “excess 
labor” on the state’s payroll (Eckstein in Centeno and Font, 1998: 144). Such rationalization 
would have substantially lessened state expenditures, as approximately one-third of the Cuban 
workforce was underemployed by 1993 (Eckstein in Centeno and Font, 1998: 144).  
Cuban officials also discussed scaling back of outlays for Cuban enterprises and the 
military, but decided that such action was both economically and politically infeasible. Cutting 
allocations to these entities would have required importation of many products, which would 
have exacerbated Cuba’s external debt problems, which were considered to be much more severe 
than Cuba’s domestic budget deficit problems (Eckstein in Centeno and Font, 1998: 145).  
It was also suggested that Cuba should institute a formal direct tax system, which was a 
foreign concept for Cuban officials and citizens. Contemplated were both income and payroll 
taxes. However, Cuban officials recognized that the administrative difficulties involved in 
collecting taxes from a populace that had not paid direct taxes since the Revolution would be 
prohibitive, and thus decided to increase revenues through increased prices, rather than through a 
more formalized tax base (Eckstein in Centeno and Font, 1998: 145).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  Cuba	  was	  experiencing	  a	  substantial	  problem	  in	  its	  education	  system,	  as	  teachers	  were	  leaving	  their	  jobs	  to	  procure	  
jobs	  in	  the	  hard	  currency	  sector,	  so	  as	  to	  obtain	  U.S.	  dollars,	  which	  had	  much	  higher	  purchasing	  power	  than	  the	  Cuban	  
peso.	  Teachers	  were	  also	  retiring	  from	  their	  jobs	  early	  to	  start	  businesses	  (Eckstein	  in	  Centeno	  and	  Font	  (Ed.)	  1998:	  144).	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In sum, Special Period reforms were introduced as a response to material exigencies on 
the island, specifically, the collapse of the USSR, which catalyzed the economic crisis of the 
1990s. Cuban officials implemented a combination of socialist and market-based policies to 
combat the crisis, choosing initially to implement externally-oriented policies, followed by 
policies that targeted internal adjustments. Importantly, Cuban authorities ambiguity towards the 
market was cast in stark relief during this period, and market-based policies were often framed as 
being measures that were necessary for Cuba’s socialist project 
Effects of Reforms 
The reforms that were implemented on the island were rather successful, in terms of 
achieving their intended goals of increased productivity and decreased budget deficits. 
Font notes that Special Period reforms allowed for increased agricultural production and lowered 
prices (Font in Centeno and Font, 1998: 126). According to Dominguez, these reforms caused 
government revenues to increase by 34%, while expenditures fell by 3%. The island’s deficit as a 
percentage of GDP fell below 8%, while monetary liquidity fell by 10%. Moreover, the peso-
dollar exchange rate fell from 120:1 in 1993 to 80:1 in 1994, and 25:1 in 1995. By 2002, Cuba’s 
budget deficit, as a percentage of GDP had fallen to 3.2% (Dominguez in Dominguez et al., 2004: 
25).  
Cuba’s externally-oriented reforms were “the most successful of all,” according to one 
analyst (Dominguez in Dominguez et al., 2004: 27). Revenues in tourism doubled between 1994 
and 2000, when such revenue reached $1.7 billion (Dominguez in Dominguez et al., 2004: 27). 
Moreover, increases in foreign direct investment (FDI) boosted Cuba’s exports: mining exports 
almost tripled between 1994 and 2000, to $599 million (Dominguez in Dominguez et al., 2004: 
28). FDI also allowed for substantial increases in petroleum and natural gas production on the 
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island: petroleum production increased from 671,000 tons in 1990 to 3.6 million tons in 2002; 
natural gas production increased from 20 million cubic meters of natural gas in 1996 to 585 
million cubic meters in 2002 (Dominguez in Dominguez et al., 2004: 28). Such increases 
allowed Cuba to advance toward “energy self-sufficiency” (Dominguez in Dominguez et al., 
2004: 28).  
The effects of Special Period reforms were not all salutary. Dominguez argues that these 
reforms had several adverse consequences; in particular, there were problems related to partial 
dollarization, including multiple exchange rates (Dominguez in Dominguez et al., 2004: 30). 
Multiple exchange rates on the island stem from the partial dollarization that Cuban authorities 
introduced between 1990 and 1993 to attract hard currency (and legalize already prevalent illegal 
use of American dollars). Such partial dollarization led to a few main problems: market 
segmentation and resultant price distortions, industry failure, and inequality and devaluation of 
education (Dominguez in Dominguez et al., 2004: 30-32). Regarding market segmentation and 
price distortions, partial dollarization resulted in “structurally semi-independent coexisting 
economies,” in which product markets operating in dollars operate separately from product 
markets operating in Cuban pesos (Dominguez in Dominguez et al., 2004: 31). For instance, the 
international tourism sector, which operates in dollars, does not come into financial contact with 
the sugar industry, which operates in pesos (Dominguez in Dominguez et al., 2004: 31). Such 
segmentation results in relative price distortions, as pesos are able to purchase less and dollars 
are able to purchase more. This problem is exacerbated by those with access to dollars 
purchasing products at state-sanctioned dollar stores, and then reselling those items in illegal 
markets, where goods are scarcer, for a profit (Dominguez in Dominguez et al., 2004: 32).  
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There were also particular areas of the Cuban economy that experienced significant 
disadvantages due to the dual exchange rate that obtained on the island. For instance, the sugar 
industry had become riddled with distortions, as a result of the dual exchange rate. By 2002, the 
government had decided to shutter 45% of Cuba’s 155 sugar mills (Dominguez in Dominguez et 
al., 2004: 31). This occurred because, while sugar exports are paid for in dollars, the Cuban 
government required that state enterprises, including those in the sugar industry, be paid in pesos, 
at a parity exchange rate. To explain more fully: 
In 2000 the international price that Cuba received for a pound of sugar was approximately 
US$0.10. At the prevailing exchange rate available to those Cubans who received remittances, the 
producer would receive two pesos but, at the official exchange rate, that producer received only 
0.10 pesos or one-twentieth of the real worth of the products. On the other hand, the sugar industry 
had to purchase some imported supplies in dollars. No wonder state industrial and agricultural 
enterprises in the sugar sector performed poorly, given that its revenues remained in pesos while 
some of its inputs switched to dollars (Dominguez in Dominguez et al., 2004: 31-2). 
  
Partial dollarization also led to problems related to inequality and devaluation of 
education. More specifically, the introduction of partial dollarization and multiple exchange rates 
has led to a situation in which those who are able to obtain dollars enjoyed a decided advantage 
over those without such access. Such access to dollars ensures a higher standard of living, as 
state-sanctioned dollar stores are well-stocked with consumer goods, while peso stores’ shelves 
are “nearly bare” (Dominguez in Dominguez et al., 2004: 32). The corollary of this situation is 
that Cubans are incentivized to obtain dollars, which leads to behavior that effectively devalues 
education, as it is not uncommon for people with college degrees to perform menial work in the 
dollar sector, so as to procure U.S. dollars (Dominguez in Dominguez et al., 2004: 32). Most 
importantly, maybe, is that those who receive remittances from abroad are able to live 
comfortably, while performing little to no work (Dominguez in Dominguez et al., 2004: 32-3).23 
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  This	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  without	  doing	  work	  will	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  be	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  more	  thoroughly	  in	  the	  chapter	  on	  
inequality	  and	  education.	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Despite the relative success of, and as a result of some of the adverse consequences of, 
Special Period reforms, Cuban authorities continued to maintain a perception of private 
employment and marketization measures that can euphemistically be described as “ambivalent.” 
Cuban officials simultaneously legalized self-employment, while still characterizing private 
entrepreneurship as an act of deviance (Font in Centeno and Font, 1998: 126). Moreover, to 
ensure that private enterprise did not pose potential threats to state-owned industries, a 
significant impediment to business success was promulgated, in which private entrepreneurs 
were legally prohibited from hiring employees (Font in Centeno and Font, 1998: 126). Also, 
even though newly-introduced agricultural cooperatives were rather successful, particularly 
when compared to state farms, Cuban authorities “did not enact new reforms to grant greater 
autonomy to the cooperatives and shift more productive activities from the state to the 
cooperative sector” (Dominguez in Dominguez et al., 2004: 26). Dominguez attributes such 
reluctance to Fidel Castro’s publicly-stated aversion to market mechanisms in agriculture 
(Dominguez in Dominguez et al., 2004: 26). Such illustrations are simply a microcosm of Cuban 
authorities’ schizophrenic attitude towards markets versus planning.  
Conclusion 
Paradoxically, as the Cuban economy was increasingly marketized during the 1990s, the 
state’s renunciations of capitalism actually became more vehement, as authorities stressed “the 
rejection of capitalism and adherence to socialism” (Font in Centeno and Font, 1998: 130). 
Hence, Font notes, “It is a major contradiction that, just as the country is compelled to find a 
place in the capitalist world economy, and in fact makes increasing use of private capital and 
entrepreneurship, those at the helm insist on a highly centralized moral economy and condemn 
the market” (Font in Centeno and Font, 1998; 132). The major lesson to be taken away from the 
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Special Period reforms is that rhetoric cannot be taken at face value on the island. Marketization 
measures may very likely be accompanied by anti-market rhetoric on the part of Cuban officials, 
but this is very often a patina that seems intended to convince Cubans that liberalization 
measures are not indeed liberalization measures.  
Interestingly, a rhetorical shift occurred during the 1990s: writing in 1998, Font explains, 
“The theme of building socialism has given way to that of survival of the homeland” (Font in 
Centeno and Font, 1998: 128). Hence, Cuban authorities may have realized at this juncture that 
the reforms they were implementing could not be reconciled with socialist ideology, and hence 
opted for a pragmatic stance, based on nationalistic and revolutionary notions of survival. 
Eckstein, regarding Cuban officials’ strategy for remedying fiscal and monetary problems, 
concurs with this assessment: “The reforms, like preceding Special Period measures, were not 
justified in the name of Marxist-Leninist and Guevarist principles or the continued construction 
of socialism. Instead, they were justified on the basis of leadership wisdom and concern for the 
common good” (Eckstein in Centeno and Font, 1998: 142).  
The Special Period reforms evince the ambivalent, often confused (and confusing), nature 
of Cuban officials’ rhetoric. At once shifting away from socialist ideology, shifting towards 
nationalist rhetoric, and renouncing the market while adopting marketization measures, Cuban 
officials seemed particularly confused as to how Special Period reforms should be justified. 
Eckstein explains that the shift away from socialist rhetoric during the Special Period can be 
attributed to the fact that “in the context of the 1990s, (statist and collectivist strategies) no 
longer worked” (in Centeno and Font, 1998: 147). Hence, the state had to adjust its rhetoric to 
economic conditions that were not amenable to Cuba’s previous economic model. Thus, a shift 
towards rhetorical emphasis on nationalism and survival can largely be seen as a corollary of 
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material exigencies, as market-based mechanisms became increasingly necessary. In general 
terms, though, the Special Period did seem to exhibit a shift towards nationalistic, rather than 
socialist, justification of reforms.  
Just as important as Cuban officials’ ambivalence towards socialism and the market, is 
the ostensible confusion amongst analysts regarding official rhetoric during this time. For 
instance, Font argues that there was a shift away from socialist rhetoric during this time, and a 
shift towards nationalist rhetoric (in Centeno and Font, 1998: 128). Eckstein agrees with this 
assessment, explaining that there was a shift away from socialist rhetoric during the Special 
Period, and that the exigencies of this period were so severe that Cuban authorities eschewed 
adherence to Marxist ideology, instead justifying reforms on pragmatic grounds: “Noted Castro, 
‘This is no time for theorizing but instead for advancing, resisting, and overcoming’” (in Centeno 
and Font, 1998: 137). However, Fidel continued to argue that such measures were necessary to 
“save the Revolution” (in Centeno and Font, 1998: 137, 147) However, in the same text, Font 
argues that adherence to socialism in Cuba remained a leitmotiv during the Special Period (in 
Centeno and Font, 1998: 130), while Eckstein notes that the government “remained publicly 
committed to socialism” (in Centeno and Font, 1998: 149).  
Such confusion is understandable, since the Special Period seems to be a period during 
which Cuban officials evinced exceptional ambivalence regarding the market and socialist 
ideology. Indeed, Cuban citizens themselves seemed to be rather ambivalent regarding the role 
of the market in the Cuban economy during the Special Period: Eckstein explains that Cubans 
who were engaging in black market, illegal activity, were not particularly pro-market, nor were 
they antisocialist. Rather, they were simply “trying to make the best of a bad situation…They 
were not calling for a capitalist transformation. Indicative of their support of market measures, 
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they opposed government efforts to terminate guaranteed employment, and government efforts to 
impose an income tax” (in Centeno and Font, 1998: 148). All of the above can be taken to 
illustrate the confused, ambivalent nature of the Special Period. Cuban officials, Cuban citizens, 
and analysts of Cuban politics and economics, all evince a rather inconclusive attitude towards 
the role of socialism, and socialist rhetoric, in the Cuban economy during the Special Period.  
In sum, 1990s reforms can be characterized as further promoting foreign investment, 
while making modest inroads towards liberalization of the internal economy: As of 1998, Font 
noted, “The measures adopted thus far have compartmentalized the economy into a 
dysfunctional pattern. Tourism and the external sector rely on market-driven entrepreneurship, 
while the internal economy, where by far most Cubans operate, remains largely collectivized and 
regulated” (in Centeno and Font, 1998: 129). The Special Period was the cycle during which 
Cuba’s schizophrenic approach to capitalism and socialism was most clearly illustrated, the 
result being that analysts, and Cuban officials themselves, often seemed unsure as to whether the 
period should be characterized as one that relied more on socialist or market-based measures. 
 In terms of policy results, Special Period reforms, in terms of remedying fiscal and 
liquidity problems, can be characterized as relatively successful:  
By the end of 1994 the money in circulation declined by about 16 percent, the budget deficit was 
reduced by some 72 percent, the black market peso/dollar exchange rate declined from about 
120:1 to 25:1, food sales through legal channels improved, and the economy grew (modestly) for 
the first time since the collapse of Soviet aid and trade (Eckstein in Centeno and Font, 1998: 149). 
 
Special Period reforms, which lacked a cohesive long-run plan and were implemented in 
a piecemeal fashion, were halted in in 1996 (Mesa-Lago in Ritter, 2004: 36). While we would 
intuitively be inclined to say that such reforms were halted “despite” their success, it should be 
clear at this point that, in a Cuban context, Special Period reforms were halted “because of” their 
success, as Cuban authorities viewed material exigencies as being sufficiently blunted to allow 
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for a halting of such reforms. It can also be presumed that these reforms were halted due to 
political and ideological concerns, as Cuban officials had to cede operational control to foreign 
capital to attract investment, the cradle-to-grave welfare state was scaled back significantly, and 
new inequality was introduced, largely as a result of the use of U.S. dollars in the Cuban 
economy (Eckstein in Centeno and Font, 1998: 149). Hence, material conditions, vis-à-vis fiscal 
shortfalls and inflation, were mitigated enough by Special Period policies to allow for ideological 
and political concerns to be addressed, through the halting of Special Period reforms. However, 
it should be stressed that Special Period policies, while being halted, in terms of further measures, 
were not substantially scaled back. Conditions had changed on the island, and Cuban authorities 
likely realized that an increased level of market behavior would have to be brooked on the island 
for the foreseeable future.  
This chapter brings to an end our overview of reform periods in Cuba, until we return to 
the issue of recent reforms, later in this thesis. Before proceeding to the analysis of recent 
reforms and their implications for Cuba’s insertion in the global economy, however, it is 
important to understand some facets of the Cuban economy that are peculiarly Cuban in nature. 




Chapter Four:  
Reforming Monetary Duality in Cuba 
 
Introduction 
 If presented with the question, “what is your currency worth?”, a Cuban would be in the 
peculiar (and undesirable) position of being inclined to give an answer to extent of, “to which 
currency do you prefer, and for whom?” In addition to the already convoluted economic situation 
on the island, there are three different currencies in use in Cuba: the Cuban Peso, the Cuban 
Convertible Peso (CUC), and the US Dollar. Further complicating things, there are multiple 
exchange rates, depending on whether you are a Cuban citizen, a Cuban enterprise, or a foreign 
enterprise. Add to this the differential in purchasing power that obtains between those who have 
access to dollars and those who don’t, and you have what may be described, without hyperbole, 
as an economic and monetary nightmare. This chapter provides an overview of the role of the 
dollar in Cuba, including the inequalities that have emerged as a corollary of the dollar’s use on 
the island. Also included in this chapter is an overview and analysis of the problems engendered 
by monetary duality, as well as a brief proposal regarding how the issue of monetary duality can 
be resolved in Cuba. 
The Dollar in Cuba 
 As Rowe and Faya explain, the use of the US dollar has a long history in Cuba (in Ritter, 
2004: 45-6). As early as 1898, the US government was paying Cuban tariffs and taxes in US 
dollars. The Cuban government attempted to move away from use of the dollar in 1914, when it 
passed a law that made the peso equivalent to the dollar, in gold terms. However, Cubans 
continued to use the dollar in common transactions, since paper dollars were more convenient 
than Cuban coins (in Ritter, 2004: 45-6). In 1933, the Cuban government printed paper currency, 
and the dollar and peso were both legal tender until 1948, though Cubans still preferred the 
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dollar as a store of value (in Ritter, 2004: 46). After 1948, the Cuban government phased out use 
of the dollar, and after the Cuban Revolution of 1959, use of the US dollar was prohibited (in 
Ritter, 2004: 46). However, use of the dollar would reemerge during the Special Period in the 
1990s.  
 During the initial years of the Special Period of Reform (1990-93), the Cuban 
government was presented with a substantial budgetary crisis. As the economy shrank by 
approximately 35%, state revenues also contracted sharply. However, recognizing that reduction 
in state spending would have caused a spike in unemployment, along with the suffering of 
thousands of Cubans, Cuban authorities chose not to meet decreased revenue with similar 
decreases in spending. As a result, the budget deficit on the island averaged 24.9% of GDP 
between 1990-93 (Alejandro in Dominguez et al., 2012(a): 40). And because Cuba had been shut 
out of international credit markets for its nonpayment of loans, it had to rely largely on the 
printing of money to fund its deficits. Hence, monetary policy was used to accommodate fiscal 
policy. Accordingly, as Rowe and Faya explain, “a simple model of monetary policy in Cuba 
would…assume that the central bank passively monetizes government deficits” (in Ritter, 2004: 
50).24 Use of the printing press caused liquidity to increase during this period, and inflation 
increased as prices in the informal market25 jumped 150% in 1991 and 200% in 1993, while the 
black market peso/dollar exchange rate exceeded 100:1 (it had originally been approximately 5:1)  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Importantly, the subordination of monetary policy to fiscal policy was a characteristic of Cuban policy during the early years of 
the Special Period, but one of the main developments in Cuban policy since those years has been the development of an 
independent monetary policy that has kept inflation below double-digits since the early 1990s (Alejandro in Dominguez et. al. 
(ed.) 2012(a): 117). See this thesis’s chapter, Recent Reforms. 
25 It should be noted that inflation in Cuba during these years was recorded in informal markets. This is because, prior to market 
reforms of the Special Period, increases in the Cuban money supply led to excess liquidity, rather than inflation, because most 
consumption was conducted through state retail stores, and prices in these stores were controlled. Hence, excess money supply 
simply meant that Cubans had to engage in “forced saving” as they had more money, but no goods to purchase. As Alejandro 
explains, “Until the early 1990s, the Cuban family’s basic market basket was obtained almost entirely from state retail markets. 
In this environment, monetary disequilibrium was reflected not in prices, but in the accumulation of excess liquidity. Thus, the 
process of monetary instability did not result in price increases, but rather in repressed inflation or forced savings. The economic 
authorities, as their fundamental monetary strategy, monitored this variable – the amount of liquidity held by the population – and 
undertook actions to control it. The policy was to maintain monetary liquidity within certain limits or ratios relative to the value 
of production” (in Dominguez et al., 2012(a): 17). 
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(Alejandro in Dominguez et al., 2012(a): 40). Alejandro explains that these deficits were largely 
financed through an inflation tax, as “nominal salaries in Cuban pesos were frozen and real 
salaries dropped by more than 70% due to inflation (in informal markets)” (Alejandro in 
Dominguez et al., 2012(a): 41). In sum, the deficit during the early years of the Special Period 
was financed by drastically increasing liquidity on the island, which led to substantial inflation in 
informal markets. 
 In an attempt to obtain hard currency, obviate the volatility and inflation that was now 
associated with use of the peso, and legalize already ubiquitous use of the dollar, the Cuban 
government legalized dollar holdings and transactions in 1993 (Alejandro in Dominguez et al., 
2012(a): 41; Rowe and Faya in Ritter, 2004: 46). Regarding the attempt to obtain hard currency, 
Togores and Garcia argue that “One of the principal objectives of the institution of the de-
penalization of foreign exchange holding was to guarantee the capturing of a significant share of 
U.S. dollars in the hands of the population by the state” (in Dominguez et al., 2004: 280). 
Obtaining such currency was necessary for funding the increasing trade deficit that the state was 
experiencing in the early years of the Special Period (once again, it must be kept in mind that 
Cuba did not have access to credit markets) (in Dominguez et al., 2004: 280). As a necessary 
concomitant, Cuban dollar stores were expanded that accepted US dollars for the purchase of 
consumer goods (in Dominguez et al., 2004: 280).  
 Regarding the attempt by Cuban officials to avoid the volatilities that were associated 
with the peso during the early 1990s, Alejandro explains that dollarization was a policy that was 
meant to isolate foreign-invested sectors from the “disequilibria and instabilities that dominated 
the rest of the economy” (Alejandro in Dominguez et al., 2012(a): 41). In other words, the 
increased liquidity and inflation that the island was experiencing, due to monetized budget 
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deficits, made legalization of the dollar necessary, so as to isolate Cuba’s emerging foreign-
invested sector from the volatilities that had emerged in its peso economy.  
 Moreover, dollarization was a pragmatic policy move on the part of Cuban officials, who 
recognized that illegal use of the dollar was already ubiquitous on the island. As Togores and 
Garcia explain, the legalization of dollar holdings and transactions was a response to already 
extant use of the dollar in the Cuban economy, due to the opening of the Cuban economy, 
increased tourist activity, and increased remittances from abroad (in Dominguez et al., 2004: 
279).  
 In sum, the decision to dollarize the Cuban economy should be understood as being 
impelled by three main exigencies. First, dollarization was a response to a need to attract hard 
currency. Second, dollarization was a pragmatic response to already ubiquitous illegal use of the 
dollar. Lastly, dollarization was a necessary corollary of Cuba’s fiscal policy (budget deficits) in 
the early Special Period years, as it tried to isolate its foreign-invested sector from the volatilities 
associated with the peso (Ibid: 41). This last analysis is interesting because dollarization is often 
characterized in terms of the first two exigencies (legalizing ubiquitous behavior and obtaining 
hard currency (Eckstein in Centeno and Font (Ed.) 1998: 148), but such dollarization is not often 
linked to Cuba’s fiscal policy during the Special Period. Hence, Alejandro’s assessment that 
dollarization was a necessary monetary response to Cuba’s fiscal deficits, is a novel and 
insightful analysis. Both the funding of budget deficits through the printing press, and the 
dollarization of the Cuban economy, therefore, are illustrations of Rowe and Faya’s 
characterization of Cuban monetary policy as being subordinate to fiscal policy in the early years 
of the Special Period (in Ritter, 2004: 50-1).26  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 While Alejandro’s analysis is similar to Rowe and Faya’s, it is novel insofar as it links dollarization to Cuba’s fiscal policy, 
while the analysis of the latter authors simply linked general monetary policy to fiscal policy. 
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 Dollarization served the function of maintaining stability in the foreign-invested sector, 
and provided the Cuban government a means through which to regulate economic functions 
(through allocation of dollars to targeted enterprises and sectors, for example) (Alejandro in 
Dominguez et al., 2012(a): 42). Moreover, dollarization yielded some very beneficial social 
results. For instance, hard currency acquired through dollar stores has primarily been used to 
finance redistributive consumption for the rest of the population that only has access to pesos 
(Togores and Garcia in Dominguez et al., 2004: 281). Consumption through the dollar market 
has also allowed for import substitution and resuscitated manufacturing on the island, thus 
precluding further unemployment in the manufacturing sector (Togores and Garcia in 
Dominguez et al., 2004: 281). Lastly, Togores and Garcia argue that access to foreign exchange 
in the dollarized sector has provided incentives to workers to increase productivity in such 
sectors (Togores and Garcia in Dominguez et al., 2004: 281).  
However, there were also adverse effects that followed dollarization. For instance, the 
legalization of the dollar spurred increased devaluation of the peso in the black market. Relatedly, 
inflation increased as the value of the peso decreased (Rowe and Faya in Dominguez et al., 2004: 
41). Inequality on the island is also related to dollarization and monetary duality on the island, as 
is discussed below (see section on “Current State of Monetary Duality”).  
De-Dollarization 
 Beginning in the early 2000s, the Cuban government attempted to scale back use of the 
US dollar. In 2003, Resolution 65 was promulgated, which made the convertible Cuban peso 
(CUC), which had been introduced in 1994, the dominant form of transaction between Cuban 
state entities. The dollar accounts of these entities were converted into CUCs, at the official 
91	  
	  
exchange rate of 1:1. Purchase of dollars by these entities had to be approved by the newly 
created Hard Currency Approval Committee (Rowe and Faya in Dominguez et al., 2004: 43).  
Starting in 2004, the Cuban government began the implementation of policies meant to 
more decisively shift domestic transactions away from the dollar and towards the CUC. This 
shift was partly a response to US policy, which targeted and punished entities that accepted US 
dollar deposits from Cuba. For instance, UBS, earlier in 2004, had been fined $100 million by 
the US Treasury Department for accepting Cuban deposits of US currency (Rowe and Faya in 
Dominguez et al., 2004: 42). In March of 2005, Agreement 13 was promulgated, which revalued 
the peso’s exchange rate with the dollar by 7.5% (from 26:1 to 24:1) (Rowe and Faya in 
Dominguez et al., 2004: 41). In April of that same year, Agreement 15 was introduced, which 
revalued the exchange rate of the CUC in relation to the dollar by 8%.27 Agreement 13 and 15 
were both announced ahead of time, and Cubans were given a grace period to adjust their 
currency holdings. Moreover, these policies did not affect the value of bank account deposits 
held in US dollars, nor did Cuban authorities seize bank account assets to achieve their desired 
shift towards the use of Cuban currency. Hence, these policies should be viewed not primarily as 
an attempt to tax the Cuban populace through currency revaluation and asset seizure, but rather 
as an attempt to further convert “the population’s wealth toward domestic currencies” (Rowe and 
Faya in Dominguez et al., 2004: 44).  
These policies succeeded in achieving their purpose: within a year of Agreement 13 and 
15’s passage, dollar-denominated bank accounts decreased by 35%, while CUC-denominated 
accounts increased by 300% (Rowe and Faya in Dominguez et al., 2004: 44). Alejandro notes 
that these policies yielded additional benefits: “the level of international reserves in Cuba’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 The CUC-US Dollar exchange rate, pursuant to Agreement 30 of 2011, was once again devalued to 1 CUC: 1 US Dollars, from 
1 CUC: 1.08 US Dollars (Laverty 2011: 82, note 9). 
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Central Bank grew, the measurement and control of the money supply improved, and the 
autonomy of monetary policy was generally enhanced” (in Dominguez et al., 2012(a): 45).  
Alejandro stresses that the success of Cuba’s shift towards use of domestic currencies 
“cannot be understood without analyzing the evolution of monetary stability” (in Dominguez et 
al., 2012(a): 45). Such stability was achieved through the use of a currency board regime, under 
which every CUC in circulation was supported by an equivalent US dollar in Cuba’s central 
bank (Alejandro in Dominguez et al., 2012(a): 45). The success of this currency board can be 
taken as evidence that Rowe and Faya were wrong in their 2004 speculation that the Cuban 
government could not credibly maintain a currency board (in Ritter, 2004: 43-58). Monetary 
stability was also engendered by the promotion of a relatively healthy financial system on the 
island, with the Cuban government respecting Cuban bank accounts (Alejandro, in Dominguez et 
al., 2012(a): 45). However, as explained below, de-dollarization did not remove monetary duality 
from the island (Alejandro, in Dominguez et al., 2012(a): 46).  
Current State of Monetary Duality 
 As Alejandro explains, despite efforts of the Cuban government during the early years of 
the Special Period, monetary duality still obtains on the island (in Dominguez et al., 2012(a): 48). 
By monetary duality, we mean the use of two currencies and multiple exchange rates. A 
thorough and concise description of the current state of Cuban currency markets is as follows.  
Table 4.1 
Cuban Population - 24 Pesos = 1 CUC = $1 USD 
- Currency transactions conducted through CADECA 
Cuban Enterprises - 1 Peso = 1 CUC = $1 USD 
- Peso effectively unconvertible 








First, there is an exchange rate that applies to the general population. For the general 
population, 24 pesos can be exchanged for one CUC, and one CUC can be exchanged for $1USD 
(Alejandro, in Dominguez et al., 2012(a): 47).28 Such transactions are conducted at CADECA, 
which is Cuba’s official currency exchange agency. Cubans and tourists are charged a 10% tax 
when selling dollars at CADECA, while Cuban enterprises are prohibited from converting 
currency at CADECA (Alejandro, in Dominguez et al., 2012(a): 43, 47).  
 Second, there is an exchange rate that applies to Cuban enterprises and institutions. For 
Cuban enterprises, one peso is equivalent to one CUC, and one CUC is equivalent to $1USD, 
which overvalues both the Peso and the CUC, relative to the US dollar. However, Cuban 
enterprises are not allowed to purchase CUCs or foreign currency with pesos, so the peso is 
effectively unconvertible. Enterprises operating in pesos must purchase imports with hard 
currency, but because they are unable to convert pesos to CUCs or foreign exchange, they must 
rely on Cuba’s centralized Hard Currency Approval Committee (established by Resolution no. 
92 of December 29, 2004 (Rowe and Faya in Dominguez et al., 2004: 43)), through which funds 
are allocated by the Ministry of the Economy and Planning, as well as by the Central Bank 
(Alejandro, in Dominguez et al., 2012(a): 47).29 If an enterprise has an account in CUCs, it can 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 On March 12, 2011, pursuant to Accord 30, the official CUC-Dollar exchange rate was devalued to 1:1. Prior to this Accord, 
the official exchange rate was 1 CUC : $1.08 US Dollars (Laverty 2011: 82, note 9).  
29	  As	  explained	  in	  this	  thesis’s	  chapter,	  Recent	  Reforms,	  there is a reason, historically, that input purchases have been highly 
regulated, and private wholesale markets have not been further liberalized (until recently). As Jose Luis Rodriguez explains, 
During the 1990s and early 2000s, while Cuban officials were experimenting with dollarization of certain sectors of the economy, 
in order to garner foreign exchange, they found that the intended goals of their experiment fell short, due to financial 
mismanagement of many entities that were attracting foreign exchange. “Many enterprises whose products were generating 
sufficient foreign currency for their own needs were failing to act with the financial discipline necessary to ease Cuba’s binding 
foreign-exchange constraint and contribute to its domestic production and social programs” (Campbell (ed.) 2013: 46-7). Hence, 
while many enterprises during this period were attracting foreign exchange, they were failing to properly allocate these resources 
to the government’s desired economic and social sectors. To respond to this issue, the Cuban government, in 2003, converted 
from $USD to CUCs all bank accounts held by enterprises that did business abroad, and then required these enterprises to receive 
approval for foreign-input purchases, which required their CUCs to be converted back to foreign currency (Ibid: 47). By doing so, 
the efficiency of Cuban enterprises was likely diminished, but the ability of the Cuban government and Central Bank to reduce 
the island’s foreign-exchange tensions was greatly increased (Rodrigues in Campbell (ed.) 2013: 47).	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purchase dollars at an exchange rate of 1 CUC to $1 US dollar (Alejandro, in Dominguez et al., 
2012(a): 47).  
 Finally, foreign entities conduct their transactions and hold their accounts in foreign 
currency (Alejandro, in Dominguez et al., 2012(a): 47).  
 There are some significant distortions that have emerged as a result of Cuba’s exchange 
rate regime. First, the official exchange rate for Cuban enterprises and institutions (1 peso = 1 
CUC) is greatly overvalued (Alejandro, in Dominguez et al., 2012(a): 48). Because of this 
overvaluation, accurate accounting is made very difficult, as enterprises operating in pesos 
appear to be more profitable than they actually are, while enterprises operating in CUCs appear 
to be less profitable than they actually are (Alejandro, in Dominguez et al., 2012(a): 48).  
Second, multiple exchange rates serve as a subsidy to imports, and a tax on exports. This 
is because, according to official exchange rates under Cuba’s enterprise exchange rate regime, 
when a Cuban exporter brings in $1USD, it only registers as one Cuban peso for accounting 
purposes, since $1USD = 1 CUC, and 1 CUC = 1 Peso. In contrast, Cuban imports appear overly 
cheap for the same reason, even though, in terms of actual market exchange rates, 1 Peso < 1 
CUC < $1USD. The upshot is that allocation of state resources through Cuba’s centralized hard 
currency account is suboptimal, since revenues and expenditures are not recorded in market 
values (Alejandro, in Dominguez et al., 2012(a): 48). 
Third, as may be implied by the first and second distortions listed above, significant 
issues pertaining to efficiency have emerged in the Cuban economy, due to monetary duality on 
the island. This is because the total value produced within the economy, and within particular 
sectors and enterprises, can be difficult to accurately measure, since multiple currencies are often 
used, which leads to some sectors and enterprises appearing to be more profitable or costly than 
95	  
	  
they actually are. Hence, “the corollary,” as Rodriguez explains, “is an inability to determine the 
efficacy of policies designed to improve efficiency, and hence an inability to effectively plan for 
further improvements” (in Campbell, 2013: 53-4). 
 Fourth, market segmentation has occurred in Cuba, since state enterprises cannot convert 
pesos for CUCs, which are required for transactions between state enterprises and institutions 
(Rodriguez in Dominguez et al., 2012(a): 48).  
 Fifth, because certain economic activities/sectors were never dollarized, and continue to 
be designated in Cuban pesos, investment and economic activity in these sectors has been 
neglected (Rodriguez in Dominguez et al., 2012(a: 49). Hence, even if a particular activity is 
socially desirable, it may be avoided because it does not bring in foreign exchange or CUCs. 
Such has been the case in recent years, as Cubans with PhDs have worked as prostitutes, waiters, 
and taxi drivers, since these jobs afford them access to hard currency (Karsseboom 2003). This 
problem is summarized by Mesa-Lago and Vidal-Alejandro: 
In 1989, university professors and physicians were at the top of the salary scale and teachers 
earned adequate salaries; thereafter, small private farmers, self-employed workers and traders in 
the free agricultural and black markets became the highest earners. Many professionals shifted 
their state occupations to jobs in enterprises with foreign capital or in tourism, where they earned 
part of their wages or tips in hard currency; they also moved to small private sector, informal and 
black-market jobs, where remuneration was higher (2010: 700). 
 
Moreover, a black market for health services has emerged in Cuba, in which healthcare 
professionals offer services under the table, in exchange for hard currency and other favors (Kath, 
2009). Such an arrangement, while supplementing lacunae in the official system, also poses risks 
to equality and fairness, since those without marketable resources, and those who wait in official 
queues, are at a disadvantage when attempting to obtain health services.  
Thus, dollarization, as part of a larger movement towards marketization, has caused an 
effectual devaluation of education in Cuba, as well as introduced distortions in the Cuban 
economy, as Cuban doctors offer services through unofficial channels. These are issues that 
96	  
	  
Cuban authorities will need to address, since education and health care are pillars of the 
Revolution, and lower pay in those sectors threatens to have a deleterious effect on the quality of 
services offered in those sectors. Cuban authorities seem to have partially addressed these 
concerns by increasing educators’ pay in 2009 (Mesa-Lago and Vidal-Alejandro 2010). Similar 
increases in pay for doctors have thus far not been forthcoming. 
 Finally, the most salient result of monetary duality has been drastically increased 
inequality on the island, and the concomitant emergence of a dual economy. As Prieto states, “In 
contemporary Cuban society the main source of inequality is determined by those having a 
source of income in foreign exchange. That reflects the appreciated exchange rate ($1US: 
$26Cuban) in effect along with the fact that meeting some essential household needs requires 
foreign exchange” (in Dominguez et al., 2004: 223). Essentially, the dollar (and thus CUC) has 
much more purchasing power than the peso, and is able to purchase many goods that are not 
available in state stores that accept pesos. As Togores and Garcia explain, this problem is even 
more pronounced, since many of the goods that are available through dollar purchases, but not 
through peso purchases, are essential goods (in Dominguez et al., 2004: 286).  
 In contrast to the above arguments, Alejandro argues that inequality in Cuba is not caused 
by dollarization/monetary duality, but rather by structural factors (in Dominguez et al., 2012(a): 
39-40). He argues that the monetary duality-inequality link is an “inaccurate perception,” and 
that “inequality primarily stems from low state salaries,” and that “these are the result of low 
productivity” (in Dominguez et al., 2012(a): 49). This may be true if Alejandro means that 
monetary duality is not the sole cause of increased inequality in Cuba, but it can hardly be denied 
that monetary duality – particularly the asymmetric access to dollars/hard currency that currently 
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obtains on the island – provides a mechanism through which inequality is engendered and 
exacerbated much more quickly than would be the case without monetary duality.  
Moreover, even if inequality on the island is more a result of low pay in state salaried 
sectors than of monetary duality, it could still be argued that low productivity in these sectors is a 
result, rather than a cause, of low pay in these sectors. In other words, when state workers are 
paid in pesos that have lower purchasing power than CUCs, they have lower incentives to 
produce. Moreover, since sectors of the economy that are not dollarized likely receive less 
capital than dollarized sectors, these sectors are likely less productive as a result. Alejandro 
seems to admit as such when he states, “a number of important domestic economic activities 
were never dollarized and have continued to be designated in Cuban pesos. The current exchange 
regime does not stimulate investment in these Cuban and foreign enterprises” (in Dominguez et 
al., 2012(a): 48). Lower investment in these sectors presumably causes lower productivity, since 
there is less capital per worker in non-dollarized sectors. This would be the implicit argument of 
Togores and Garcia, who proffer that access to foreign exchange in the dollarized sector has 
provided incentives to workers to increase productivity in such sectors (Togores and Garcia in 
Dominguez et al., 2004: 281). If increased access to dollars has increased productivity, then it 
can be reasoned that lack of access to dollars presumably decreases productivity. 
In sum, lower productivity is likely a result of lower pay in non-dollarized sectors, rather 
than low pay in these sectors being a result of lower productivity. Moreover, even if lower 
productivity was the cause of lower pay, it is, arguably, ultimately monetary duality on the island 
that is partially causing this lower productivity, since lower investment in non-dollarized sectors 




An additional flaw in Alejandro’s argument is that it completely neglects the role of 
remittances in the Cuban economy. The receipt of remittances allows Cubans to enjoy relative 
prosperity over those without access to hard currency, and this can in no way be attributed to the 
“higher productivity” of those who simply receive remittances. As Laverty explains, in Cuba, 
“the people who don’t work and are the least educated can sometimes have the highest incomes, 
if they have access to remittances…Highly educated people and workers in strategic sectors that 
have no access to hard currency remittances are some of the most underpaid and vulnerable” 
(2011: 52). When viewed this way, it seems that Alejandro’s insistence that inequality on the 
island is a structural/productivity problem, rather than a corollary of monetary policy, is unsound. 
However, as will be explained below, steps that should be taken for monetary unity will not 
necessarily eliminate the inequalities that have been engendered by the introduction of the dollar 
into the Cuban economy. As such, inequalities related to Cuba’s monetary policy are more a 
result of dollarization than they are of the use of multiple exchange rates for different sectors.  
Fixing the Problem of Monetary Duality 
 Alejandro argues that there are four main steps that must be taken to eliminate monetary 
duality on the island (in Dominguez et al., 2012(a): 50-2): 
1. Devalue Peso in state enterprise sector (currently 1P = 1CUC = $1); 
2. Unify exchange regimes for enterprise sector and general population; 
3. Convert prices at CADECA from CUC to Peso prices, thus eliminating CUC from circulation amongst 
general population; 
4. Convert institutional bank accounts held in CUCs to Pesos, and allow institutions to directly purchase 
imports. 
 
The first step to be taken is the devaluation of the peso’s exchange rate in the state enterprise 
sector. The devalued exchange rate is yet to be determined, as is explained below. This step must 
be taken before opening the exchange market for the Cuban peso to institutions; if the exchange 
market for pesos were opened to Cuban institutions without first devaluing the peso, there would 
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be excess demand for hard currency, since these institutions retain large amounts of Cuban pesos, 
and the Peso/CUC (and Peso/$USD) exchange rate is currently exorbitantly overvalued 
(Alejandro in Dominguez et al., 2012(a): 50). Alejandro cautions that this first step has the 
potential to cause significant problems, since capital expenditures and inputs purchased with 
CUCs and dollars (all imports, in other words) would increase, in terms of pesos. Hence, since 
these prices would be passed on in the form of increased input costs for other Cuban entities, this 
step has the potential to introduce severe inflation in the Cuban economy (Alejandro in 
Dominguez et al., 2012(a): 50).  
 To mitigate the inflationary impact of this first step, and ensure that the devaluation of the 
nominal exchange rate actually translates into a devaluation of the real exchange rate (by 
avoiding price increases, which cause the real exchange rate to appreciate)30, Alejandro argues 
that the Cuban government must “identify enterprises that are most negatively affected and those 
that are beginning to suffer losses, and take appropriate action” (Alejandro in Dominguez et al., 
2012(a): 50). It is unclear what he means by “appropriate action,” but one option may be to 
implement temporary price controls in sectors that are most affected by the peso devaluation. If 
price controls were implemented at the beginning of the production chain with enterprises that 
purchase inputs from abroad, using foreign exchange, then losses as a result of devaluation could 
be limited to those entities, and inflation could be prevented from spreading throughout the rest 
of the economy. The government could provide increased support, such as subsidized foreign 
exchange, for these entities while they adjust. Providing such support, while implementing price 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 The equation for the real exchange rate is Qt = et(Pf/Ph), where Qt is the real exchange rate at time t, et is the nominal exchange 
rate at time t, Pf is the foreign price level, and Ph is the home price level. If a devaluation of the nominal exchange rate, e, is 
simply met by increased prices in Cuba, then the real exchange rate is unaffected, and the distortion in the Cuban economy is not 
ameliorated, since Cuban enterprises will simply pass on higher prices throughout the economy. Moreover, failing to achieve a 
real devaluation of the currency would preclude Cuba from making advances towards increased exports.  
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controls throughout affected sectors, would allow importing firms to sufficiently sustain losses, 
while avoiding the larger problem of economy-wide inflation. 
It is important to stress that such price controls and subsidies would be temporary. 
Ultimately, structural change must be effected in the import and export sectors, with price 
incentives being the mechanism through which change, vis-à-vis efficiency, is accomplished (in 
essence, Cuban enterprises must eventually become competitive, though there is probably a case 
to be made for state industrial policy for a certain period of time). The precise pace and depth of 
future measures to needed to improve efficiency amongst Cuban enterprises remains uncertain at 
this point, since improving efficiency will require a tradeoff in political power/control for Cuban 
authorities. As Sanguinetty argues, “Efficiency requires workers’ and citizens’ freedom to 
choose as an incentive to work hard and be efficient, while political control to avoid political 
instability requires constraining workers’ and consumers’ behavior” (2011: 20). Hence, 
achieving competitiveness through price and profit incentives is economically, though not 
necessarily politically, possible for Cuban enterprises at this point.31 
 Regarding inflation that could occur once sufficient currency devaluation has transpired, 
Rodrik argues that such risks are often overstated, since inflation under an overvalued currency 
is often extant, but hidden, since black market prices often far exceed official prices, due to the 
official overvaluation of the currency (in Dominguez et al., 2012(a): 57).  
 Importantly, while wealth redistribution, vis-à-vis profitability and costs of state 
enterprises, is a logical corollary of peso devaluation, Alejandro stresses that such alterations are 
necessary, since it is artificial overvaluation of the peso that is currently causing such substantial 
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  The question of how to prevent inflation in the Cuban economy while devaluing the Peso should be an area of further study. 
Particularly, the question of how price controls can eventually be phased out, and how price mechanisms can take their place, 




distortions in the Cuban economy (in Dominguez et al., 2012(a): 51). Rodrik argues that Cuban 
authorities could mitigate the severity of redistribution caused by devaluation of the peso, by 
making the peso convertible at the margin (in Dominguez et al., 2012(a): 57). Essentially: 
Exporters, for example, could get the devalued, higher rate only for export earnings above what 
they earned, say, in the previous year. Similarly, importers would pay the higher rate for dollars 
only for allocations that exceeded their previous quota. This provides the appropriate incentives at 
the margin, but without eliminating the streams of rents and transfers implicit in the previous 
regime (in Dominguez et al., 2012(a): 57). 
 
Such an approach is taken directly out of China’s marketization strategy, under which it very 
successfully provided incentives at the margin, which allowed the market to grow alongside the 
state (in Dominguez et al., 2012(a): 56-7). Such an approach allows for gradual adjustment, 
while also allowing for efficiency gains in productive sectors.  
 Secondly, after the peso exchange rate in the state enterprise sector has been devalued, 
the exchange regime of the enterprise sector can be unified with the exchange regime of the 
general population. The official exchange rate that should be arrived at cannot yet be determined, 
since unifying the state enterprise and population exchange currency markets is going to alter the 
supply and demand of pesos and hard currency (Alejandro in Dominguez et al., 2012(a): 51). 
Hence, while the current exchange rate for the general population in Cuba is 24 
Pesos/1CUC/$1USD, the new exchange rate for a unified currency market may be much more 
devalued, since Cuban enterprises hold large amounts of Pesos.  
 Third, once the exchange regimes have been unified, CUC prices, in terms of dollars, 
should be converted to peso prices, at CADECA (the population’s exchange agency). Through 
this step, monetary dualism amongst Cuban households would be removed, as only the peso, 
rather than the CUC, would be used (Alejandro in Dominguez et al., 2012(a): 51).  
 Finally, Alejandro argues that institutional bank accounts held in CUCs should be 
converted to pesos, and for the enterprise sector operating in pesos, the peso should be made 
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convertible, so that these enterprises can purchase imports (Alejandro in Dominguez et al., 
2012(a): 51-2). Alejandro notes that enterprises that currently have to wait for centrally assigned 
hard currency would greatly benefit, as they could autonomously purchase their own foreign 
exchange for import purchases (Alejandro in Dominguez et al., 2012(a): 52). Hence, the 
unification of exchange markets would engender greater efficiency amongst Cuban enterprises, 
since their access to foreign currency would be tied to their productivity and profitability, rather 
than being independent of performance, as is the current case under centralized allocation of hard 
currency (Alejandro in Dominguez et al., 2012(a): 52).  
This last step is of great importance, because, as is proposed below, the increased 
efficiency and profitability in these enterprises could hopefully be redistributed towards sectors 
of the economy that do not have access to foreign exchange. However, the likelihood that the 
Cuban government will introduce this necessary step depends on how amenable Cuban officials 
are to the decentralization and loss of economic power that this step will require. The current 
system requires centralized decisions regarding which enterprises are allocated hard currency, 
and are thus capable of purchasing imports. Such a system was introduced to mitigate the 
financially irresponsible behavior of Cuban enterprises, and to more strategically target specific 
sectors of the economy that officials want to give preferential treatment. Introducing a reform 
that allows Cuban enterprises to purchase their own foreign exchange will require that Cuban 
authorities substantially loosen the reins and brook a significant degree of decision-making 
decentralization, which will dilute the political and economic power of those who are currently 
in charge of allocating hard currency. The willingness of Cuban authorities to make such 
changes is difficult to assess, but it can tentatively be predicted that Cuban authorities will opt 
for a policy that allows them to maintain some degree of control over access to foreign exchange 
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markets, but will introduce some degree of liberalization, so as to introduce some economic 
discipline into the state enterprise sector. Such a policy would comport with recent rhetoric and 
actions of Cuban authorities, which indicate that they are attempting to introduce a more 
rationalized industrial policy (see the shuttering of some Cuban sugar mills, for instance).   
 As was alluded to above, taking these steps will not necessarily eliminate the inequalities 
that have been engendered by the dollarization of the Cuban economy. Under the proposed 
reforms, Cubans – enterprises and individuals alike – will still enjoy full convertibility of 
currencies. As a result, those with access to dollars will still enjoy a relative advantage over those 
who do not have such access. Such inequality may simply be a necessary inconvenience if Cuba 
wishes to continue attracting hard currency from abroad. The key for Cuban officials will be to 
find a way to identify and mitigate such inequalities, lest they begin to approach socially 
unacceptable levels.  
However, by unifying the currency/exchange regime, and allowing Cuban enterprises 
greater autonomy in purchasing foreign exchange, distortions will be removed that afford some 
Cuban entities artificial advantages and cause other entities unnecessary burdens. Entities in the 
economy that are granted greater autonomy in procuring hard currency and purchasing their own 
imports are likely to experience substantial efficiency gains.32 Prior experiments with such 
projects have yielded favorable results. For instance, subsequent to the collapse of the USSR, 
Cuba introduced a policy of “foreign currency self-financing,” which essentially granted Cuban 
enterprises greater autonomy in procuring and spending foreign exchange (Alvarez in 
Dominguez et al., 2012(a): 157). Enterprises that were granted such autonomy experienced 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32	  Efficiency	  would	  increase	  because,	  as	  part	  of	  a	  more	  general	  shift	  towards	  the	  price	  mechanism	  and	  profit	  seeking,	  
Cuban	  enterprises	  will	  seek	  to	  produce	  goods	  that	  are	  being	  demanded	  by	  Cuban	  citizens	  (allocative	  efficiency),	  while	  
also	  seeking	  to	  do	  so	  at	  the	  lowest	  cost	  possible	  (productive	  efficiency).	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substantial gains, with both the volume and the value of production increasing substantially 
(Alvarez in Dominguez et al., 2012(a): 160).  
If similar access to hard currency procurement were introduced today, thus allowing 
Cuban enterprises to exchange their pesos for hard currency, then efficiency gains in these 
enterprises could potentially be redistributed towards sectors of the economy that do not 
necessarily have access to hard currency. For instance, increased profits from state firms that 
experience increased productivity (and incentives at the margin) would translate to higher 
revenue for the state, and could be redistributed towards the educational and health care sectors, 
offering higher pay to teachers and doctors, so as to obviate the incentives that currently divert 
professionals in these sectors to sectors that attract foreign currency, such as taxi driving and 
prostitution.33 To maintain incentives in these sectors that experience efficiency gains, retained 
profits could be introduced that would allow managers of these corporations to retain profits 
above a certain level. Hence, Cuban authorities could determine what level of revenue is needed 
from these sectors to achieve higher pay in the education and health care sectors. Once these 
levels of revenue have been collected from relevant enterprises, managers would be allowed to 
retain profits, preferably distributing them in part to workers or shareholders, though this latter 
option would require that a stock market is developed for Cuban enterprises. This would be just 
one possible path that serves as an example of what Dani Rodrik refers to as “providing market-
based incentives at the margin” (in Dominguez et al., 2012(a): 56). This arrangement is very 
similar to a progressive income tax arrangement. The reason this path is chosen, rather than a 
progressive income tax arrangement, is that Cuba currently does not have a well-developed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 A natural question that one asks when viewing this proposal is, “why not just liberalize the health care and education sectors, 
so that doctors and academics make more money?” This is a logical question, but it neglects the political reality that the Cuban 
government is simply just not ready to take that step. Cuba takes great pride in its healthcare sector as one of the shining 
achievements of the Cuban Revolution; hence, it is unwilling to relegate the operation of this sector to the market. Similarly, the 
Cuban government takes great pride in its educational system, and is unwilling to marketize employment in this sector.  
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income tax system. The island’s tax system is currently under construction, and when it is 
established, it may be preferable to switch to a tax-based redistribution system.  
Hence, while those in sectors that attract hard currency would still maintain an advantage 
over more internally-oriented sectors of the economy, the gains made in terms of efficiency and 
profitability could hopefully be redistributed so as to at least mitigate the inequalities that 
currently obtain in the economy. And market-based incentives at the margin could be introduced 
so that enterprises that experience efficiency gains could retain profits after their obligations to 
the state are met, such obligations being necessary for increased redistributive pay in areas such 
as education and health care. Simply put, completely removing inequalities on the island that are 
related to Cuba’s monetary policy would require the Cuban government to prohibit dollar 
holdings, which is both impractical (because it would simply reintroduce black market dollar 
transactions) and undesirable, as some degree of inequality is necessary for an economy that is 
shifting towards the market and privatization. But policies can be introduced that unify the 
exchange rate, allow for efficiency gains, provide productivity incentives, and allow for an 
amelioration of monetary policy-based inequalities.  
Conclusion 
  
 By removing monetary duality on the island, Cuban authorities can much more 
effectively mitigate the inefficiencies and inequalities that have emerged as a result of monetary 
duality and dollarization. While such steps would not correct all inequalities and distortions, it 
would put the Cuban government in a much better spot to start tackling problems in Cuba’s 
internal economy, and allow them to more smoothly transition towards a mixed-market economy. 
Correcting monetary duality would also mitigate much of the uncertainty that currently obtains 
internationally, regarding Cuba’s economic situation. Further steps to address the question of 
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Cuba’s place in the world economy are addressed in the following chapter, which aims to answer 
the question, “What is Cuba’s comparative advantage?”  
	   	  
107	  
	  
Chapter Five:  
Inserting Cuba Into the World Economy 
 
Introduction 
A dynamic economy necessitates engagement with the world economy, and Cuba’s case 
is no exception. Indeed, international insertion is much more important for a small island nation 
such as Cuba than it would be for a larger country at a similar level of development, because the 
potential for import substitution is much more limited in the former case. As Quinones Chang 
states regarding Cuba, “One must bear in mind that the expansion of exports is an unavoidable 
necessity for financing imports and as a source of economic growth, given that the potential for 
import substitution is limited by the size of the national market” (in Campbell (ed.) 2013: 109). 
Emphasizing the importance of international insertion for the Cuban economy, Silva-Castaneda 
states, “It is not impossible for Cuba to be developed in 25 years, but it is hard to imagine that 
scenario without a deeper and successful integration into global markets” (in Dominguez et al. 
(ed.) 2012(a): 244-5). Similarly, Monreal Gonzales also argues that Cuba’s embrace of 
globalization is much less of a choice than it is an economic imperative, since, as a small island, 
Cuba’s only potential for true development lies in its embrace of specialization in the 
international economy (in Dominguez et al. (ed.) 2012(a): 229). 
Cuba’s insertion into international markets should be viewed not only as a necessity, but 
also as an advantageous opportunity. For instance, Monreal Gonzales, speculating on Cuba’s 
potential in the global economy, argues that globalization should be greeted as a potential boon, 
rather than as a threat, to Cuba’s economy:   
[Globalization] should be seen as a mechanism that creates opportunities for development. Making 
use of these opportunities could lead to extremely positive economic accomplishments 
characterized by a high level of value-creation based on increasingly complex technology, 
conditions that globalization imposes on contemporary development processes (in Dominguez et 
al. (ed.) 2012(a): 227). 
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If Cuba is able to harness the potentials – and overcome the obstacles – of globalization, and the 
island’s insertion into the world economy, Monreal Gonzales argues, “Cuba could emerge as a 
developed economy within twenty-five years” (in Dominguez et al. (ed.) 2012(a): 227).  
 However, the foregoing statements should not be construed as a categorical endorsement 
of globalization. Not all experts agree that globalization necessarily yields economic benefits to 
countries that open up their current and capital accounts. In particular, the dangers of unregulated 
financial liberalization can be particularly pronounced for developing economies, since they are 
often left susceptible to capital flight. This susceptibility to capital flight is especially 
problematic for developing countries, since they are required to borrow in foreign currencies 
(“original sin”) – mainly the US Dollar and/or Pound – and capital flight causes drastic 
depreciation of their domestic currencies, which increases the real value of their debt, in terms of 
foreign currency (For “original sin,” see Eichengreen and Hausmann (ed.) 2005; for dangers of 
capital account liberalization, see Grabel 2004). Moreover, Dani Rodrik (2011) argues that 
globalization has the potential to pose threats to national determination and sovereignty, since 
domestic adjustments that are necessary for the receipt of foreign capital and trade agreements 
may contravene economic and political desires of developing states. In this sense, the threats that 
globalization poses are as political as they are economic. 
 Regarding the political aspect of globalization, Monreal Gonzales argues that it is not 
necessarily the Cuban economy, but rather the Cuban state, that faces the most challenges from 
globalization (in Dominguez et al. (ed.) 2012(a): 227). This is because it is the state that must 
define/redefine economic institutions on the island, including property rights and other 
institutions that are currently underdeveloped on the island. However, Monreal Gonzales argues 
that international insertion is absolutely necessary, and that the state must thus make necessary 
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adjustments in its institutions. This does not mean that the state must abandon, wholesale, its role 
in economic development; rather, it simply means that the island must accept that its 
developmental fate is dependent on its insertion into international markets (in Dominguez et al. 
(ed.) 2012(a): 230).   
As to particular development models, it should be emphasized that the model of import 
substitution industrialization (ISI) that reigned as the development paradigm in Cuba until 
recently is infelicitous for Cuba’s international position.34 This is due to Cuba’s position as a 
small island economy, which prevents it from achieving a complete internal production cycle. 
Because Cuba is unable to establish a complete internal production cycle, full ISI is an 
inappropriate development model, since ISI requires that countries be able to produce their own 
capital goods as inputs (Hence why ISI is actually more appropriate for countries with large-
scale economies and fully developed markets). Thus, because Cuba’s internal production cycle 
(including production of capital goods) is incomplete, savings do not automatically translate to 
investment in capital. As a result, in order to drive aggregate demand growth, Cuba must rely on 
exports, so as to fill in the lacuna that is left by insufficient investment. Moreover, because Cuba 
is a small economy, and ill suited for production of its own capital goods, its export 
specialization must inherently be narrowly defined (because more diversified exports require a 
more complete production cycle, for which the island does not have the capacity) (in Dominguez 
et al. (ed.) 2012(a): 231).  
In short, although globalization has its drawbacks, in terms of political compromises and 
increased susceptibility to financial instability, most analysts agree that the benefits outweigh the 
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  Cuba’s	  main	  emphasis	  of	  ISI	  was	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  the	  early	  1990s.	  Although	  Cuba	  did	  focus	  on	  an	  export	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costs, and that Cuba has no choice but to insert itself more fully into the world economy. The 
question then becomes not if, but how, the island can integrate internationally, in a way that 
minimizes globalizations risks, and allows the island to retain its national sovereignty and 
continue to advance its social goals through economic development. This chapter gives an 
overview of Cuba’s current position in the world economy, its most promising sectors, and how 
globalization is being managed on the island, so as to minimize social, economic, and political 
risks. It should be noted that not all aspects and sectors of the Cuban economy are covered in this 
chapter. For instance, Cuba continues to devote a significant share of resources to mining and 
exporting nickel, but that sector is not extensively covered in this chapter, because mining has 
historically been exploited much more extensively by foreign companies than by domestic 
entities. Moreover, nickel is a primary resource, and thus is supplied as a commodity on world 
markets by many actors, and its price is thus susceptible to substantial demand and supply shocks. 
Hence, a drop in the price of nickel was one of the main mechanisms through which the global 
recession was transmitted to Cuba’s economy (Perez, 2009: 17-18). This means that Cuba’s 
economy will be best served by moving away from primary exports, and towards high-tech 
exports, which are less susceptible to demand/supply swings in world markets. This is not to say 
that resource mining is not important; rather, for my purposes, it is simply beyond the scope of 
this chapter. The focus is on areas in which Cuba truly has a comparative advantage: tourism and 
the knowledge-based economy, especially the biotech sector. Agriculture is also analyzed, 
because the island has the potential to domestically produce a very large percentage of what it 
currently imports, which would substantially reduce its current account deficit. Foreign direct 
investment (FDI) is also discussed, since Cuba’s fraught relationship with, and minimal access to, 
foreign capital, has served as an impediment to its development.   
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The Current State of Cuba’s International Trade35 
 The overall characteristics of Cuba’s trade regime, like the rest of its economy, have 
undergone substantial changes since the beginning of the Special Period in 1990. From 1990-
2003, Cuba’s trade regime could be characterized as one of relative decentralization, combined 
with a policy that aimed to develop sectors of the economy that could garner foreign exchange: 
“tourism, medicines and pharmaceuticals, biotechnology, the agro-food industry, and national 
crude oil” (Quinones Chang in Campbell (ed.) 2013: 100).  
With decentralization of trade activity during this period, the number of entities engaging 
in trade on the island burgeoned, along with the Cuban government’s administrative costs 
pertaining to the regulation of such entities. Hence, in 2003, in an effort to reign in 
administrative costs, and ensure that Cuban entities were acting in a financially responsible 
manner, Cuban officials shifted back toward a centralized trade regime. To achieve this goal, the 
Cuban government first, in 2003, replaced US dollars in domestic circulation with CUCs, and 
required all Cuban entities to convert CUCs to US dollars before purchasing imports (Quinones 
Chang in Campbell (ed.) 2013: 101). Cuban authorities then, in 2005, established a unified bank 
account at the Central Bank for all hard currency; this was the account that entities wishing to 
make foreign purchases were required to draw dollars from. By doing so, the Cuban government 
took a step towards ensuring that any international transactions would be in accordance with the 
government’s priorities, in terms of sectors that it wished to support, and the international inputs 
that those sectors need to operate (Quinones Chang in Campbell (ed.) 2013: 101). Finally, in 
2006, the Plan of Imports was drafted, which required “frameworks and guidelines for all foreign 
trade activities, in particular for Hard Currency Approval Committee authorization of any hard-
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  This	  section	  draws	  mainly	  from	  Quinones	  Chang’s	  very	  concise	  treatment	  of	  the	  topic	  in	  Campbell	  (ed.)	  2013:	  89-­‐113).	  
112	  
	  
currency transactions” (Quinones Chang in Campbell (ed.) 2013: 101). Quinones Chang 
summarizes the current state of Cuba’s trade regime very concisely:  
[C]entralized  planning mechanisms determine the structure and volumes of imports and even, to a large 
extent, the geographic distribution of purchases. Prices, although they are an important consideration in the 
analysis, do not by themselves determine the approval of imports. The determining factor is rather the 
availability of hard currency, which is allocated according to the priorities of the national economic plan. 
Individual enterprises can only make purchases that accord with this national plan (Quinones Chang in 
Campbell (ed.) 2013: 101).  
 
In addition to regulatory changes in Cuba’s trade regime, there have also been substantial 
changes in terms of whom Cuba trades with, the goods Cuba exports, and the goods it imports. 
Regarding Cuba’s trading partners, there has been both a regional shift and a diversification in 
Cuba’s trade activity. As of 2009, Cuba divided 60% of its trade between Venezuela, China, 
Spain, Canada, the US, Brazil, and the Netherlands, whereas in 1990, that same percentage of 
trade was with the Soviet Union alone (Quinones Chang in Campbell (ed.) 2013: 101-2). Notably, 
as will be discussed in this thesis’s chapter on US-Cuban relations, the United States, by 2009, 
was Cuba’s 4th largest trading partner.  
 Regarding exports, the most salient trend has been a shift away from the exportation of 
goods, mainly sugar (73% of exports in 1990), towards an export regime that is based on services 
(72.8% of exports in 2009) (Quinones Chang in Campbell (ed.) 2013: 102). In 1990, about 90% 
of Cuba’s exports were goods, while only 10% were services. By 2000, Cuba had begun its shift 
towards service exports, with services accounting for a about 62% of exports. During that time, 
the main service Cuba exported was tourism, which accounted for about 45% of Cuba’s total 
exports, while other services accounted for about 17% of Cuba’s exports. By 2009, services 
accounted for more than 70% of Cuba’s exports, and goods accounted for a little less than 30%. 
Importantly, by 2009, the share of tourism in Cuba’s service exports had decreased to about 10% 
of total exports, while high value services had garnered more importance, especially in the areas 
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of “health care, telecommunications, sports, education, agriculture, industry, construction, 
culture, and informatics” (Quinones Chang in Campbell (ed.) 2013: 103-4, esp. figure 3.3).  
Regarding the structure of Cuba’s export of goods, an important development has been the 
continued increase in the export of human-capital-intensive, health-related products, which 
include vaccines (e.g. hepatitis B, meningitis B), medicines, and other medical goods, such as 
“diagnostic systems, kits, and equipment; gene therapy; and neuroscience equipment” (Quinones 
Chang in Campbell (ed.) 2013: 104).36  
In sum, Cuba’s export regime has shifted away from one based on the export of sugar, and 
towards a regime that exploits its comparative advantages, vis-à-vis human capital and its 
concentration on health care and medical services. This shift will be invaluable in the future, as 
demand for such products will be less deleteriously affected by external shocks, since they are 
less susceptible to world market price swings than are primary goods, such as sugar. Cuba’s 
balance of trade in recent years is illustrative of the importance of Cuba’s export of services: in 
2004, 2005, and 2007, Cuba actually ran trade surpluses (Quinones Chang in Campbell (ed.) 
2013: 106). These surpluses are explained by Cuba’s service exports, since the island runs a 
deficit in its balance of trade in goods (Luis Rodriguez in Campbell (ed.) 2013: 48).    
Regarding Cuba’s imports, Cuba sustained a drastic decrease in its ability to import during 
the 1990s, due to the collapse of the Soviet Union. As of 2009, the itemization of Cuba’s imports 
was as follows: foodstuffs and oils (17.7%); fuels and lubricants (29.1%); chemicals and related 
items (9.2%); manufactured products (11.8%); machinery and transportation equipment (20%); 
and assorted manufactures (8.3%) (Quinones Chang in Campbell (ed.) 2013: 105). One troubling 
figure is the 17.7% of Cuba’s imports that is constituted by food imports, since many of Cuba’s 
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  This	  development	  is	  further	  discussed	  below,	  in	  the	  section,	  “Cuba’s	  Comparative	  Advantage.”	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imported foods could be produced domestically, with the right incentives and infrastructure 
properly put in place. This is the issue to which we now turn. 
The Role of Agriculture in Cuba’s Insertion 
 For Cuba to improve the external sector of its economy, one of its primary focuses must 
be the continued promotion of agricultural productivity. One of the curious facts about Cuba is 
that it imports a large proportion of its food, while simultaneously a large proportion of its land 
remains idle. Since 2007, Cuban officials have been in the process of transferring idle lands to 
individuals for usufruct use, hoping to thus increase agricultural production. If Cuban authorities 
are able to increase agricultural production, and thus improve their balance of payments, then the 
island will likely be able to obtain much-needed hard currency.  
 According to Johnston and Mellor, agricultural development plays a crucial role in the 
more general economic development of any country (1961; Alvarez in Dominguez et al. (ed.) 
2012(a): 137-91). Particularly, agricultural development serves five main functions: increasing 
food for domestic consumption; releasing some agricultural labor to the manufacturing and 
service sector37; increasing demand for industrial products and services; increasing domestic 
savings to finance investments; and earning foreign exchange by selling to foreign markets. In 
Cuba’s case, the fifth function – attracting foreign exchange – should not necessarily be seen in 
terms of attracting foreign exchange, but rather in terms of stemming the outflow of foreign 
reserves that the island currently spends on imported food. In other words, Cuba, agriculturally, 
must learn to crawl before it can walk, by reducing its imports before it can export. 
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  This	  is	  one	  aspect	  of	  the	  classic	  role	  of	  agricultural	  development	  in	  general	  economic	  development	  that	  may	  not	  
comport	  with	  Cuba’s	  situation,	  since,	  as	  Dominguez	  states,	  “Cuban agricultural regions require repopulation. Without an 
agricultural population, there is no guarantee for stable or sustained agricultural production” (in Dominguez et. al. (Ed.) 2012(a): 
82-3). Hence, Cuba, with its well-developed service sector, actually needs to draw laborers away from the service sector and 
towards the agricultural sector.	  
115	  
	  
 To understand the potential of agricultural development, vis-à-vis improving Cuba’s 
balance of payments, it is necessary to first understand the situation as it currently stands in Cuba: 
in the most simple terms, Cuba imports a substantial portion of its food, while at the same time 
allowing a large portion of its productive land to remain idle. Cuba’s balance of payments 
deficits related to food imports date back – as do so many of its contemporary problems – to the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. Cuba imported a significant amount of food, as well as agricultural 
inputs, from the Soviet Union, so when the USSR collapsed, the island lost both a cheap source 
of food and a source of inputs for domestic agricultural production (Alvarez in Dominguez et al. 
(ed.) 2012(a): 143). As a result, caloric intake dropped substantially on the island. This situation 
began to improve in 1994, and per capita daily calories surpassed FAO (Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations) recommendations by 2004. However, as Alvarez explains, 
this increase in caloric intake was achieved not through increased domestic production, but rather 
mainly through food imports (Alvarez in Dominguez et al. (ed.) 2012(a): 143).  
 Currently, the exact proportion of Cuba’s food that is imported is debated. Alvarez argues 
that in 2006, a little over 50% of Cuba’s food was imported (in Dominguez et al. (ed.) 2012(a): 
145). The World Food Program (WFP) estimated this proportion, as of 2013, to be even higher: 
“Cuba, with a population of a little over 11 million people, imports about 80% of its domestic 
food requirements” (World Food Program). Avery and Avery give a similar figure, citing the 
Center for Global Food Issues (CFGI) attaché in Havana, who says approximately 84% of Cuban 
food is imported (Avery and Avery, cfgi.org). Altieri and Funes-Monzote dispute these figures, 
arguing that Cuba’s actual food imports, when taking into account all food consumed on the 
island, rather than just food sold in state stores, is closer to 14% of total food needs (Altieri and 
Funes-Monzote 2009: 212). However, even these two authors recognize the very high proportion 
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of Cuban food that has been imported in recent years, and seem to implicitly recognize that their 
figure of 14% may be dubious: 
There is considerable debate concerning current food dependency in Cuba. Dependency rose in the 2000s 
as imports from the United States grew and hurricanes devastated its agriculture. After being hit by three 
especially destructive hurricanes in 2008, Cuba satisfied national needs by importing 55 percent of its total 
food, equivalent to approximately $2.8 billion. However, as the world food price crisis drives prices higher, 
the government has reemphasized food self-sufficiency. Regardless of whether food has been imported or 
produced within the country, it is important to recognize that Cuba has been generally able to adequately 
feed its people. According to the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), Cuba’s average daily per 
capita dietary energy supply in 2007 (the last year available) was over 3,200 kcal, the highest of all Latin 
American and Caribbean nations (Altieri and Funes-Monzote 2009: 212).   
 
Rather than focusing on the proportion of calories that are domestically produced, Altieri and 
Funes-Monzote are more concerned with caloric intake per person, regardless of source, and 
indicate as much when they state, “Regardless of whether food has been imported or produced 
within the country…” However, the question of whence Cuba obtains its food from is a very 
important one, as it has substantial implications for its balance of payments.  
 More important than, but tragically related to, the current amount of food that Cuba 
imports, is the fact that Cuba has the potential to drastically increase domestic food production. 
If Cuba were unable to produce food domestically, then all of the foregoing discussion about 
how much food Cuba imports would be incidental to our debate; however, Cuba does have such 
capacity, and with the proper amendments to agricultural policy, could potentially produce a 
trade surplus in the agricultural sector (Alvarez in Dominguez et al. (ed.) 2012(a): 138). Thus, 
the question becomes, how does Cuba increase domestic production? This is the question Cuban 
authorities have been addressing, in earnest, since 2007.  
 Cuba has introduced multiple reforms to combat low agricultural productivity. Pertinent 
to Cuba’s external sector, there are two main agricultural problems, and two corresponding 
agricultural reforms that Cuba has introduced since 2007 to combat its agricultural shortcomings; 
these problems are low productivity and idle land.  
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First, regarding low productivity, prices paid by the state for agricultural products have 
historically been too low, and have thus acted as a disincentive to producers to sell their product 
to the state. In response, Cuban officials have increased the prices paid to agricultural producers, 
and also have begun paying some producers with CUCs, so that their ability to purchase inputs 
would increase (Monreal Gonzales in Dominguez et al. (ed.) 2012(a): 80). Cuban officials have 
recognized that price incentives do indeed matter, as production results have been greatest for 
foods that are allowed to be sold in farmers’ markets, where prices are higher (Alvarez in 
Dominguez et al. (ed.) 2012(a): 147). Hence, Cuban officials have offered higher prices, so as to 
offer incentives to food producers to increase productivity. Such increase in state purchase prices 
is important, as “commitments to sell [food] to the state reach and surpass 70% of total 
production” (Monreal Gonzales in Dominguez et al. (ed.) 2012(a): 83).  
 So far, this strategy has yielded relatively beneficial results. Increased prices paid for 
milk has provided incentives for milk producers to sell their products to the state. However, 
similar price increases have not stimulated significant production for meat producers (Monreal 
Gonzales in Dominguez et al. (ed.) 2012(a): 80). Though, payment to meat producers in CUCs 
has afforded such producers increased purchasing power for inputs; thus, increased productivity 
may be experienced as the efficiency in input-purchases becomes more forthcoming in the longer 
term.  
Importantly, it is very likely that Cuban officials simply haven’t gone far enough in terms 
of offering higher prices to agricultural producers. When prices for agricultural goods in free 
agricultural markets are compared with prices paid by Acopio (the state agency in charge of 
purchasing, storing, and distributing agricultural products), free market prices are consistently 
higher than Acopio prices. Given that 70% of total agricultural product is required to be sold to 
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the state, it is not surprising that productivity is lacking. Hence, productivity may not increase 
sufficiently until market prices are offered for agricultural products. To sum up the argument 
regarding market prices and incentives for agricultural products, Monreal Gonzales states, 
Prices determined by markets where supply and demand are allowed to operate provide a greater stimulus 
to producers, while the official price stimulus remains insufficient. The state Acopio should pay a stimulus 
price that is equivalent to the prices obtained in unregulated agricultural markets and international market 
prices, especially for those products that substitute imports (in Dominguez et al. (ed.) 2012(a): 82, italics 
mine).  
 
As stressed in the quotation above, offering higher prices for frequently imported foods will be 
particularly important in combating Cuba’s balance of payments deficit.  
 One obvious question that presents itself on this issue is how, and whether, Acopio can 
obtain enough cash to pay market rates for agricultural products. The revenue for such purchases 
could potentially be obtained if Cuba would further liberalize self-employment on the island, 
which would allow subsequently legal forms of employment to be taxed. Many forms of self-
employment already obtain in the island’s black market, so there is really little reason, 
economically, for Cuban authorities to retain proscriptions on relevant forms of employment. 
Cuban authorities have already signaled their desire to progressively legalize further forms of 
entrepreneurship, so revenue should continue to increase in this regard, which could then be 
redirected towards purchases of agricultural products at market prices.  
The second, and probably most important impediment to increased agricultural production on 
the island has been the large amount of land that has been allowed to lie idle. As Monreal 
Gonzales states, “It is paradoxical that the Cuban economy requires the importation of a 
significant volume of food products, many of which could be produced competitively on the 
island, given that Cuba has a significant quantity of idle land (equivalent to 27% of total land 
available for cultivation)” (Monreal Gonzales in Dominguez et al. (ed.) 2012(a): 82).  
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To address the issue of idle land, the government promulgated two measures, Decree-Law 
259 and Regulatory Legal Decree 282, in July and August 2008, respectively.38 Decree-Law 259 
grants individuals the right to usufruct use of land, and establishes “economic property” and 
“legal property,” as well as introducing taxes for the use of such land. Decree-Law 282 
establishes the operating procedures of Decree-Law 259 (Monreal Gonzales in Dominguez et al. 
(ed.) 2012(a): 82).  
By the end of 2009, these measures had resulted in 52% of erstwhile idle land being allocated 
for production (Monreal Gonzales in Dominguez et al. (ed.) 2012(a): 84). Perkins notes that, 
while this is a step in the right direction, “less impressive is that most of this land is apparently 
still cultivated by state or collective entities that have very limited decision-making authority at 
the production level unit” (in Dominguez et al. (ed.) 2012(a): 108). The proportion of land 
cultivated by individuals, as opposed to state or collective entities, is important because Cuba, as 
well as other developing countries, has been able to impel much higher agricultural yields when 
agricultural production was privatized.  
Regarding Cuba, during the early years of the Special Period, liberalizations that allowed for 
private cooperatives, as well as private agricultural markets, engendered increased productivity; 
as a result, farmers in private cooperatives saw their incomes jump 50%, and workers who 
owned and tilled their own land experienced a 423% increase in income (Burki and Erikson 2005: 
19). Burki and Erikson conclude, “private farmer cooperatives were typically better and more 
profitable performers than state farms in comparable lines of production” (Burki and Erikson 
2005: 19). However, such reforms failed to achieve more widespread implementation, largely 
due to Fidel Castro’s aversion to market-oriented policies in agriculture (Burki and Erikson 2005: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




18). Current figures on Cuban agricultural production are illustrative of the productive potential 
of the private sector in agriculture: while the state owns 70% of arable land in Cuba, the private 
sector produces 70% of agricultural yields (Frank 2013: 117). 
Regarding other countries’ experience with agricultural liberalization, Vietnam began to 
experience higher yields when it shifted to individual agricultural production, and currently 
exports three times the food it imports (Perkins in Dominguez et al. (ed.) 2012(a): 108). To put 
things in perspective, Vietnam has a population of 80 million people, which it is able to feed 
with about 9.4 million hectares of land (~.1175 hectares per capita). Cuba, which imports a much 
larger portion of its food, had 6.6 million cultivatable hectares in 2005, and has a population of 
approximately 11 million people (~.5455 hectares per capita). However, as of 2005, only 3.2 
million hectares of this land were under cultivation, and only 7.8% of that land was being 
cultivated by private individuals (Perkins in Dominguez et al. (ed.) 2012(a): 108).  
Similarly, China experienced substantial productivity gains after 1978, when it introduced a 
dual strategy of privatization and increased agricultural prices. McMillan et al. estimate that 
agricultural productivity between 1978 and 1984 increased by 61% (1989: 781). These authors 
argue that such productivity gains can be attributed to two factors: privatization of the 
agricultural sector (increased private responsibility); and increased prices offered by the state for 
agricultural products. They estimate that 78% of increased productivity during this period is 
attributable to privatization, while 22% of increased productivity is attributable to increased 
prices (Perkins in Dominguez et al. (ed.) 2012(a): 782). 
Hence, there are sizable gains that could be made if Cuba continues to cultivate more of its 
idle land, shifts more of its land towards individual use, and offers market prices for agricultural 
products. Such gains would go far in allowing Cuba to shift towards a positive balance of trade 
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in its agricultural sector, given the large amount of food that the island currently imports. Raul 
Castro is not unaware of the potential of Agriculture to mitigate Cuba’s balance of trade deficit. 
As Damien Cave of The New York Times explains, “No other industry has seen as much 
liberalization, with a steady rollout of incentives for farmers. And Mr. Castro has been explicit 
about his reasoning: increasing efficiency and food production to replace imports that cost Cuba 
hundreds of millions of dollars a year is a matter ‘of national security’” (12-08-12).  
However, as is explained in this thesis’s chapter on “Recent Reforms,” there is still much that 
needs to be done in the agricultural sector. Despite recent reforms that increased prices paid to 
farmers, decentralized some production and procurement decisions, and increased access to 
agricultural inputs, agricultural yields of many agricultural products have actually dropped in 
recent years (Cave/ New York Times, 12-08-12; Laverty 2011: 18-21). These disappointing 
results are largely a result of poor infrastructure (roads), inadequate access to inputs, bureaucratic 
interference in the production decisions and pricing, and limited access to financing, among 
other problems (Cave/ New York Times, 12-08-12; Laverty 2011: 18-21). Hence, productivity 
gains in the agricultural sector are not likely to present themselves unless the Cuban government 
is willing to go even further in the area of agricultural reform, by extricating bureaucratic 
impediments from the process, increasing access for farmers to inputs, and building better 
infrastructure, and introducing a more expansive role for wholesale markets of agricultural inputs, 
for starters.  
Agricultural Trade: Food that Cuba Imports, and the Potential for Domestic Production 
 
 While Cuban food imports as a share of total merchandise imports has dropped in recent 
years, the proportion of food that the island imports is still undesirable. Such food imports left 
Cuba vulnerable to increased international food prices in recent years; hence, Cuba’s food 
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imports, as a share of total imports, jumped from approximately 17% in 2007, to 26% in 2008, 
and back down to approximately 17% by 2009 (Alvarez in Dominguez et al. (ed.) 2012(a): 166). 
Cuban officials presumably wish to avoid similar import volatility in the future; hence, they 
should look to substitute a substantial portion of their food imports in coming years (more 
importantly, the island has the potential to make such substitutions).  
 A large portion of Cuba’s food imports – more than 50% - has been composed of items 
such as “rice, milk products, eggs, fish and fish-based products, meat and meat-based products, 
and even coffee” (Alvarez in Dominguez et al. (ed.) 2012(a): 166).39 This list of items is 
important, because they are all items for which Cuba has productive potential (Alvarez in 
Dominguez et al. (ed.) 2012(a): 166). Alvarez focuses particularly on rice, beans, and milk – 
three items that compose a large percentage of Cuba’s total food imports – and concludes that the 
potential for domestic production below import price is feasible (Alvarez in Dominguez et al. 
(ed.) 2012(a): 169-73). Taken together, these three categories compose more than 32% of Cuba’s 
total food imports. Both milk (12.8% of food imports) and beans (4.9% of food imports) have a 
domestic production cost below their import costs. Hence, they could be produced domestically 
for less than it costs to import them. Rice (13.6% of food imports) currently has a domestic 
production cost slightly above import price, but Alvarez notes that “improvement of yields to 
potentially achievable levels would reduce costs to the point where domestic rice could compete 
with imports” (Alvarez in Dominguez et al. (ed.) 2012(a): 173).  
 Rice, beans, and milk products are illustrative of the more general potential Cuba has in 
agricultural production of currently imported food products. Cuba has such potential in a large 
number of food products; the further Cuba goes in granting use rights for idle land, and shifting 
agricultural production towards in a private direction, the further the island can progress in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39	  For	  a	  full	  product	  structure	  of	  Cuban	  food	  imports,	  1958-­‐2009,	  see	  (Alvarez	  in	  Dominguez	  et	  al.	  (ed.)	  2012(a):	  170-­‐1).	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obtaining its domestic production potential, and thus mitigating its balance of payments deficit 
related to food imports.  
Any current analysis of Cuban food imports would be incomplete without at least a brief 
mention of Cuba’s food imports from the United States. In 2000, the United States passed the 
U.S. Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act, which legalized the sale of 
pharmaceuticals and food to Cuba, so long as the accounts were settled at the time of sale, in 
hard currency (Dominguez et al. (ed.) 2012(b): 39). In 2001, following Hurricane Michelle, Cuba 
proposed that it be allowed to buy food under this Act, which had not yet been implemented. 
Subsequently, Cuba began to import a significant portion of its food from the United States. By 
2004, Cuba imported 44% of its agricultural products from the US; currently the US is Cuba’s 
top agricultural import market (Dominguez et al. (ed.) 2012(b): 39, 2). Moreover, Between 2001 
and 2009, Cuba moved from the United States’ 114th most important export market, to its 36th 
most important export market (Alvarez in Dominguez et al. (ed.) 2012(a): 179). Overall, the US 
is Cuba’s fourth-largest trading partner (Egozcue in Dominguez et. al. (Ed.) 2012(b): 161).  
As of 2012, The ten foods that Cuba imported most from the United States were: chicken, 
corn, wheat, soybeans, soybean oil cake, brewing/distilling beverages, soybean oil, pork, and 
beans. Six of these foods consistently appear in yearly lists of top imports into Cuba from the 
United States: corn, chicken, wheat, soybeans, soybean oil cake, soy oil, and pork, all of which – 
except wheat – could be produced domestically (Egozcue in Dominguez et. al. (Ed.) 2012(b): 
179-80).  
Cuba’s high volume of imports from the United States is important for two particular 
reasons. First, per US law (the U.S. Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 
2000), Cuba is not allowed to finance its food imports from the US – all imports must be paid for 
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on the spot, with hard currency (Egozcue in Dominguez et. al. (Ed.) 2012(b): 181). Hence, 
imports from the United States potentially contribute even more significantly to foreign 
exchange losses than imports from other countries. Second, there is the simple political fact that, 
as relations currently stand, Cuba would prefer to not be so highly dependent on its adversarial 
neighbor. For both these reasons, increasing domestic production of currently imported foods 
would be beneficial to Cuban interests.  
Human Capital and Biotechnology/Pharmaceuticals: Cuba’s Comparative Advantage40 
 
The necessity of Cuba’s insertion into the international economy being understood, the 
question must be asked, what is Cuba’s comparative advantage in the world economy? Monreal 
Gonzales argues that Cuba should pursue a policy mix of ISI and export substitution (not full ISI, 
but partial ISI, as this is will be necessary so as to domestically produce some inputs for Cuba’s 
new economy).41 The issue of export substitution is directly related to the above question, 
regarding Cuba’s comparative advantage, and Monreal Gonzales stresses that “export 
substitution” should not be conflated with “export diversification”:  
Cuba’s route to development must involve export growth, but not just quantity. The issue is not 
simply to increase traditional exports and ‘diversify’ the export bundle through the widening of 
export activities. The truly important achievement would be to increase (both absolutely and 
relatively) export lines based on technological inputs and intensive utilization of a trained 
workforce. That is, the key measure of diversification must be the degree to which such new 
technologically intensive exports constitute a growing share (and eventually the majority) of the 
total (in Dominguez et al. (ed.) 2012(a): 232-3, emphasis mine).  
 
In short, Cuba should not simply pursue aggregate growth in its exports, but rather should seek to 
take advantage of its highly educated workforce so as to produce high tech, high value exports 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40	  The	  scope	  of	  this	  section	  is	  mainly	  restricted	  to	  Cuba’s	  biotech	  sector.	  However,	  as	  Quevedo	  Rodriguez	  explains,	  there	  
are	  other	  dynamic	  sectors	  of	  Cuba’s	  knowledge-­‐based	  economy,	  including	  informational	  technology	  and	  energy	  (2013:	  
292-­‐317).	  
41	  Monreal	  Gonzales	  notes	  that	  partial	  ISI	  need	  not	  be	  inconsistent	  with	  export	  substitution:	  “A	  strategy	  based	  on	  the	  
export	  of	  technology-­‐intensive	  manufacturing	  does	  not	  exclude,	  by	  necessity,	  the	  existence	  of	  processes	  of	  import	  
substitution”	  (in	  Dominguez	  et.	  al.	  (Ed.)	  2004:	  94).	  	  
125	  
	  
that exploit Cuba’s comparative advantage, vis-à-vis human capital (in Dominguez et. al. (Ed.) 
2004: 97).  
Such a development model represents a substantial break from Cuba’s previous export 
economy. In the past, Cuba’s exports have been narrowly defined (as they would continue to be 
in Monreal Gonzales’s proposal), but they were also low-value commodities, or commodity 
equivalents, such as beach tourism (in Dominguez et al. (ed.) 2012(a): 231). To engage in 
sufficient export substitution (moving up the value chain), Cuba must exploit the substantial 
investment it has made in human capital in the last six decades. As Dominguez explains,  
Cuba’s economy…has long emphasized labor-intensive relatively low value-added 
economic activities depending on the exploitation of natural resources. The sugar economy and 
nickel mine exploitation are examples. The way the new tourism industry developed since the 
1990s is another, for its emphasis on beach tourism channels most Cuban workers to jobs as maids, 
waiters, and chauffeurs. And yet, an important Cuban accomplishment during the last four 
decades of the twentieth century had been a massive and successful investment in education. For 
example, UNESCO’s first international comparative study of school achievement standardized 
country median scores to a regional Latin American mean of 250. The median score in 
mathematics for Cuban fourth graders was 353; the next highest scoring Latin American country 
was Argentina at 269 (in Dominguez et. al. (Ed.) 2004: 5-6, emphasis mine).   
 
Hence, Dominguez concludes, “Cuba’s human capital is potentially its single most 
important resource” (in Dominguez et al. (ed.) 2012(a): 6). Monreal Gonzales concurs with this 
assessment, stating, “A workforce with a relatively high skill level and with a high capacity for 
learning is the principal asset on which the country can count to develop itself. The greatest 
potential for development of Cuba is based, without a doubt, on its people” (in Dominguez et. al. 
(Ed.) 2004: 96). Although there are sectors in which Cubans do not have particular education or 
skills, this apparent shortcoming is overcome by the general education level and basic technical 
skills of Cubans, as well as “a tradition of technical inventiveness [that] has established a general 
profile of very fast assimilation of new techniques by the Cuban labor force, as recognized by 
foreign investors” (in Dominguez et. al. (Ed.) 2004: 112). Such a strategy of employing human 
capital as a form of comparative advantage is particularly appropriate for Cuba, argues Monreal 
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Gonzales, because it accommodates a world economy that rewards learning and adaptation 
(which Cuba’s workforce is well suited for), and because such a strategy focuses on the Cuban 
workforce, rather than physical capital, which comports with Cuban ideology (in Dominguez et. 
al. (Ed.) 2004: 96).  
 Monreal Gonzales argued in 2004 that Cuba’s highly educated workforce made the island 
felicitously suited for export of high tech goods, including biotechnological goods (in 
Dominguez et. al. (Ed.) 2004: 97). “Biotechnology” is defined by Cuban economist Quinones 
Chang as a subsector of the pharmaceutical industry, “based on knowledge, rooted in scientific 
research, and characterized by products with a high density of value added from knowledge and 
technology” (in Campbell (ed.) 2013: 306). Comporting with Monreal Gonzales’s assessment, 
Cuba had already begun to develop its exports of medical services and biotechnology products as 
of 2004 (in Dominguez et. al. (Ed.) 2004: 91-118). Regarding this development, Quinones Chang 
states, “the most promising new export lines of goods are biotechnological and pharmaceutical 
goods. All of these products are the fruits of Cuba’s emphasis on education and human 
development” (in Campbell (ed.0 2013: 109). Cuban officials’ emphasis on pharmaceuticals, 
biotechnology, and medical equipment began in the 1990s42, as Cuba sought to develop 
particular export sectors that could supply resources to continue its model of ISI and attract 
foreign exchange (in Dominguez et. al. (Ed.) 2004: 102). Since then, Cuba has developed 
“superior biotech capacity, which it shares with other countries,” acting as a “global leader in the 
South-South transfer of technology, helping low-income countries develop their own domestic 
biotech capabilities, providing technical training, and facilitating access to low-cost lifesaving 
drugs” (Jimenez, July/August 2011: 26).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42	  Though,	  Jimenez	  notes	  that	  Fidel	  Castro,	  as	  early	  as	  the	  1980s,	  was	  convinced	  that	  biotechnology	  was	  to	  be	  the	  future	  of	  
the	  Cuban	  economy	  (July/August	  2011:	  27).	  As	  early	  as	  1985,	  Cuba	  had	  developed	  the	  world’s	  first	  vaccine	  for	  Meningitis	  
B	  (Jimenez,	  July/August	  2011:	  28).	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Jimenez argues that the biotech and pharmaceutical industries have played a significant role 
in Cuba’s high-tech export economy: “Today [as of 2011], biotechnology has filled that role [of 
high tech export substitution] after the government invested more than $1 billion43 in the industry” 
(Jimenez, July/August 2011: 27). As a result of this investment, “in 2007 pharmaceutical exports 
earned an estimated $350 million, surpassing the traditional Cuban exports of sugar, rum, and 
tobacco, and ranking second only to nickel as the country’s leading export earner” (Jimenez, 
July/August 2011: 27). As of 2007, “nontraditional exports such as pharmaceutical and 
biotechnical products and medical equipment…accounted for some 29% of exports” (Perez 2009: 
7). Medicines and pharmaceuticals alone grew from two percent of exports in 2000 to 18.1% in 
2009. Moreover, by 2009, services accounted for 72.8% of Cuba’s exports, more than 65% of 
which was accounted for by nontraditional exports, including medicine and pharmaceuticals 
(Quinones Chang in Campbell (ed.) 2013: 103-4). Not only has Cuba shifted towards the export 
of high-value services; the composition of its goods exports also shifted towards higher value 
items, including goods such as vaccines (e.g. hepatitis B, meningitis B) and medicines, and other 
medical goods, such as “diagnostic systems, kits, and equipment; gene therapy; and neuroscience 
equipment” (Quinones Chang in Campbell (ed.) 2013: 104). 
Moreover, BioCubaFarma, the state biotech and pharmaceutical holding that was 
established in November of 2012, plans on doubling its pharmaceutical exports to $1 billion 
within five years (Cuba Standard, 04/13/13). According to Cuba Standard, BioCubaFarma is 
composed of 38 companies, and “is one of a new generation of state companies supposed to run 
on ‘entrepreneurial principles,’ with more budget autonomy” (Cuba Standard, 04/13/13). Hence, 
BioCubaFarma is illustrative of the most intriguing facets of the new Cuban economy: market-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43	  This	  $1	  billion	  investment	  has	  been	  referred	  to	  as	  Fidel	  Castro’s	  “billion	  dollar	  gamble,”	  which	  Jimenez	  concludes	  has	  
paid	  off,	  as	  of	  2011	  (July/August	  2011:	  29).	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disciplined enterprise, dynamic pharmaceutical and biotech capabilities, and an eye directed 
towards international markets. Indeed, the holding entity was created so as to be expressly 
guided “by business principles,” with the ultimate goal of “generating exportable goods and 
services” (Fox News Latino, 11-28-12). 
As to how Cuba’s pharmaceutical industry has been so successful, Dr. Augustin Lage 
Davila, director of Cuba’s Center for Molecular Immunology, attributes such success to a 
“complete cycle model44, whereby research, development, production, marketing, and follow-up 
evaluations for a given product are carried out within the same administrative unit” (Jimenez, 
July/August 2011: 27). In other words, while other pharmaceutical producers often outsource 
some stages of their development, all stages of Cuban pharmaceutical development are 
conducted within Cuba, by the same administrative unit.  
 In addition to being a dynamic economic industry, Cuban medicine and pharmaceuticals 
have always been directed towards domestic social goals: “The health needs of the population 
drive industry priorities” (Jimenez, July/August 2011: 28). Quinones Chang concurs with, stating, 
“the original reason for the development of biotechnology in Cuba was…its social impact;” 
moreover, she explains that this emphasis on social goals and equity in the island’s biotech sector 
comports with Cuba’s larger economic paradigm, which has always sought to address the needs 
of the general population (Quinones Chang in Campbell (ed.) 2013: 293). Accordingly, the 
service of domestic health needs has been the impetus behind some of the industry’s most 
innovative breakthroughs. For instance, Cuba’s groundbreaking development of vaccines for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44	  The	  success	  of	  the	  complete	  cycle	  model	  within	  the	  pharmaceutical	  industry	  should	  not	  be	  interpreted	  as	  being	  
contradictory	  of	  the	  above	  statements	  by	  Monreal	  Gonzales,	  that	  small	  island	  economies	  are	  not	  capable	  of	  achieving	  a	  
complete	  internal	  production	  cycle.	  Monreal	  Gonzales	  is	  referring	  to	  a	  macroeconomic	  internal	  production	  cycle,	  not	  a	  
complete	  cycle	  within	  a	  particular	  sector	  or	  industry,	  which	  is	  feasible,	  as	  Cuba’s	  biotech	  industry	  demonstrates.	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Meningitis B (1985), Haemophilus influenza type B (Hib) (1999), and diabetic foot ulcers (2011), 
were all impelled as responses to domestic exigencies (Jimenez, July/August 2011: 28).45  
 Despite Cuba’s success in attracting hard currency, and addressing domestic exigencies, 
through its biotech/pharmaceutical industry, it has had to “wage a constant battle” for market 
share and credibility, since it is neighbor to the world’s leading pharmaceutical giant: the United 
States, which uses its extraterritorial trade policies to discourage other countries and firms from 
trading with Cuba (Jimenez, July/August 2011: 28). As The Economist noted in 2003, “Many 
[foreign firms] are… put off by America’s Helms-Burton act, which could shut them out of 
American markets for doing business in Cuba” (The Economist, 11/27/03). Even when 
companies in the United States have been granted permission by Congress to engage in joint 
research with the Cuban pharmaceutical industry, Helms-Burton has hampered the process with 
burdensome technicalities. For instance, in 2004, CancerVax, a biotech company based out of 
California, requested permission to engage in cancer drug research with the Cuban government. 
CancerVax was eventually granted permission, but the contract between CancerVax and the 
Cuban government required that the Cuban government be compensated by CancerVax via 
barter, rather than through hard currency payments, which would have been illegal according to 
US law (Jimenez, July/August 2011: 29). 
 The degree to which the United States’ continued embargo vitiates Cuba’s biotech 
potential is cast in sharp relief when a few statistics are taken into account. First, annual 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45	  A	  list	  of	  biotech	  products	  developed	  in	  Cuba	  between	  2001-­‐2006:	  “vaccine	  against	  Haemophylus	  influenza	  B;	  combined	  
vaccines	  (HB-­‐Hib,	  DPT-­‐HBb-­‐Hib);	  vaccine	  against	  meningitis	  B;	  vaccine	  against	  hepatitis	  B;	  vaccines	  and	  AcM	  for	  anti-­‐
cancer	  therapy;	  vaccine	  against	  meningococcal	  meningitis	  ACYW135;	  vaccine	  against	  hepatitis	  B	  in	  Uniject;	  vaccine	  
against	  salmonella;	  EPO	  Erythropoietin	  (CIM,	  CIGB);	  products	  and	  equipment	  for	  neurophysiology	  and	  neuroinformatics;	  
new	  diagnostic	  systems;	  Streptokinase	  (w/o	  HAS);	  neurological	  restoration;	  rehabilitation	  services;	  tetanic	  toxoid;	  
granulocyte	  colony	  stimulating	  factor	  (GCSF);	  anti-­‐allergenic;	  regenerant	  trofin;	  interferon	  (liquid,	  w/o	  HAS);	  interferon	  
(lyophilized,	  w/o	  HAS);	  interferon	  +	  riboflavin;	  recombinant	  gamma	  interferon;	  Interleukin-­‐2;	  PPg-­‐plus	  anti-­‐thrombolytic;	  
humanized	  recipient	  antibody	  (anti	  EGF);	  SUMA	  diagnostic	  system;	  agricultural	  biotech	  products	  (GAVAC,	  bionematicide);	  
EGF	  (parenteral);	  human	  transfer	  factor;	  culture	  of	  cells;	  new	  advanced	  generics;	  cytotoxic	  drugs;	  technology	  transfer;	  
placenta-­‐derived	  products”	  (Quevedo	  Rodriguez	  in	  Campbell	  (ed.)	  2013:	  308,	  Table	  12.1).	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pharmaceutical sales in the United States, at $235 billion, constitute almost 35% of annual 
international sales (Quinones Chang in Campbell (ed.) 2013: 306). As an economic 
subcomponent of the pharmaceutical industry, the biotech industry accounts for about $70 billion 
in international sales annually, with 60% of those sales being concentrated in the United States 
(Quinones Chang in Campbell (ed.) 2013: 306). Because of Cuba’s proximity to the United 
States, the island would have a very lucrative market for many of its biotech products, were the 
embargo to be lifted. In terms of biotech production, about 80% of the biotech sector is located 
within the United States (Quinones Chang in Campbell (ed.) 2013: 306). Once again, because of 
Cuba’s proximity to the United States, there are many advantageous, and potentially lucrative, 
partnerships that could be established between Cuban and US entities, were the embargo to be 
lifted. The total losses in this sector due to the embargo would be difficult to quantify, but it can 
easily be presumed that there is a substantial amount of money being left on the table, solely 
because of political machinations.  
 In addition to problems pertaining to US coercion, Cuba’s biotech industry also 
experienced problems that have been endemic to Cuba’s socialist economy. For instance, Fidel 
Castro was vehemently opposed to seeking patents for Cuban pharmaceuticals, viewing them as 
a manifestation of capitalist greed. At one point, responding to a Cuban official who expressed 
the need to obtain patents, so as to protect Cuba’s expanding market for pharmaceuticals, Fidel 
Castro replied, “What’s all this talk about patents? You’re sounding crazy! We don’t like patents, 
remember?” (Starr 2004). This is an issue that Cuban economist Nancy Quinones Chang seems 
to allude to when she states, “socialism’s goals of equity, sustainable development, and a better 
quality of life for its citizens will always complicate the necessary interaction of Cuba’s 
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knowledge-based sectors with the capitalist-dominated world economy” (in Campbell (ed.) 2013: 
295).  
Potential for profits in Cuba’s pharmaceutical industry have also been vitiated by the fact 
that Cuba has intentionally directed its energy towards producing medicines that are meant to 
fight diseases, which are not as lucrative as some other kinds of pharmaceuticals that are meant 
for more elective uses. Writing in 2004, Douglas Starr of Wired wrote, “Cuba’s drug pipeline is 
most interesting for what it lacks: grand-slam moneymakers, cures for baldness or impotence or 
wrinkles. It’s all cancer therapies, AIDS medications, and vaccines against tropical diseases” 
(Starr 2004).  
Despite the influence of US pharmaceutical corporations, Helms-Burton, and aversion to 
profits, the Cuban pharmaceutical industry has slowly gained international recognition. In 1995, 
Cuba signed the WTO’s Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS), 
“marking its official entry into the global pharmaceutical market” (Jimenez, July/August 2011: 
28). According to Jimenez, becoming compliant with TRIPS sent signals that galvanized investor 
and consumer confidence in Cuban products (Jimenez, July/August 2011: 28). Pharmaceutical 
innovation and participation in TRIPS have afforded Cuba mutually beneficial agreements with 
multiple countries: as of 2011, Cuba had signed biotech and pharmaceutical cooperative 
agreements with more than 50 countries, and Cuba exports its products to 50 of those countries 
(Jimenez, July/August 2011: 28). Moreover, the explicit intent of BioCubaFarma, explained 
above, to pursue generation of export revenue, would seem to indicate that Cuban authorities 
have overcome their aversion to profits (most likely this can be attributed to Fidel Castro’s 
absence in recent years).  
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In sum, Cuba has been one of the few developing countries to build a successful 
biotechnology sector. Moreover, the island’s biotech industry, as part of its larger pharmaceutical 
industry, has always been engineered towards addressing the needs of its domestic population. 
As such, Cuba’s biotech industry is illustrative of the island’s success “over the last five decades 
in harmonizing its economic development with the construction of an equitable society” 
(Quevedo Rodriguez in Campbell (ed.) 2013: 293). There are still substantial impediments to be 
overcome, though: the United States, the world’s largest single market, in terms of biotech 
production and consumption, maintains its embargo against the island, which drastically vitiates 
the potential of Cuba’s biotech sector, both in terms of a market to sell its biotech goods, and in 
terms of productive partnerships that could be developed with US biotech firms.  
Tourism  
 
 Although he argues that Cuba should exploit its advantage, vis-à-vis its educated 
workforce, to move up the value chain, Monreal Gonzales also argues that the island should 
continue to promote its tourism sector. Cuba’s most exigent deficiency has always pertained to 
its current account deficits, since it always runs a deficit in its balance of trade in goods; and 
tourism offers the “ability to earn very rapid foreign-exchange profits on investment” (Garcia 
Jimenez in Campbell (ed.) 2013: 253). Cuba has a competitive advantage in its tourism sector, 
and this sector has the ability to act as a leading sector for development (in Dominguez et. al. 
(Ed.) 2004: 102). By “leading sector,” the Monreal Gonzales means that tourism meets three 
criteria: 1) High, and insufficiently-met, demand; 2) a high degree of intersectoral ties, which 
have the potential to impel technology transfer throughout other sectors of the economy; and 3) 
an exogenous growth rate (a growth rate independent of the general economy’s growth rate) 
(Monreal Gonzales in Dominguez et. al. (Ed.) 2004: 105-6).  Each of these factors reinforces the 
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others, but Monreal Gonzales singles out the second factor – intersectoral ties – as the one that 
holds the most potential benefit for the Cuban economy:  
Tourism offers potential links – particularly with respect to industry and other services of greater 
technological complexity including air transport, telecommunications, information technology and 
engineering projects – that would facilitate advances in the structure of the economy and the 
workforce towards international trajectories of technological learning. In that way, tourism – a 
service of little technological complexity in some of its predominant activities…and based on the 
intensive use of natural resources – could act as a gateway for the development of industrial 
activities and of more technologically advanced services, both with much greater income earning 
potential (Monreal Gonzales in Dominguez et. al. (Ed.) 2004: 106).  
  
There is another benefit, conceptually linked to intersectoral ties, that tourism has 
presented to the Cuban economy: increased productivity and efficiency. This facet of tourism’s 
benefits is best understood when the original purpose of Cuban tourism, beginning in the 1990s, 
is understood. With the collapse of the USSR and Soviet Bloc in the early 1990s, which 
introduced the Special Period, Cuba lost its main source of hard currency, along with its ability 
to acquire foreign goods at favorable rates. Hence, Cuban officials recognized the exigency to 
develop sectors of their economy that could attract foreign exchange, and tourism was the most 
obvious, and most promising, sector.  Cuban officials recognized that developing the island’s 
tourist industry would require substantial investment: the island lacked much of the support 
infrastructure and intersectoral productive capacity needed for a healthy tourist sector; and most 
of Cuba’s extant tourism in 1990 was based in Havana, since that was where the American mob 
and the Batista regime had built out Cuba’s tourist/gambling attractions (Figueras in Campbell 
(ed.) 2013: 236; English 2007).46 In response to these insufficiencies, the Cuban government 
allocated $6.8 billion to its tourist industry between 1990-2007, which amounted to about one-
seventh of total investment during that period (Figueras in Campbell (ed.) 2013: 242). Moreover, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46	  As	  Figueras	  explains,	  in	  1950-­‐51,	  members	  of	  the	  National	  Crime	  Syndicate	  in	  the	  United	  States	  were	  brought	  before	  
the	  Senate	  Committee	  to	  Investigate	  Organized	  Crime	  in	  Interstate	  Commerce.	  Members	  of	  the	  Syndicate	  feared	  that	  their	  
interests,	  including	  those	  in	  Las	  Vegas,	  would	  come	  under	  increasing	  pressure	  by	  US	  authorities.	  Hence,	  they	  chose	  
Havana	  as	  the	  location	  to	  build	  out	  their	  “business”	  infrastructure	  outside	  the	  United	  States.	  As	  a	  result,	  by	  “1958	  two-­‐
thirds	  of	  the	  tourist	  rooms	  in	  Cuba	  were	  in	  Havana”	  (in	  Campbell	  (ed.)	  2013:	  236).	  The	  second	  citation	  above	  (English	  
2007)	  refers	  to	  the	  book	  “Havana	  Nocturne,”	  which	  is	  a	  thorough	  and	  entertaining	  account	  of	  the	  mob’s	  role	  in	  building	  
out	  Cuban	  gambling	  attractions.	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“a third of the amount spent on tourism development was allocated to the creation of airports and 
other necessary infrastructure and to the expansion of capacity and development of new 
technologies in branches of the economy that supply items for tourism and communication” 
(Figueras in Campbell (ed.) 2013: 243). Investment was also spread out regionally, so that 
Havana currently only accounts for one-fifth of the tourist rooms on the island, whereas, prior to 
Special Period investments, Havana accounted for two-thirds of tourist rooms (Figueras in 
Campbell (ed.) 2013: 243).  
 How does this relate to increased efficiency and productivity non-tourist sectors of the 
Cuban economy? To reiterate, Cuban tourism was fostered so as to attract foreign exchange, a 
goal which it has been very successful in achieving: between 1990 and 2010, approximately one-
third of all export dollars has been garnered through tourist activities, bringing in an approximate 
total of $34 billion (Figueras in Campbell (ed.) 2013: 242). However, the operation of the tourist 
industry also requires massive amounts of inputs, and most of these inputs were originally 
purchased as imports: “in the early 1990s only 12 percent of the purchases by tourist entities 
were met by local producers” (Figueras in Campbell (ed.) 2013: 244). Hence, 88% of all foreign 
exchange acquired through tourism simply leaked out of the Cuban economy through import 
purchases. In response, Cuban producers were asked to become much more productive and 
efficient, and they succeeded: since the early 2000s, domestic producers supply approximately 
68% of the inputs for the tourist industry (Figueras in Campbell (ed.) 2013: 244). Such gains 
were achieved through procedural and technological changes in Cuban enterprises, which 
improved the quality of Cuban products, making them acceptable for use in Cuban resorts 
(Figueras in Campbell (ed.) 2013: 244). These changes included, among many others, packaging 
systems for foods and beverages, higher-quality slaughter houses and factories, high-speed 
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communications technology for the processing of payments; and new “organizational and 
technical measures” in the construction sector (Figueras in Campbell (ed.) 2013: 244-6).  
 Hence, the relationship of tourism and increased productivity followed this stylized logic: 
1. The soviet bloc and Soviet Union collapsed in the early 1990s, leaving Cuba without 
its main source of goods and foreign exchange. 
2. In response, Cuban authorities identified sectors of the economy that can garner 
foreign exchange, with tourism being the most promising candidate. 
3. Large amounts of investment were poured into the tourist sector itself, and related 
infrastructure that can support that sector. 
4. The tourist sector was very successful in attracting foreign exchange, but almost 90% 
of that foreign exchange leaked out of the Cuban economy, since most inputs for the 
industry were purchased as imports. 
5. In response, Cuban authorities and enterprises further invest in areas of the economy 
that support the tourist sector, which engendered a substantial increase in productivity 
and efficiency in sectors of the economy outside of, but supportive of, the tourist 
industry. 
 
Regarding the current state of Cuban tourism, and its role in Cuba’s general economy, it should 
be emphasized that, despite Cuba’s shift towards high-value services and goods, tourism 
continues to play a very prominent role in the Cuban economy. As Garcia Jimenez states, 
tourism “has remained a central pillar of the Cuban economy into the twenty first century” (in 
Campbell (ed.) 2013: 260), and still accounted for 17.7% of Cuba’s export earnings as of 2009 
(Garcia Jimenez in Campbell (ed.) 2013: 261). As noted above, tourism garnered one in every 
three of Cuba’s export dollars between 1990-2010 (Figueras in Campbell (ed.) 2013: 242). To 
put this into perspective, as Cuban economist Alfredo Garcia Jimenez notes, Cuba’s tourism 
sector funded approximately one-third of its necessary imports (in Campbell (ed.) 2013: 253). 
Moreover, if the intersectoral efficiency and productivity gains that were impelled by the tourism 
sector are taken into account, which significantly reduced the amount of foreign exchange Cuba 
had to allocate towards imports, then the tonic effects of the tourist sector on Cuba’s current 
account cannot be understated.  
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 Notwithstanding the above beneficial facets of the industry, some concerns have been 
raised amongst Cuban officials and citizens, vis-à-vis the dissonance between international 
tourism and Cuba’s socialist ideology. Garcia Jimenez notes that Cuban authorities have strived 
to take sufficient measures to ensure that tourism on the island advances Cuba’s social goals (or 
at least does not impede them) (Garcia Jimenez in Campbell (ed.) 2013: 265-6). However, there 
has been one development, in particular, that contravenes Cuban socialism, and that is the 
continued growth in inequality that has been associated with sectors of the economy that have 
access to foreign exchange. Those who work in hard currency sectors, including tourism, have 
access to foreign exchange, and thus have much more purchasing power on the island than their 
peers outside of such sectors. This has led to a situation in which waiters and maids in hotels can 
make much more than doctors and university professors.  
 There are three main points that should be taken into consideration when assessing the 
tourism-inequality dynamic, though. First, Cubans are aware of the issue, and many have taken it 
upon themselves to make sure their increased earnings are, at least partially, being allocated 
towards social goals of the general Cuban population. For instance, many employees in the 
tourist industry have “voluntarily donated a portion of their gratuities to the public-health sector, 
mainly to children’s hospitals,” through a program called “My Contribution to Life” (Garcia 
Jimenez in Campbell (ed.) 2013: 266).  
Second, the employees of the tourist sector that make higher wages than their peers in the 
general economy, are also the members of society that the Cuban Revolution has historically 
aimed to help: women, young people, and recent graduates. As Figueras explains, “half the 
workers in tourism are younger than thirty-five. Women make up 41 percent of the labor force. 
(And) seventy-two percent of the workforce in tourism completed the twelfth grade or higher” 
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(Figueras in Campbell (ed.) 2013: 246). Hence, while inequity is anathema to the Cuban 
Revolution, at least those who are benefiting from such inequality are those that the Cuban 
Revolution was meant to assist. 
Lastly, despite the effect on inequality that tourism has had on the island, the Cuban 
population actually has a rather favorable perception of the industry. For instance, 72% of 
Cubans polled believe “that most of the population benefits from the industry and that it 
promotes the nation’s socioeconomic development”; and a majority of Cubans associate the 
word “tourism” with “concepts of development, economy, exports, and foreign exchange” 
(Garcia Jimenez in Campbell (ed.) 2013: 266-7). This is a very positive sign for Cuban officials, 
since tourism is a very necessary source of foreign exchange. By involving the Cuban population 
in the discussion, and by increasing the living standards of those within, and without, the tourist 
sector, Cuban officials seem to have taken the necessary measures to ensure that the Cuban 
populace is not prohibitively opposed to the sector. This should be interpreted as a sign that 
Cubans, along with Cuban officials, are approaching Cuban economic policies in a pragmatic 
manner. More importantly, the fact that workers within the tourist sector have volunteered 
portions of their income for Cuban social goals should serve as evidence that socialist ideology is 
alive and well in Cuban society, living alongside capitalist measures that have been necessary for 
the island’s survival.  
As one would expect, the one development that could cause another drastic increase in 
Cuba’s tourist sector would be a liberalization of the United States’ travel policy with Cuba. The 
issue of the United States’ general travel policy with Cuba is covered more thoroughly in this 
thesis’s chapter on US-Cuba relations, but a few figures illustrate the deleterious effects of the 
travel restrictions the US maintains with Cuba. First, half of all tourists in the Caribbean, 
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annually, are from the United States, and this figure reaches 70% in some of the more popular 
tourist spots (Figueras in Campbell (ed.) 2013: 248). Moreover, Americans spend more than any 
group of tourists, and they spread out their travels more evenly across the calendar, whereas 
Europeans and other groups tend to travel mainly between December and March (Figueras in 
Campbell (ed.) 2013: 248). Taken together, this means that Cuba is excluded from enjoying the 
benefits of 1) a higher volume of tourists, in Americans; 2) the higher spending that those 
Americans represent; and 3) the seasonal smoothing that American tourism brings to other 
Caribbean countries.  
In short, tourism continues to play a very integral role in Cuba’s economy, even though it 
is no longer Cuba’s most dynamic industry, in terms of growth. Tourism’s growth leveled off 
after the 1990s, and other service sectors, such as biotech services, have surpassed tourism in 
terms of annual growth (Garcia Jimenez in Campbell (ed.) 2013: 260-1). However, tourism still 
accounts for 17.7% of Cuba’s total exports, and will continue to play a major role in garnering 
foreign exchange and intersectoral innovation. Moreover, although tourism, as well as the 
broader foreign-exchange-garnering sector of the Cuban economy, has been associated with 
increased inequity on the island, it has also allowed many of Cuba’s vulnerable citizens – its 
women and youth – to experience increased purchasing power. Moreover, the general population, 
when polled, is not particularly averse to the tourist sector. The benefits that Cuba has 
experienced, vis-à-vis increased foreign exchange, would increase substantially if the United 
States were to lift its travel ban with the island, though no sensible analysts on either side of the 
Florida Straits is holding their breath. 
Foreign Direct Investment in Cuba 
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Attracting FDI to the island has been integral to Cuba’s economic transition, insofar as 
FDI proffers the opportunity for technology transfer, hard currency obtainment, and increased 
economic growth. As to the role that FDI has historically played in Cuba, Perez Villanueva notes 
that “In the early 1990s, Cuba faced a serious economic crisis that gave rise to a reform period 
characterized as a process of adjustment, management of the crisis, and opening to the 
international economy,” and that “the most important aspects of the economic opening to the 
outside world were the promotion and acceptance of foreign capital investment, the restructuring 
of foreign trade, and the accelerated development of international tourism” (in Dominguez et al 
(ed.) (2012): 213-4). To attract FDI during that time, Cuba enacted Law 77 of 1995 and 
Resolution 5290, the goals of which were to complement domestic efforts to develop, 
technologically and economically, in strategic sectors; find new export markets, technologies, 
and financing; and substitute imports, stimulate exports, and stimulate domestic production 
(Perez Villanueva in Dominguez et al (ed.) (2012): 214). These measures introduced the 
following measures to attract foreign capital: tax-free repatriation of dividends; taxes capped at 
30% on profits and 25% on payroll; and other incentives that depend on the individual investor 
and the sector in which an investment occurs (Perez Villanueva in Dominguez et al (ed.) (2012): 
215).  
In March of 2014, Cuban officials approved a law that further incentivizes foreign 
investment by allowing for 100% foreign ownership of ventures (rather than 49%), reduces to 15% 
the tax on companies that invest in joint ventures, and allows a grace period for this tax of at 
least eight years for investors (Gomez, USA Today, 3/29/14). Moreover, the law streamlines the 
application process for investing in Cuban businesses, reducing the application from more than a 
year in some cases, to no more than two months (Gomez, USA Today, 3/29/14). While Cuban 
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authorities are ostensibly trying to send a positive signal to foreign investors, Carmelo Mesa-
Lago argues that convincing foreign investors of the legitimacy of these recent measures will be 
difficult, given Cuban officials’ history of saying one thing and doing another. For instance, as 
Mesa-Lago notes, 100% foreign ownership was legally approved back in 1995, but Cuban 
bureaucrats ensured that the law would never effectively be applied (Gomez, USA Today, 
3/29/14). Thus, foreign investors may need further signals that current reforms are permanent 
rather than ephemeral. “Still,” as Alan Gomez states, “some say it's impossible to simply dismiss 
what has now been six years of economic changes in Cuba” (Gomez, USA Today, 3/29/14).  
In addition to investors’ fears that reforms may be simply be repealed in the future, the 
amount of FDI that the island has been able to attract has also been limited by the US embargo: 
“As a result of the U.S. embargo, Cuba is subject to the impediments posed by a foreign law that 
restricts its access to FDI resources. Consequently, Cuba is rated a ‘risk country’” (Dominguez et 
al (ed.) 2012: 218). According to Perez Villanueva, the incentives Cuba offers foreign capital 
could be expanded if the U.S. embargo were loosened, but because of the embargo, “many 
foreign businesses have left Cuba after merging with companies based in the United States” 
(Dominguez et al (ed.) 2012: 215). Providing anecdotal evidence of this problem, Ismael Clark, 
president of the Cuban Academy of Sciences, explains, “You'd have a supplier for several years, 
and suddenly you'd get a letter from the company saying, 'We can't supply you anymore because 
our firm was bought by an American transnational’” (Starr 2004). Hence, the embargo has acted 
as a considerable impediment to increasing FDI in Cuba.47  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47	  The	  degree	  to	  which	  the	  Embargo	  actually	  dissuades	  foreign	  actors	  from	  cooperating	  with	  Cuba	  is	  contestable,	  though,	  
because	  the	  Helms-­‐burton	  Act	  has	  not	  been	  fully	  enforced	  by	  US	  presidents	  since	  1996.	  Among	  other	  provisions,	  the	  
Helms-­‐Burton	  Act,	  passed	  in	  1996,	  allows	  US	  citizens	  to	  sue	  persons	  or	  corporations	  that	  “traffic”	  in	  property	  that	  has	  
been	  confiscated	  by	  the	  Cuban	  government;	  however,	  Bill	  Clinton,	  per	  a	  provision	  of	  Helms-­‐Burton,	  chose	  to	  suspend	  suits	  
and	  sanctions	  related	  to	  “trafficking”	  every	  six	  months,	  and	  every	  US	  president	  has	  followed	  suit	  since	  (Mesa-­‐Lago	  and	  
Perez-­‐Lopez	  2013:	  13).	  Hence,	  while	  the	  deleterious	  effects	  of	  the	  Embargo	  on	  the	  Cuban	  economy	  have	  been	  substantial,	  
it	  may	  be	  the	  case	  that	  they	  have	  not	  been	  as	  significant	  in	  practice	  as	  they	  seem	  to	  be	  on	  paper	  (though	  this	  presumes	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 In addition to the embargo, Cuba has also experienced some difficulty in attracting FDI, 
due to two factors in particular. First, Cuba began seeking FDI five or ten years later than other 
countries in the region, as these countries transitioned to neoliberal development policies 
(Quinones Chang in Campbell (ed.) 2013: 93). This meant that many investors that were looking 
for politically friendly investment locations had already found what they were looking for in 
other countries in the region. Second, Cuba, even when it decided to attract FDI, refused to 
introduce the full complement of neoliberal policies that many investors see as a prerequisite for 
investment. Rather, “Cuba sought to guarantee significant gains for its national economy at the 
possible cost of lower profits for the foreign investors” (Quinones Chang in Campbell (ed.) 2013: 
93). As regards this second point, for instance, Cuban authorities excluded the health and 
education sectors from FDI, lest the labor rights of Cubans within those sectors be compromised 
(Quinones Chang in Campbell (ed.) 2013: 94) (the irony of this being that it is Cubans within 
foreign-invested sectors that have experienced significantly higher wages than their peers in the 
health and education sectors). Also, Cuba maintains a thorough regulatory framework, which not 
only approves FDI on a case-by-case basis, but also monitors foreign-invested entities to ensure 
that agreements are being sufficiently abided by (Quinones Chang in Campbell (ed.) 2013: 94). 
 Cuba’s recalcitrance, vis-à-vis implementation of neoliberal policies, is illustrative of the 
general attempt of Cuban authorities to alloy necessary capitalist policies with policies advance 
Cuba’s social goals. Hence, Quinones Chang emphasizes that capitalist policies, such as those 
meant to attract FDI, are subordinate to Cuban socialist goals, rather than the other way around, 
which makes Cuba’s policy rather unique in the region. “The Cuban policy differs from the 
neoliberal policies of its neighbors in viewing these inflows as complementing national 
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investment efforts, rather than as taking precedence over national economic development” 
(Quinones Chang in Campbell (ed.) 2013: 94). 
Despite the embargo, and despite Cuba’s refusal to fully implement neoliberal policies, 
the island’s foreign investment laws have allowed foreign capital to play an important, and 
successful, role in the Cuban economy in the last two decades. As Perez Villanueva explains, 
joint ventures, while declining in number over the last decade, have continued to increase in 
efficiency and productivity, increasing their total sales of goods and services. As of 2008, such 
ventures reached nearly $5.3 billion in total sales, their exports reached $1.9 billion, and direct 
income to Cuba from such ventures totaled $1.07 billion. Hence, this author states, “In almost all 
the productive areas in which Cuba has shown its best production or export results, foreign 
capital is present in one form or another. This should point toward the potential for further 
developing such businesses” (Perez Villanueva in Dominguez et al (ed.) (2012): 218-9). Some of 
the sectors in which Cuba has actively attracted FDI include tourism, mining and petroleum, 
geological surveys, infrastructure, agriculture, packaging, and renewable energy (Perez 
Villanueva in Dominguez et al (ed.) (2012): 219-220).  
Notwithstanding the benefits that have accrued to Cuba as a result of FDI, Perez 
Villanueva argues that more substantial levels of FDI will not occur without an active effort on 
the part of the Cuban government to 1) increase domestic investment, and 2) stimulate domestic 
economic growth. In other words, FDI growth must be achieved as a result of, and as a part of 
more general, strategy of economic reform (Perez Villanueva in Dominguez et al (ed.) (2012): 
224).  
 Recent reforms have substantial potential, insofar as they are meant to increase 
investment and economic growth. In 2013, the Cuban government has continued its reform 
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campaign, one facet of which allows Cuban state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to retain 50% of 
their profits for reinvestment (Rodriguez, BusinessWeek, 07/09/13). Such a policy, combined 
with other facets of recent reforms, which “aim to resuscitate a flagging economy with a 
smattering of free-market principles” (Rodriguez, BusinessWeek, 07/09/13), have the potential 
to attract substantial FDI, as investors anticipate the growth effects of Cuba’s shift towards 
market principles.  
Regarding the importance of FDI attraction, analysts argue that there is much China can 
teach the developing world, including Cuba. For instance, Perez Villanueva notes that prior to 
1979 when Deng Xiaoping decided to open the Chinese economy, there was virtually no FDI to 
speak of in China (Perez Villanueva in Dominguez et al. (ed.) 2012(a): 198). However, after 
implementing an FDI-attraction strategy that includes allowances for equity joint ventures, 
cooperative businesses, wholly foreign-owned companies, and joint exploration contracts, among 
other forms of FDI, China, in 2008, received more FDI than any other developing country ($108 
billion) (Perez Villanueva in Dominguez et al. (ed.) 2012(a): 195, 198). Hence, China has been 
able to enjoy the benefits of such large amounts of FDI, which include “technology transfer, 
economic and job growth, and acceleration of both economic development and integration into 
world markets” (Perez Villanueva in Dominguez et al. (ed.) 2012(a): 193), all of which Cuba is 
currently pursuing.  
Cuba should, in an expanded effort to further attract FDI, take some lessons from China. 
Cuban officials should note two key facets of China’s Joint Venture Law (the legislation that 
allowed for FDI into China – see Perez Villanueva in Dominguez et al. (ed.) 2012(a): 198). First, 
policies for attraction of FDI were adopted in a gradual, experimental fashion, both in terms of 
kinds of investment allowed, and in terms of geographic regions that allowed for FDI (Perez 
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Villanueva in Dominguez et al. (ed.) 2012(a): 198; Naughton 2007). Second, China adopted 
policies to attract FDI in a purely pragmatic fashion, regardless of “whether or not these policies 
were consistent with Communist ideology” (Perez Villanueva in Dominguez et al. (ed.) 2012(a): 
206). Hence, an important question in Cuba will be how such policies can be made to comport 
with Cuban socialism, particularly since, “as a historical fact, in the socialist economies that have 
existed up until now, foreign investments were long identified as bearers of bourgeois 
penetration during the imperialist phase of the capitalist system. For years this was the reigning 
view of the presence of foreign capital within such economies” (Perez Villanueva in Dominguez 
et al. (ed.) 2012(a): 193).  
This issue - of whether or not FDI attraction comports with Cuban socialism – is more 
apparent than real, for two reasons. First of all, the island has already created a significant 
foreign-invested sector, particularly in tourism. Hence, Cubans have grown used to a foreign-
invested sector, and have grown to value the wages it affords in the form of hard currency. 
Presumably, Cubans would be eager to see other sectors of the economy attract foreign 
investment (and dollars). Secondly, insofar as foreign investment may run counter to Cuban 
socialism, Cuban officials have simply chosen to skirt the issue: “officials insist that a wholesale 
embrace of capitalism is not planned” (Rodriguez, Business Week, 07/09/13).  
Hence, ostensibly, Cuban officials are approaching the issue of FDI in a pragmatic 
fashion, similar to the approach taken by Chinese officials during China’s transition. Indeed, in 
2013, Cuban officials have introduced new reforms that are intended to attract FDI. Even more 
interestingly, the reforms are meant to attract FDI from a very specific source - Cuban ex pats. 
As explained by Patricia Mallen of The International Business Times, “There is one particular 
group of investors the government is hoping to attract: Cubans abroad. Llanio Gonzalez, consul 
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in the Cuban Interests Section in Washington, said that the reforms will make it easier for Cuban 
families who emigrated to the U.S. to move back or invest in the country from afar” (07/11/13). 
Hence, Cuba is hoping to attract FDI from its diaspora, similar to China’s approach of attracting 
investment from Chinese international citizens during its transition. If Cuban officials wish to 
draw more lessons from China’s transition, they would be well advised to introduce future FDI 
schemes in a geographically piecemeal fashion, as China did. This would allow for prudent 
experimentation as Cuba further marketizes its economy.   
In sum, Cuba’s approach to FDI, similar to its approach to tourism, is illustrative of the 
broader strategy that Cuban officials have followed during the island’s transition. First, FDI was 
recognized as an economic necessity, both for attracting capital, and for learning through 
technology transfer. Recognizing this necessity, Cuban authorities sought to attract FDI in such a 
way as to obviate the more deleterious effects of neoliberal development policies. More 
importantly, they sought to ensure that policies attracting FDI would positively complement 
Cuba’s social goals, for instance, by excluding health and education from FDI (though, once 
again, the results of this policy may be counterintuitive, since doctors and professors have been 
unable to garner the increase in wages that their peers in the foreign-invested sectors have 
obtained). Lastly, Cuban authorities, by maintaining a state regulatory framework, have taken 
necessary measures to ensure that approved FDI ventures complement social policy on the island.  
Hence, as is the case with Cuba’s biotech industry, Cuba’s FDI strategy is illustrative of Cuba’s 
continuing attempt to reconcile “its economic development with the construction of an equitable 




 The Cuban economy, as a relatively open, island economy, has much to gain by further 
inserting itself into the world economy. Because there are limits to the degree to which Cuba can 
develop complete internal production cycles in sundry sectors of its internal economy, the island 
would be best-served by developing its exports, particularly in the area of human capital-
intensive biotech goods. Moreover, Cuba could ameliorate its current annual current account 
deficits by continuing its transfer of idle agricultural lands to private and cooperative producers. 
This would also proffer political benefits, since one of the countries relies on for food imports is 
the United States. 
 We now turn to recent and current economic and political reforms in Cuba, covering the 
periods between 2007-2010, and 2010-present. What will become clear when analyzing current 
reforms is that, while the island is still exhibiting a rather schizophrenic attitude towards market 




Chapter Six:  
Reforms Between 2007-2010 
 
Introduction 
On July 31st, 2006, Raul Castro, due to Fidel’s quickly-escalating intestinal health issues, 
provisionally assumed control of his brother’s three titles: First Secretary of the Communist 
Party, President of the Council of State and Ministers, and Commander in Chief of the Armed 
Forces. Explaining the issue, Fidel explained, “the ‘extreme stress’ of recent work had ‘brought 
about an acute intestinal crisis with persistent bleeding which made it necessary for me to 
undergo complicated surgery’” (Frank, 2013: 46). Although Fidel would not officially, but only 
provisionally, relinquish control of the presidency for another eighteen months (on February 24th, 
2008), and although five years would pass before it was finally clear that Raul was truly the one 
calling the shots, July 31st, 2006 nevertheless “marked the start of one of the most remarkable 
chapters in Cuba’s history” (Frank, 2013: 46-7). 
This chapter covers the reforms that took place between 2007-2010, while the next 
chapter focuses on reforms that have occurred since 2010, subsequent to the Communist Party’s 
6th Party Congress, and publication of a document entitled Project of Economic and Social 
Policy Guidelines for the Party and the Revolution, which was meant to correct and formalize 
previous reforms, and guide the Party in deeper reforms in forthcoming years.  
There are Four main conclusions that should be taken away from this chapter. First, the 
agenda of Cuban reforms between 2007-2010 was conducted in a deliberate, incremental manner. 
Cuban authorities are wary of the destabilizing effects of “shock therapy capitalism,” and are 
thus introducing all reforms in a gradual manner.  
Second, reforms between 2007-2010 represented a substantially pragmatic shift towards 
the market. Carmelo Mesa-Lago characterizes the period of reforms between 2007 as “the third 
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and most powerful pragmatist cycle of the Revolution” (Mesa-Lago and Perez-Lopez, 2013: 3). 
However, this does not mean that Cuba is going to become a categorically free market economy. 
The recent financial crisis has confirmed many Cubans’ fears regarding the volatility of 
unfettered capitalism.  
Third, reforms between 2007-2010 were at least semi-democratic, particularly in the area 
of agricultural reforms, in the sense that reforms were developed and implemented according to 
demands and feedback from the Cuban population. 
Finally, the effects of the reforms have been mixed, as there were still significant 
distortions in the Cuban economy that were vitiating the efficacy of the reforms. Deeper reforms 
after 2010, as will be discussed in the next chapter, were meant to correct some of these 
distortions. 
Reforms: 2007-2010 
Monetary Policy Reform  
One of the most significant developments in Cuba in recent years has been the 
introduction of an independent monetary policy that has explicitly sought to control inflation. 
This is important because current Cuban monetary policy contrasts vividly with monetary policy 
during the early years of the Special Period, which was subordinated to fiscal policy, and 
passively monetized fiscal deficits (Rowe and Faya in Ritter, 2004: 50). A brief contrast of the 
crisis of 1990-93 with the recent global economic crisis of 2008 will clearly illustrate the 
difference between the two forms of monetary policy. This section on monetary reform is 
included because it is illustrative of the decision of Cuban authorities to conduct policy in a 
pragmatic, responsible manner, thus comporting with the general nature of recent reforms.  
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 Confronting the Special Period crisis after the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 
1990s, the Cuban economy experienced a substantial contraction, with GDP shrinking by 
approximately 35% between 1990 and 1993. The resultant drop in government revenue led the 
Cuban government to run budget deficits that averaged 24.9% of GDP during those same years. 
Because Cuba did not have access to international credit markets, it resorted to printing money to 
finance its budget deficits (Alejandro in Dominguez et al., 2012: 117). Hence why Rowe and 
Faya characterize monetary policy during that period as being passively accommodative to fiscal 
policy (in Ritter, 2004: 50). As a result of deficit monetization, the annual growth rate of the 
money supply reached 27.6%, inflation peaked in the informal market at 200% in 1993, and the 
peso exchange rate for the dollar reached 150:1 (Alejandro in Dominguez et al., 2012: 117). It 
should be noted that inflation in Cuba during these years was recorded in informal markets. This 
is because, prior to market reforms of the Special Period, increases in the Cuban money supply 
led to excess liquidity, rather than inflation, because most consumption was conducted through 
state retail stores, and prices in these stores were controlled. Hence, excess money supply simply 
meant that Cubans had to engage in “forced saving” as they had more money to hold, but no 
goods to purchase. As Alejandro explains,  
Until the early 1990s, the Cuban family’s basic market basket was obtained almost entirely from state 
retail markets. In this environment, monetary disequilibrium was reflected not in prices, but in the 
accumulation of excess liquidity. Thus, the process of monetary instability did not result in price increases, 
but rather in repressed inflation or forced savings. The economic authorities, as their fundamental monetary 
strategy, monitored this variable – the amount of liquidity held by the population – and undertook actions 
to control it. The policy was to maintain monetary liquidity within certain limits or ratios relative to the 
value of production (in Dominguez et al., 2012: 17). 
 
Hence, during the early years of the Special Period, fiscal deficits were passively 
monetized, but such monetization was only reflected, vis-à-vis inflation, in informal markets, 
since formal retail prices were controlled, and thus did not reflect price changes. Thus, Cuban 
authorities paid attention to excess liquidity, but not inflation, during this period. 
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 Since the early 1990s, monetary policy on the island has detached itself from fiscal policy, 
and has managed to keep inflation in single-digits (Alejandro in Dominguez et al., 2012: 117). 
Cuban monetary authorities now track a Consumer Price Index that monitors inflation in three 
different markets: state retail (both rationed and non-rationed) markets, which make up 40% of 
the index; agricultural markets, which account for 30% of the index; and informal markets, 
which account for 30% of the index. 
The amended form of monetary policy is best illustrated by contrasting the monetary 
response of the Special Period crisis to the monetary response of the recent global economic 
crisis. During the Special Period, the Cuban government ran substantial deficits, and monetized 
those deficits by increasing the money supply. During the recent crisis, Cuban authorities 
followed a more cautious path. As Alejandro explains, Cuba lacked the necessary foreign 
exchange reserves to engage in sustained expansionary fiscal policies. The government 
responded in 2008 by increasing the money supply by 16.8% to finance a budget deficit. As a 
result, inflation increased in unregulated markets (where prices are not fixed), though Alejandro 
notes that exact numbers on this inflation are difficult to obtain, because official data are not 
available (Alejandro in Dominguez et al., 2012: 125-6). Cuba was able to keep inflation in check 
by instituting price freezes in sectors that experienced cost increases, such as agricultural markets 
(Alejandro in Dominguez et al., 2012: 126). Unlike the sustained budget deficits (and necessary 
monetization) of the Special Period, the budget deficit of 2008 was quickly reduced in 2009, and 
the money supply only grew by 2.1%, as the government chose to reduce spending, thus 
allowing for a trade surplus in 2009, and alleviating inflationary pressures in unregulated prices 
(Alejandro in Dominguez et al., 2012: 115). Such a response indicates that Cuban authorities 
have developed a better understanding of how money supply, retail mercantile circulation, and 
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regulated prices ultimately impact inflation in unregulated prices48, and more importantly, that 
they are willing to take the necessary steps to limit such inflation.49 
The efforts on the part of Cuban officials to detach monetary policy from fiscal policy 
and rein in inflation should be understood as part of a more general strategy of economic reform. 
By focusing on inflation rather than liquidity, Cuban authorities are sending a signal that private 
markets will continue to play an increasingly salient role in the Cuban economy, since private 
markets are where inflation manifests most clearly. Moreover, by minimizing inflation, the 
Cuban government is furthering its efforts to unify its currency, since the closer the peso moves 
to parity with the US dollar and the CUC, the more capable Cuban authorities will be of unifying 
the CUC and Peso. 
Agricultural Reforms, 2007-2010 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Although extensive attention is not here paid to how inflation is transmitted in the Cuban economy, a brief overview should be 
noted. A stylized account is taken from Alejandro in Dominguez et at., 2012: 115-35). The endogenous variable in this account is 
“inflation in unregulated prices.” Inflation is measured in some official outlets, such as state gas stations. However, inflation is 
much more substantial in unregulated prices because state retail prices are usually fixed. The exogenous variables that affect 
inflation are: US dollars possessed by the Ministry of Internal Commerce (MINCIN); money supply; regulated prices; retail 
mercantile circulation (amount of goods for sale at state retail outlets); input costs (particularly fuel costs); and internal demand. 
It is these latter two variables that affect inflation; the other exogenous variables affect inflation (in unregulated prices) indirectly 
through internal demand and costs.  
The inflation transmission process is as follows: the supply of US dollars possessed by MINCIN is positively related to retail 
mercantile circulation, since increased dollar possession by MINCIN leads to increased purchases of good for sale at state retail 
outlets. Regulated prices are also positively related to retail mercantile circulation, as increased prices cause mercantile 
circulation to increase. Regulated prices also affect input costs, since regulated prices in one sector are often input costs for 
another, purchasing sector. Money supply and retail mercantile circulation affect internal demand, as increased money supply, or 
decreased retail mercantile circulation, will cause internal demand to increase in non-state markets. Finally, costs and internal 
demand both a have a positive relation to inflation in unregulated prices.  
The above explanation makes it clear why Cuban authorities act through price controls (regulated prices) and sale of dollars to 
MINCIN. By controlling prices in state markets, the state can limit inflation to particular sectors at the beginning of the 
production chain. For instance, when fuel prices rose in 2008, and drove up costs for agricultural inputs (fuel, tools), price 
controls were imposed in agricultural markets, thus isolating inflation to agricultural inputs (Alejandro in Dominguez et al., 2012: 
126, 128). Through sales of dollars to MINCIN, the Central Bank can also control inflation. If dollars are sold to MINCIN, then 
MINCIN can purchase goods for resale at state retail outlets, thus increasing retail mercantile circulation, driving down internal 
demand in non-state markets, and driving down inflation in unregulated prices.  
49	  It is important to understand that Cuban monetary policy does not entail open market operations. There is no market for Cuban 
government debt, and fiscal deficits have a direct impact on monetary stability (Alejandro in Dominguez et al., 2012: 119). 
Rather than using open market operations, Cuban authorities use a combination of fiscal restraint, as well as control of exchange 
and interest rates. The central bank also attempts to affect supply and demand of consumer goods by selling dollars to the 
Ministry of Internal Commerce, so that it can purchase goods for subsequent sale at state retail outlets (Alejandro in Dominguez 






The area of agriculture has been addressed in a particularly earnest manner by Cuban 
officials since Raul Castro assumed office on the island. As explained in this thesis’s chapter on 
“Inserting Cuba Into the World Economy,” the Cuban authorities have been compelled to 
promulgate reforms that will galvanize agricultural production, so as to mitigate Cuba’s current 
account deficit in agricultural goods. As Laverty states,  
In 2008, Cuba spent $2.2 billion USD importing food while vast plots of land remained idle or 
unproductive. Cuban government officials told visiting CDA (Center for Democracy in the 
Americas) delegations that the country was importing over 80% of its daily food requirements. 
Increased international prices for food, including such staples as rice and beans, animal feed, and 
powdered milk forced Cuba to spend hundreds of millions of dollars more on imports in 2008 than 
2007 (2011: 18).   
 
Raul Castro, since taking office in 2006, has recognized these shortcomings, and has 
identified agricultural productivity as one of the most – if not the most – urgent exigencies in the 
Cuban economy. As a result, it is agriculture that has undergone the most substantial reforms 
since Raul took office. As Damien Cave of The New York Times explains, “No other industry has 
seen as much liberalization, with a steady rollout of incentives for farmers. And Mr. Castro has 
been explicit about his reasoning: increasing efficiency and food production to replace imports 
that cost Cuba hundreds of millions of dollars a year is a matter ‘of national security’” (12-08-
12).  
Importantly, agricultural reforms since 2007 have been developed and implemented in 
what could arguably be deemed a “semi-democratic” fashion. As Laverty states, regarding 
agricultural reforms since 2007, “After consultations with farmers – from state, private, and 
cooperative farms – the government took concrete steps aimed at increasing incentives for 
producing food” (2011: 18). Laverty emphasizes that Raul has distinguished himself from Fidel 
in this respect:  
Fidel Castro no longer commands public opinion, and his successor has a very different style 
of leadership. President Raul Castro, by working to cultivate a debate in Cuba about the reforms, 
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appears to be trying to bring along the general public and counterbalance resistance to change in 
the bureaucracy and among orthodox economic socialists (2011: 45).  
 
Moreover, in a rather significant development, the state has allowed criticism of these 
reforms to be published in Granma, the Communist Party’s newspaper; the newspaper “was also 
used to criticize recalcitrant bureaucrats and encourage the process to move forward” (Laverty, 
2011: 20). This means that individual Cubans are being allowed to voice their concerns, whether 
pro- or anti-reform, in the state’s newspaper – a phenomenon that would have been unthinkable 
in previous years.  
Hence, agricultural reforms during this period are illustrative of first, the Cuban 
government’s pragmatism in addressing economic exigencies; and second, the Cuban 
government’s attempts to include the welfare and concerns of those affected by its policies when 
developing such policies. Including the Cuban population in the policy formation process should 
go far in endowing current and future reforms with a degree of legitimacy.  
Regarding the particular substance of agricultural reforms, there were four main reforms 
that were promulgated between 2007-2010, which were meant to increase productivity and 
efficiency. The list is as follows: 
1. Legalizing the purchase of some inputs by farmers; 
2. Granting usufruct tenure of idle land to private farmers and cooperatives; 
3. Increasing prices offered to farmers for agricultural products; 
4. And decentralizing government functions and organizational structures, as they 
pertain to agriculture (Gonzales in Dominguez et al., 2012(a): 75-91; Marc Frank, 
Reuters, 03-17-08, 06-01-2014).  
 
First, there was the legalization of supply purchases by farmers in 2008. The Cuban 
government opened state50 stores through which such supplies could be purchased. As prominent 
Cuba expert Marc Frank explains, this reform was meant to address complaints of farmers 
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  chapter.	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regarding the nonproductive use of land: “Cuban farmers complain the cumbersome state-run 
system does not work, leaving crops to rot and farmers without timely supplies such as animal 
feed, resulting in poor land use” (3/17/08). Prior to this reform, which started with dairy farmers, 
and was subsequently extended to include other farmers, all allocation of supplies to farmers was 
conducted through the central government. Such an arrangement was one instrument through 
which the state ensured a legally stipulated amount of agricultural output: “In exchange for state-
assigned supplies, they must grow certain crops or raise certain livestock to sell back to the 
government at fixed prices” (Frank, 3/17/08). Hence, by deciding who gets how much of certain 
inputs, the state has been able to determine which agricultural products are produced, as well as 
how much output of each product farmers are obligated to sell to the state. By allowing farmers 
more latitude in purchase of inputs, the state signaled a broader move towards more liberalized 
and decentralized production and sale decisions. 
 This move towards less agricultural control was made by Raul Castro as an attempt to 
mitigate shortfalls in production, as well as mollify the concerns of farmers regarding such 
shortfalls (Frank, 03/17/08). Moreover, the decision to allow farmers to purchase their own 
inputs indicates that Raul Castro is listening to pragmatic concerns of economists on the island, 
who have voiced their concerns regarding the state’s monopoly over agricultural inputs and 
output, and the lack of incentives that obtain in such a situation, since productive farmers are not 
rewarded, and unproductive farmers do not suffer any consequences (Frank, 3/17/08). These 
economists argue that allowing more productive farmers to retain their earnings and purchase 
inputs would act as a substantial incentive, which would galvanize production (Frank, 3/17/08).  
This reform, while relatively substantial by Cuban standards, still falls short of meeting 
the demands of Cuban farmers. Being able to purchase inputs from state stores is a step in the 
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right direction, but these stores, since this reform was introduced in 2008, have exhibited 
shortages of goods that farmers must purchase as inputs. Hence, farmers often have no choice 
but to turn to black market sellers for such inputs as fertilizer (The Economist, 06/29/13: 35). 
The most practical option that Cuban officials have in meeting this shortfall in demand is the 
introduction of private, wholesale markets that sell agricultural inputs, with which it is currently 
experimenting (Frank, 3/17/08: 35; Frank, 6/1/2014). The state most likely avoided introducing 
private wholesale markets in 2008 because it wanted to experiment with direct purchases by 
farmers; it can also be presumed that the state did not want to completely forfeit the political and 
economic power that it retains through the control of agricultural inputs. Such control will 
possibly wane if the state legalizes private wholesale markets in agricultural inputs.  
The upshot that should be taken away regarding the legalization of direct agricultural 
input purchases from the state, is that Cuban authorities implemented such a reform to 1) 
mitigate output shortfalls; 2) address the concerns and desires of Cuban farmers; and 3) 
implement reforms in a piecemeal fashion that allowed for experimentation, while also avoiding 
the complete loss of political and economic power that the state retains by controlling input 
allocation. Importantly, the tonic effects of semi-liberalization of input purchases by Cuban 
farmers will be vitiated until more extensive wholesale markets for such inputs are introduced on 
the island, a topic that is discussed in the next chapter. 
The second agricultural reform between 2007-2010 was the granting of usufruct use of 
idle agricultural lands to private farmers and co-ops. In terms of attempts at increasing 
productivity, Gonzales identifies this reform as the single most important agricultural reform, 
since the non-use of potentially productive lands is one of the most salient factors contributing to 
the island’s balance of payments deficit in agricultural products (Gonzales in Dominguez et al., 
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2012(a): 75). According to Gonzales, this is a step that should have been prioritized and 
advanced much earlier, since, as of 2008, 27% of Cuba’s potentially productive land remained 
idle (in Dominguez et al., 2012(a): 82). Such an arrangement is unacceptable, given that Cuba 
runs substantial trade deficits in agriculture. 
The importance and potential of transferring agricultural production to the private sector 
cannot be understated. As the examples of China and Vietnam51 have illustrated, the shifting of 
agricultural production from the state to the private sector led to substantial increases in yields. 
In Cuba after the Revolution, all private landholdings over 6.5 hectares were banned, with the 
state coming to own 70% of all land, “making it the largest unproductive landowner in Latin 
America when Raul took over,” neglecting the land, and allowing marabou and other weeds to 
overrun approximately one-third of Cuba’s 3.6 million hectares of productive land (Frank, 2013: 
116). And while Cuba should look to Vietnam and China as examples of the potentialities of 
private land production, officials really need look no further than their own island: as an 
agricultural expert informed Marc Frank, while the state retains 70% of land, “the private sector, 
with just a fraction of the land, produces 70 percent of (Cuba’s) produce” (Frank, 2013: 117). 
Thus, Cuba’s agricultural production has the potential to increase substantially if Cuban officials 
continue to transfer arable land to private hands. 
To address the issue of idle land, the government promulgated two measures, Decree-
Law 259 and Regulatory Legal Decree 282 in July and August 2008, respectively. Decree-Law 
259 clarifies and codifies the period for usufruct use of land by individuals; clarifies the 
meanings of the terms “economic property” and “legal property”52; and introduces taxes/rents on 
those who engage in usufruct use of land (Gonzales in Dominguez et al., 2012(a): 82). Decree-
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Law 282 establishes the operating procedures of Decree-Law 259, regarding how a usufruct 
license/contract is obtained (Gonzales in Dominguez et al., 2012(a): 82).  
While these laws are indicative of progress being made on the part of Cuban authorities 
to increase agricultural productivity, both Decree-Law 259 and Legal Decree 282, as they were 
originally introduced in 2008, had significant flaws that vitiated their efficacy. Regarding 
Decree-Law 259, there are four main problems.  
First, 259 did not take into account variance in the amount of time that different 
agricultural endeavors require – all usufruct contracts were set for ten years, at which point they 
can be renewed (Gonzales in Dominguez et al., 2012(a): 82). Gonzales-Corzo identifies this 
aspect of 259 as one of the most saliently flawed of its provisions, since it instills in Cubans a 
sense that the land is not indeed theirs, and thus acts as a disincentive to “engage in the rational 
and optimal use of resources” (2009).  
 Second, 259 did not account for variance in the amount of monetary investment that is 
required for different agricultural endeavors – payments for improvements made to property are 
only paid at the end of the usufruct period. Moreover, the building of “permanent structures” (e.g. 
homes) on agricultural land granted in usufruct was initially53 prohibited (Frank, 2013: 262). 
This facet of 259 acts as a disincentive to those using the land, since they are unlikely to make 
more than minimal improvements/investments, because 1) they will not be compensated until at 
least a decade into the future; 2) because this facet of 259 reinforces the perception by land users 
that their time on the land is strictly transitory; and 3) because developing agricultural land is 
simply not practical when farmers are not allowed to build homes, and thus live on, their land. 
As one farmer put it, “It’s ridiculous to try to work on a plot of land during the day and, when 
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night falls, to have to go away and leave it until the following day” (Frank, 2013: 263). And, as 
another farmer put it, “Only someone sitting in an office in Havana with no idea what goes on in 
the countryside would lease land for just ten years and prohibit building permanent structures on 
it” (Frank, 2013: 263). Such policies prevent the repopulation of agricultural land in Cuba; 
Gonzales stresses the significance of this point, since “Cuban agricultural regions require 
repopulation. Without an agricultural population, there is no guarantee for stable or sustained 
agricultural production” (in Dominguez et al., 2012(a): 82-3). As is explained in the next chapter, 
however, these shortcomings have largely been addressed since 2012.  
Third, the state only granted 13.42 hectares (33 acres) of land per farmer for usufruct use, 
which, according to many Cubans, is simply insufficient (Frank, 2013: 262). 
Finally, Decree-Law 259 allowed for termination of the usufruct contract by the state if 
“contractually agreed production” is not satisfied. Since commitments to the state meet and 
exceed 70% of total production, farmers are disincentivized from producing, since the state 
procurement agency, Acopio, continues to pay below market prices for many agricultural 
products (in Dominguez et al., 2012(a): 83).  
Regarding Legal Decree 282, the main flaws pertained to the amount of paperwork 
required to obtain a usufruct permit, as well as the amount of time that is required to obtain the 
permit, as the law was worded in its initial promulgation in 2008. At the low end, obtaining a 
usufruct permit required nine documents to be filed, which takes 63 days. At the high end, 
obtaining a license required thirteen documents, plus an additional appeals document, the 
processing of which can take up to 128 days (in Dominguez et al., 2012(a): 83-4). In other words, 
the process for gaining a usufruct license was convoluted by excessive bureaucratic hurdles.  
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According to Gonzales, by the end of 2009, permits for approximately 52% of all idle 
land had been granted, and 35% of the permitted land had been planted. While a step in the right 
direction, Perkins notes that a majority of usufruct land is “still cultivated by state or collective 
entities that have very limited decision-making authority at the production unit level” (Gonzales 
in Dominguez et al., 2012(a): 108). As discussed in this thesis’s chapter on “Inserting Cuba Into 
the World Economy,” much better use of this land would be made in private hands, as has 
occurred in other developing states, such as China and Vietnam.  
In sum, the usufruct permit process is illustrative of the nature of the general pattern of 
recent reforms in Cuba: piecemeal advances towards the market, punctuated and hampered by 
centralized bureaucracy. There are significant flaws that obtain in the system, including problems 
pertaining to Decree-Law 259 that disincentivize production; bureaucratic impediments in Legal 
Decree 282; and the small proportion of usufruct land that has been allocated to private, as 
opposed to state or collective, entities. However, it is not surprising that such “flaws” obtain in 
Cuba’s usufruct system. Such “inefficient” arrangements, such as those that allow for contract 
abrogation if production quotas are not met, allow for Cuban authorities to maintain a certain 
level of control over agricultural processes. In this sense, insofar as bureaucratic impediments 
allow Cuban officials to monitor and manage the pace and nature of privatization and 
marketization measures, such inefficiencies are not only predictable, but also desirable, as long 
as they are temporary. 
As time passes, it should be expected that there will be more significant moves towards 
marketization and privatization, but such moves will be conducted in an incremental, deliberate 
manner. Such has been the case in wholesale markets and other input procurement arrangements 
– the state has started off with experimentation with particular sectors and products (and even in 
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particular regions, as has been the case with wholesale markets recently – see The Economist, 
06/29/13: 35), and has slowly indicated that further marketization is being contemplated. Indeed, 
Perkins’s concern that the process of usufruct reform “has been slow” (In Dominguez et al., 
2012(a): 108) seems strange, since a deliberate pace seems to be an intended objective of Cuban 
officials. Reforms are supposed to be “slow.”  
Moreover, a fully privatized and marketized agricultural sector is not what Cuban 
authorities are aiming for, nor is it likely to eventuate. Rather, as Gonzales-Corzo explains, the 
island is moving towards a form of market socialist, rather than fully privatized, agricultural 
sector (2009). And in this regard, Cuba’s reforms are typical of an economy moving away from a 
fully centrally planned economy, with the state continuing to retain a large role in the economy, 
and playing a large regulatory role in the areas that it has privatized and marketized (Gonzales-
Corzo, 2009). 
The third agricultural reform between 2007-2010 was an increase in prices paid for 
agricultural products. This reform was sufficiently analyzed elsewhere54, so it will not be 
extensively covered here. Suffice it to say that the Cuban government, attempting to increase 
agricultural productivity, offered higher procurement prices for some goods. Effects have been 
mixed, with productivity of some products, such as milk, increasing, while some products, such 
as meat, were unaffected. Importantly, Cuban agricultural producers who were offered higher 
prices were also paid in CUCs. Payment in CUCs, along with the legalization of input purchases 
at state stores (which take CUCs), suggest that increased productivity may yet appear in higher-
priced products that have yet to be affected by price increases, such as meat (Gonzales in 
Dominguez et al., 2012(a): 80). However, it should be noted that, despite increased procurement 
prices, Acopio continues to offer prices for many goods below the market price (Gonzales in 
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Dominguez et al., 2012(a): 81-2). As a result, productivity gains may not be as substantial as 
Cuban authorities had anticipated. Such is likely to be the case until Acopio offers near-market 
prices for agricultural goods, since producers are often required to sell 70% of their output to the 
state.  
The fourth agricultural reform between 2007-2010 pertained to the decentralization of 
government functions and organizational structures, and the simplification of state bureaucracy, 
as they pertain to agriculture (Gonzales in Dominguez et al., 2012(a): 75-91; Frank, Reuters, 
3/17/08). Decision-making authority has been devolved to the municipal level, and 17 
municipalities have been selected by the Ministry of Agriculture to serve as experimentation 
sites for decentralized agricultural production. Moreover, the “Ministry of Economy and 
Planning (MEP) has selected five additional municipalities to which it provides economic 
resources and assists with decentralized forms of economic management to foster import 
substitution, increase food production and employment, and generate export income” (Gonzales 
in Dominguez et al., 2012(a): 90). In terms of simplifying agricultural bureaucracy, the Food 
Industry Ministry has been merged with the Ministry of Fishing, and steps are being taken to 
merge the Ministry of Agriculture with the Ministry of Sugar. As Gonzales explains, “the final 
goal is to constitute a single Ministry of Food to oversee agriculture, fishing, and the food 
industry” (Gonzales in Dominguez et al., 2012(a): 90).  
Decentralization and bureaucratic simplification are definitely steps in the right direction. 
However, supply and demand disequilibria are likely to remain until the state allows individual 
farmers more latitude in making their own production decisions. As stated before, allowing a 
larger role for the market in determining agricultural production decisions has had much success 
in countries such as Vietnam and China.  
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As of 2012, the results of these agricultural reforms had seemingly fallen short of 
expectations. According to Laverty, farm sector output decreased by 2.8% in 2010. Also, while 
20% of Cuba’s population works in agriculture, this sector only accounts for 4% of GDP 
(Laverty, 2011: 20). Further, the Cuban National Statistics Office reported in 2011 that many key 
crops exhibited lower yields in 2010 than they had in 2005, and that imports of food were set to 
increase once again in 2011 (Laverty, 2011: 20). Damien Cave of The New York Times reiterates 
this finding when he states, “At this point, by most measures, the project has failed…Many 
Cubans are actually seeing less food at private markets” (12-08-12). Hagelberg attributes these 
shortcomings to a lack of investment in the agricultural sector: capital investment in agriculture 
(crop and livestock) fell from 428.7 million pesos in 2009 to 327.9 million in 2009 and to101.6 
million in the first six months of 2010 (2009). Moreover, agriculture’s share of total investment 
fell in 2009 and 2010, which does not indicate that authorities are prioritizing the sector as they 
say they are (Hagelberg, 2009). 
Notwithstanding official figures and the critiques of experts, it should be noted that 
positive perceptions of the reforms do in fact obtain on the island, and that reforms may have 
been more effective than official figures indicate. Regarding the 2.8% decrease in agricultural 
productivity, a group of Cuban ranchers explained to Marc Frank that “the data was based on old 
reporting that did not accurately take into account the growing amount of food being sold 
directly to consumers, bypassing the state and sometimes its antiquated reporting system” (Frank, 
2013: 271). Regarding a 20% increase in food prices in 2011, these same ranchers explained to 
Frank that “market economics and the end of subsidies” (Frank, 2013: 271) were responsible, 
implying that inflation is to be expected when state support is reduced. An additional salutary 
indicator for the Cuban economy pertains to the structural change that has occurred, vis-à-vis the 
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agricultural sector: according to Marino Murillo, “in July 2012…just 53 percent of farm output 
was contracted by the state that year and the other 47 percent sold on the market or consumed by 
farmers, compared with more than 80 percent sold to the state just a few years earlier” (Frank, 
2013: 270). Related to this last point, and pertaining to the general nature of Cuban economic 
reforms, Campbell states,  
The reforms target medium- and long-term structural changes. It will be several years before one 
can even begin to meaningfully evaluate from the data whether the reforms are starting to yield the 
desired results. In fact, given the immediate disruptions in ‘business as usual’ entailed by the large 
structural changes being proposed, one would expect many empirical measures to worsen…before 
beginning to improve, even if they are eventually successful (in Campbell, 2013: 7-8).  
 
Moreover, to the extent that agricultural reforms have thus far yielded disappointing 
results, Damien Cave of the New York Time argues that this is not because the reforms don’t 
have the potential to be effective; rather, it’s mainly due to infrastructural shortcomings on the 
island, since poor roads prevent much produce from arriving at its destination without rotting. 
There is also a lack of inputs – fertilizer for instance – that prevents productivity gains: 
“Government economists are aware of the problem. If you give people land and no resources, it 
doesn’t matter what happens on the land,” said Joaquin Infante of the Havana-based Cuban 
National Association of Economists” (Cave, New York Times 12-08-12).  
Hence, in response to disparaging critiques of these agricultural reforms, it should be 
stressed that 1) official figures may be flawed; 2) inflation is a natural corollary when the state 
reduces agricultural subsidies; 3) the structure of the agricultural market is moving towards the 
market and away from the state, which is one of the main goals of recent agricultural reforms; 4) 
infrastructural issues and lack of access to inputs are also to blame, which are unrelated to the 
potential of agricultural reforms themselves; and 5) the long-term and structural nature of Cuba’s 
reforms precludes any meaningful assessment of their efficacy thus far. 
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Notwithstanding the above explanations for, and responses to, shortcomings in 
agricultural reforms, Cuban authorities would be well advised to err on the side of caution, and 
presume that official figures are accurate indicators of the efficacy of agricultural reforms. The 
fact is, economic policy is based on economic indicators, and reformers have to do the best with 
the figures they have. Hence, until better data comes along, official figures should be relied upon. 
If such a presumption is made, then agricultural reforms between 2007-2010 fell short, at least 
according to some metrics, and there are multiple reasons why agricultural output was so low.  
First, while the government has granted farmers the right to buy inputs, the supply of 
many of these inputs in state outlets still falls short of demand. As The Economist states, the 
“ability to sell a broader selection of crops remains stymied by a shortage of seeds and fertilizers,” 
which are not yet available for sale in private wholesale markets (06-29-13). Government 
economists are aware of this problem – as Joaquin Infante of the Cuban National Association of 
Economists states, “If you give people land and no resources, it doesn’t matter what happens on 
the land,” (Cave, New York Times 12-08-12). This shortfall in supply could be addressed by 
legalizing private wholesale markets for agricultural inputs, which the state has not yet done, but 
with which it is experimenting on The Isle of Youth, as of June 1st, 2014. The shortfall could also 
be addressed by allowing farmers to purchase their own imports, (Cave, New York Times 12-08-
12), though this measure would necessitate a multitude of other reforms, pertaining to farmers’ 
access to hard currency, among others (the direct purchase of imports would also vitiate the 
efforts of the government to monitor and reduce its balance of payments deficit).  
Second, while usufruct contracts have done much to shift idle land into production, there 
are flaws in the laws that grant farmers usufruct use. Decree-Law 259 fails to grant farmers a 
sense of ownership in the land they use, and thus acts as a disincentive to investment in that land. 
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Legal Decree 282 simply presents too many bureaucratic hurdles, and requires too much time, in 
the usufruct contract process. Moreover, despite the shift towards productive use of idle land, too 
much of this land remains in state and collective, rather than private, hands.  
Third, while the state raised procurement prices for many agricultural goods, which 
yielded mixed results, the prices offered still usually fall short of market prices. As Gonzales 
argues, offering procurement prices that are aligned with market prices would go far to increase 
productivity (in Dominguez et al., 2012(a): 82).  
Fourth, while the state has engaged in a process of decentralization of agricultural 
production decisions, it still has not granted enough autonomy to individual farmers to determine, 
on their own, what crops to grow. Allowing the market to play a larger role in this regard would 
likely go far in approximating equilibrium in agricultural supply and demand. The state could 
still require a certain quota of particular necessities, so as to fulfill its obligation to provide 
rationed goods, but these obligations are likely to continue to fall, as the state continues to reduce 
the number of goods that are available through the ration card (Haven, 11/07/09). Indeed, as 
Laverty explains, the state is shifting towards a system of targeted benefits, which is “being sold 
to the population as a work incentive” (2011: 61). Raul Castro has made this clear when stating, 
“The social welfare system is being reorganized to ensure a rational and deferential support to 
those who really need it. Instead of massively subsidizing products as we do now, we shall 
gradually provide for those people lacking other support” (Granma, 04/16/11). This shift towards 
targeted benefits is significant because it represents a shift towards material, rather than moral, 
incentives in the Cuban economy, which is characteristic of a more general pragmatic shift 
taking place. As this targeted benefit system develops, and farmers are required to provide less of 
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their produce to the state, they should garner more latitude in determining their own production 
decisions.  
Finally, a major contributor to supply shortfalls has been an inadequate supply of state-
owned trucks, which are necessary to get harvests from their point of production to the point of 
sale. Because of the shortage of necessary transportation, there is a substantial amount of wasted 
produce on the island: “In 2009, hundreds of tons of tomatoes, part of a bumper crop that year, 
rotted because of a lack of transportation by the government agency charged with bringing food 
to processing centers” (Cave, New York Times, 12-08-12). Thus, investing in more delivery 
trucks – a step that would be relatively easy compared to the form and scale of other reforms – 
would go far in addressing shortfalls in food supply in Cuban markets. The state also has the 
option of simply allowing agricultural producers to directly deliver their produce to retailers 
themselves.  
Conclusion 
Cuban agricultural reforms between 2007-2010 were representative of the Cuban 
government’s desire, and more importantly willingness, to engage in marketization and 
privatization reforms. Such reforms were developed in a semi-democratic manner, through 
consultation with the Cuban populace, and were implemented in a deliberate, gradual manner. 
Complaints emerged subsequent to these reforms that the state had not gone far enough in 
liberalizing the agricultural sector. These complaints are reasonable and well-founded, but they 
failed to recognize that the tentative pace of Cuban reforms is deliberate, not accidental – Cuban 
officials have been implementing reforms on an experimental basis, and are not willing to 
completely relinquish political and economic control of the agricultural sector, nor are they 
willing to completely abandon their obligation to providing basic agricultural necessities to the 
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Cuban people. In 2010 the years following, Cuban officials exhibited their determination to 
continue liberalization in a deliberate fashion when they introduced a number of measures that 
corrected and deepened the reforms of 2007-2010. The next chapter provides an overview and 




Chapter Seven:  
The 2010 Project Document and the 6th Party Congress: Reforms since 2010 
 
Introduction 
In the second half of 2010, two important and related events occurred. First, the 
Communist Party issued a document titled Project of Economic and Social Policy Guidelines for 
the Party and the Revolution (hereafter referred to as the 2010 Project Document), in which 
future reform plans were laid out. Second, the Communist Party announced that it would hold 
the first party congress since 1997. This would be the 6th Party Congress, and it took place in 
April of 2011. During this Congress, feedback and suggestions pertaining to the 2010 Project 
Document were discussed by the Party. Subsequently, a series of substantial economic reforms 
were announced and introduced on the island. This chapter provides an overview and analysis of 
these reforms. The main conclusions regarding these reforms are: 1) These reforms have moved 
the Cuban economy further towards the market than it has ever been since 1959; 2) the reforms 
of the 6th Party Congress are likely here to stay; and 3) the process of reforms has included 
feedback from, and debate with, Cuban experts, academics, and citizens, thus allowing the 
process to be characterized as semi-democratic.  
Project of Economic and Social Policy Guidelines for the Party and the Revolution (“2010 
Project Document”) 
 
In the latter half of 2010, the Cuban Communist Party released a document titled, Project 
of Economic and Social Policy Guidelines for the Party and the Revolution (2010 Project 
Document). This document gave an assessment of recent economic developments, both within 
and without Cuba, and listed economic and social guidelines that were being considered for 
reform in 2011. The purpose of the document, and its nature as mainly a set of economic 
proposals, is explained in the introduction of the document:  
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In proposing economic policy guidelines, in the framework of the 6th Congress of the Cuban 
Communist Party, it is necessary to make an evaluation of the state of the economy and the problems to 
resolve, taking into account the principal events and circumstances, both external and internal, since the last 
Congress [in 1997] (Cuba, Communist Party, 2010).  
 
As to external problems pertaining to the Cuban economy, the document very specifically 
refers to the recent turmoil of the international economy: “the international context is 
characterized by the existence of a systemic structural crisis that is simultaneously an economic, 
financial, energy, food and ecological crisis, with a greater impact in the underdeveloped 
countries” (Cuba, Communist Party, 2010).“Cuba,” the document continues, “with an open 
economy and dependent on its external relations, has not been exempt from the impact of this 
crisis, which is expressed in price instability of the products it exchanges, in the demand for its 
export products and services, as well as greater restrictions on the possibilities of obtaining 
external financing” (Cuba, Communist Party, 2010). This sentiment is echoed by Perez, who 
explains that the main impacts of the global crisis on the Cuban economy have been through: a 
fall in the prices of Cuba’s exports, mainly nickel; a rise in international food prices, which 
constitute a significant proportion of Cuba’s imports; and future decreases in access to capital, 
since Cuba implemented capital outflow controls55, and stopped servicing some of its external 
debts, since the crisis started (2009: 17-18).56 Luckily, at least in this case, Cuba does not have 
equity markets, so it has not experienced capital outflows in that regard (Perez, 2009: 7). 
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  of	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  important	  for	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  benefit	  of	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  to	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  and	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  Forbes	  (2006),	  responding	  to	  Grabel’s	  (2001)	  
arguments	  in	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  of	  capital	  controls,	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  development	  had	  negative	  
macroeconomic	  effects,	  which	  could	  not	  be	  detected	  in	  macroeconomic	  analyses.	  Forbes	  argues	  that	  the	  ability	  of	  smaller	  
firms	  to	  compete	  was	  deleteriously	  affected	  by	  Chile’s	  capital	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  the	  mechanisms	  through	  which	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  global	  crisis	  has	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  developed	  to	  
developing	  countries,	  see	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  2009.	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  which	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  spread	  to	  developing	  countries	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  1)	  decreased	  demand	  in	  developed	  countries	  for	  exports	  of	  developing	  countries;	  and	  2)	  capital	  flight	  and	  
decreased	  FDI.	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Surprisingly, as of November 2009, Cuba’s exports of tourism had not been negatively affected 
by the crisis that began, in earnest, in September of 2008 (Perez, 2009: 10).  
Regarding external debt and future access to capital, Cuba may be in a particularly 
precarious position. Nailing down a concrete figure regarding Cuba’s external debt is difficult, 
and estimates vary between analysts. The official figure for active (currently serviced) external 
debt reported by the Cuban Central Bank in 2007 was US$8.9 billion, with another US$7.6 
billion owed to Western countries, which is not being serviced, for an aggregate of US$16.5 
billion (Perez, 2009: 13). In contrast, the Cuban Transition Project of the University of Miami 
estimates Cuba’s external debt to be US$23.8 billion at the end of 2007 (Perez, 2009: 13). 
Analyses show that bank credits flowing to Cuba were already beginning to decrease 
substantially by the last quarter of 2008, indicating that Cuba’s access to credit from private 
banks was beginning to wane (Perez, 2009: 13). What makes Cuba’s situation so precarious is 
that much of its credit was through governments, rather than private banks or suppliers, and that 
much of that credit was provided by a small number of governments, particularly Venezuela and 
China, mainly for political reasons (Perez, 2009: 13, 18). The upshot: Cuba’s inability to service 
a large portion of its debt to many Western countries, along with the island’s reliance on 
politically-motivated credit, means that Cuba will have a more difficult time accessing credit 
from Western countries, and could lose access to capital from its political allies, if political 
conditions change in those countries (though, this is much more likely in Venezuela than in 
China) 
Perez explains that developing countries are more capable of absorbing crisis-related 
shocks if they have balance of payment surpluses, large amounts of foreign exchange reserves, 
and/or budget surpluses or small deficits. In all of these categories, Cuba shows signs of trouble, 
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as it runs sizable deficits in its balance of payments and budget, and lacks substantial foreign 
exchange reserves (Perez, 2009). Thus, the Cuban economy and government exhibit conditions 
that make the island particularly vulnerable to external shocks.57 Mesa-Lago and Vidal-
Alejandro concur with this assessment, and explain that Cuba’s open economy has most 
negatively been affected by decreased demand for its exports, increased deficits in its balance of 
payments, and a decrease in access to capital markets, which has exacerbated its inability to fight 
its recession with fiscal or monetary policy (2010: 715). 
However, the effect that international markets have had on Cuba is complicated, for the 
following reason. The IMF’s World Economic Outlook has found a very strong connection 
between the onset of crises in developed and developing countries (Perez, 2009: 4).58 Moreover, 
“transmission (of crises) is stronger to emerging countries with tighter financial links to 
advanced economies” (Perez, 2009: 4). Hence, because Cuba already had limited access to 
capital markets, particularly private bank credit, the effect of the financial crisis may have been 
less pronounced than in other developing countries. Also, China is one country that continued to 
provide credit to Cuba during the financial crisis, and China was able to sustain the crisis much 
better than most countries, developed or developing.  
Cuban officials, in the 2010 Project Document, also drew attention to economic problems 
internal to the economy that must be addressed: “Internally, there have been factors such as low 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  Cuba’s	  situation	  has	  its	  genesis	  exclusively	  in	  domestic	  policy	  and	  economics.	  All	  of	  the	  above	  
problems	  are	  exacerbated	  by	  the	  US’	  economic	  blockade	  on	  the	  island,	  and	  Cuban	  authorities,	  while	  recognizing	  their	  own	  
shortcomings,	  also	  continue	  to	  emphasize	  the	  role	  that	  the	  US	  has	  played	  in	  their	  crisis:	  the	  Project of Economic and Social 
Policy Guidelines for the Party and the Revolution states, “the country experienced the tightening of the economic, commercial 
and financial blockade that has been imposed uninterruptedly by the US for half a century, a situation that has not been changed 
by the present administration of that country, and that has resulted in great losses” (Cuba, Communist Party, 2010). In other 
words, Cuban authorities still identify the US as one of the major economic problems external to the country; however, on the 
internal side, they are recognizing the exigent need for reform.	  
58	  The	  link	  between	  crises	  in	  developed	  states	  and	  developing	  states	  is	  well	  established,	  and	  not	  surprising,	  given	  the	  
highly	  integrated	  nature	  of	  the	  international	  economy.	  Equity	  and	  debt	  markets	  were	  one	  of	  the	  main	  conduits	  through	  
which	  the	  recent	  financial	  crisis	  spread	  from	  developed	  to	  developing	  countries,	  “as	  investment	  from	  mature	  markets	  
retracted	  to	  consolidate	  positions	  at	  home	  to	  face	  increasing	  financial	  losses”	  (Perez	  2009:	  3).	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efficiency, de-capitalization of the productive base and of infrastructure, the aging of the 
population and stagnation in population growth” (Cuba, Communist Party, 2010). Significantly, 
the Cuban Communist Party, in this document, is no longer blaming the United States as the sole 
contributor to its economic problems. Rather, the Party is recognizing that the Cuban economy is 
suffering from flaws that are of the island’s own making, and making known its desire to address 
them in earnest (Laverty, 2011: 3).   
To address internal and external deficiencies in the Cuban economy, the 2010 Project 
Document proposes 291 specific measures. Not all of these will be covered, but the document 
evinces a clear, pragmatic, market-oriented reform strategy. For instance, the document, in 
guideline #158, emphasizes the need to introduce additional forms of non-state, private- and self-
employment (During the same time period, the Cuban government issued new licenses for 178 
new forms of self-employment (Laverty, 2011: 24)). Guideline #158 also recognizes the need to 
develop an adequate tax system for Cuban entrepreneurs. In guideline #6, the document indicates 
that a more clear separation between the state sector and the private enterprise sector must 
emerge in the Cuban economy. Guideline #14 gives a very clear indication of the market-
oriented nature of the reforms when it states, “Control over enterprise management will be based 
principally on economic-financial mechanisms, in place of administrative mechanisms, removing 
the existing burden of controls on enterprise activity” (Cuba, Communist Party, 2010). The 2010 
Project Document, in guideline #19, indicates that loss-sustaining state enterprises will no longer 
be subsidized. Guideline #19 also indicates that wages will be based on productivity. Illustrating 
the truly radical nature of this document, guideline #162 even called for the “orderly elimination 
of the ration book system as a form of distribution that is regulated, egalitarian and subsidised, 
and which favours both those citizens who need it and those who do not, therefore encouraging 
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people to exchange and resell these products, [thus] stimulating a black market” (Cuba, 
Communist Party, 2010). Hence, even the ration book, an item that is considered to symbolize 
Cuban socialism, was on the table for elimination59.  
Importantly, many of the proposals in the 2010 Project Document are phrased in a rather 
vague manner, which affords Cuban officials latitude in the scope and pace of their 
implementation. Laverty draws attention to this issue when he states, “In some areas, the 
guidelines and government intentions are extremely vague or undeveloped, making it difficult to 
predict how fast and far the government is willing to go in reforming the economy.” Moreover, 
he explains, “The proposed changes lack timetables and clear action steps of how they will be 
executed” (Laverty, 2011: 28). As an illustration of this issue, guideline #19, which links’ 
employee pay to productivity, simply states, “The incomes of the workers of an enterprise will 
be linked to the final results obtained” (Cuba, Communist Party, 2010). The vague and 
ambiguous nature of this guideline is evident in its phrasing. However, to perceive this as a “flaw” 
would evince a misunderstanding of these reforms, insofar as one of their inherent benefits is 
their vagueness. An absence of timetables and of unequivocal wording may be undesirable for 
investors and Cuban citizens, but would constrain Cuban officials in implementing these reforms. 
Using ambiguous language allows Cuban authorities latitude in both the substance, and timetable, 
of these reforms. Cuban authorities have shown that they are genuinely dedicated to 
implementing current reforms, but such implementation will be conducted on their own terms, 
according to their own interpretations, and on their own timetable.  
After the publication of the 2010 Project Document, thousands of meetings were held 
across the island, with the document being the central topic of debate. More than eight million of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59	  The	  ration	  book	  has	  not	  yet	  been	  eliminated,	  but	  items	  available	  through	  the	  card	  have	  been	  substantially	  scaled	  back	  
(Haven, Boston Globe, 11/07/09; Center for Democracy in the Americas, 09/03/10). 	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Cuba’s 11.2 million citizens partook in such debates, according to government figures (Laverty, 
2011: 25). Criticism and praise for proposed reforms were both fielded during these meetings, 
with the result being that, according to Granma, “619,387 proposals for deletions, additions and 
modifications, and expressions of doubts and concerns” were put forward through the meetings 
(Laverty, 2011: 25). Raul Castro used the meetings both to gauge public opinion regarding 
proposed reforms, as well as to garner support for such reforms (Laverty, 2011: 25). The 
inclusion of such a large portion of the Cuban populace in the debate process led one Cuban 
official to remark on the “democratic” nature of the process, “[there] has never been a process so 
thorough and well-rounded that included so many members of the population, as well as an 
exhaustive effort by the government to take their feedback into account” (Laverty, 2011: 26).  
Laverty notes that some critics of the process have argued that the debates were simply a 
“façade,” and some Cuban economists have argued that the proposed reforms do not go far 
enough in the direction of marketization (Laverty, 2011: 26). However, Laverty argues that the 
government was genuinely listening to citizens’ concerns, and that modifications to the 2010 
Project Document guidelines were based on citizens’ feedback (Laverty, 2011: 26). Lopez-
Levy’s analysis comports with Laverty’s analysis, as he states,  
For the first time, nonpartisan organizations of Cuban civil society, like the religious 
communities, debated the document in their publications and published articles and editorials 
about the proposed reforms. In the end, the organizing commission rewrote the document, which 
was discussed again by the different provincial delegations to the congress and then on the floor of 
the Sixth Congress itself (2011: 218). 
 
Indeed, the Communist Party characterized the 2010 Project Document as a popular referendum, 
and stated, “In a truly extensive democratic exercise, the people freely stated their views, 
clarified their doubts, proposed amendments, expressed their dissatisfactions and discrepancies, 
and suggested that we work toward the solution of other problems not included in the document” 
(Granma 04/16/11). The Party, in this statement, ostensibly showed its willingness to brook 
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partially democratic processes, as well as to allow for dissenting opinions in the policy process. 
Hence, the debate process that followed the publication of the 2010 Project Document should be 
seen as at least a semi-democratic process.  
The 6th Party Congress and Subsequent Reforms 
In April of 2011, the Cuban Communist Party convened for its 6th Party Congress, the 
first since 1997. As Lopez-Levy notes, the 6th Party Congress should be seen as a continuation of 
the 2010 Project Document (2011: 218). The Cuban Communist Party expressed as much when 
it stated, during the 6th Party Congress, “this Congress really started on November 9 last year, 
with the release of the Draft Guidelines of the Economic and Social Policy of the Party and the 
Revolution” (Granma, 04/16/11). Hence, in the future, when analysts are discussing Cuba’s 
“transition,” a proper starting point, if only for pedagogical reasons, should be with the 
publication of the Project of Economic and Social Policy Guidelines for the Party and the 
Revolution in 2010.  
The 6th Party Congress essentially amended, formalized, and expanded, the guidelines of 
the 2010 Project Document. As the Communist Party stated during the Congress, “The original 
document [2010 Project Document] contained 291 guidelines; 16 of them were moved to others; 
94 preserved their phrasing; 181 had their content modified; and, 36 new guidelines were 
incorporated for a grand total of 311 guidelines in the current draft” (Granma, 04/16/11).  
The 6th Party Congress, and subsequent reforms, have confirmed that the Cuban economy 
is moving in a pragmatic manner towards the market. This section provides an overview of Raul 
Castro’s address to the 6th Party Congress, since this address provides a good illustration of 
Raul’s vision for Cuban politics and economics. This section also provides an overview and 
analysis of the economic reforms that have transpired since the Congress.  
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Raul’s address to the 6th Party Congress 
During the 6th Party Congress, Raul Castro gave Cubans an idea of the path the island 
would be following in the following years. At the same time, and just as importantly, he 
intimated to Cubans the change in ideology amongst Cuban officials that was transpiring on the 
island. There were five main themes that could be discerned in Raul’s address: general 
rationalization of the economy; decentralization; privatization; the fostering of democratic 
processes; separation of party and state; and the introduction of term limits. 
General Rationalization 
First, Raul emphasized that Cuban institutions must undergo a dramatic process of 
rationalization. Raul explained that for the benchmarks of the Cuban Revolution to be 
maintained, revisions of some state institutions would be necessary. Raul stated, “without 
renouncing their quality and scope, the social programs should be characterized by greater 
rationality so that better and sustainable results can be obtained in the future with lower spending 
and keeping the balance with the general economic situation of [Cuba]” (Granma, 04/16/11). The 
Communist Party first enunciated its plans to rationalize the economy with the 2010 Project 
Document, in which it stated its plans to reduce “inflated payrolls,” and gradually eliminate the 
ration book (Cuba, Communist Party, 2010). In his address, Raul expressed his discontent with 
the perverse incentives and distortions that the ration book had introduced into the Cuban 
economy. By reiterating its plan to discontinue the ration book, the resolve of the Cuban 
government to pursue a pragmatic course moving forward was confirmed. 
A perusal of the discussion of the ration book is informative, as it is illustrative of the 
pragmatic agenda that was to be introduced by the 6th Party Congress. In this section of the 
address, Raul’s speech evinces a practical approach to Cuban economics, stressing the need to 
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reform antiquated Cuban institutions. Notably, when discussing the history of the ration book, 
Raul refers to the “harmful egalitarian quality” of the ration book (Cuba, Communist Party, 
2010). Raul argues that the ration book had introduced and preserved perverse incentives in the 
Cuban economy, since Cubans, for decades, have been granted equal access to certain goods, 
regardless of need (Cuba, Communist Party, 2010). As a result, Raul argues that Cubans lack 
incentives to work, and that the ration book causes those who do not actually need ration card 
items to hoard them (Cuba, Communist Party, 2010). Characterizing the ration book, and its 
attendant distortions, as anathema to the true nature of Cuban socialism, Raul states,  
Certainly, the use of the ration book to distribute the basic foods, which was justified under concrete 
historic circumstances, has remained with us for too long even when it contradicts the substance of the 
distribution principle that should characterize Socialism, that is, ‘From each in accordance with his ability 
and to each in accordance with his labor,’ and this situation should be resolved (Cuba, Communist Party, 
2010 – italics mine).  
 
Importantly, the above statement from Raul illustrates an important facet of Cuban 
reforms: even if they move the Cuban economy closer to the market, they are presented as being 
pragmatic measures that preserve, rather than contravene, Cuban socialism. Indeed, there may be 
no phrase that more accurately and concisely characterizes the pragmatic nature of Cuban 
socialism than the rephrasing of the classic Marxian “…to each according to his need,” to the 
updated, incentive-based, “to each in accordance with his labor” (Cuba, Communist Party, 2010), 
which evinces the desire of Cuban officials to move away from a categorically egalitarian, and 
towards a more meritocratic/pragmatic, society, while still formally adhering to the tenets of 
Cuban socialism.  
Moreover, Raul emphasizes that such a reform must be conducted on an incremental 
basis,” and that ration book reform must be conducted as part of a broader reform agenda:  
No member of the leadership of this country in their right mind would think of removing that system by 
decree, all at once, before creating the proper conditions to do so, which means undertaking other 
transformations of the Economic Model with a view to increasing labor efficiency and productivity in order 
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to guarantee stable levels of production and supplies of basic goods and services accessible to all citizens 
but no longer subsidized (Cuba, Communist Party, 2010).  
 
Hence, the approach to ration book reform can be considered as representative of the 
general nature of other 6th Party Congress reforms: pragmatic and market-oriented, incentive-
based, incremental, and systemic, while still formally adhering to the principles of Cuban 
socialism. As the above statement by Raul emphasizes, each measure that occurs during the 
current reform process must be assessed as part of a broader, systemic reform agenda. Thus why 
Laverty characterizes the current reform agenda as “a dramatic shift away from 
collectivism…toward a mixed economy where individual incentives are more prominent” (2011: 
28). Further emphasizing the systemic, dramatic nature of current reforms, Laverty explains, “In 
fact, this is the first major overhaul of economic policy adopted with such a document since the 
Economic Resolution adopted at the First Party Congress in 1976” (2011: 86, note 68).  
Decentralization 
Second, Raul emphasized that, in an attempt to increase efficiency in Cuban government 
and economics, a certain degree of decentralization would be necessary. Raul characterized the 
current model of the Cuban political economy as “excessively centralized,” and argued that 
“excessive centralization inhibits the development of initiatives in the society and in the entire 
production line, where the cadres got used to having everything decided ‘at the top’ and thus 
ceased feeling responsible for the outcome of the entities they headed” (Granma, 04/16/11). In 
other words, the Cuban government will be engaging in its project of decentralization as an 
attempt to cultivate initiative at the individual level amongst Cubans. Notably, this 
decentralization shall not only be introduced in traditional areas of government, but also in 
Cuban state-owned companies: “these concepts will permit a solid advance while avoiding 
backward steps in the gradual decentralization of powers from the Central to the local 
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governments, and from the ministries and other national agencies in favor of the increasing 
autonomy of the socialist State-funded companies” (Granma, 04/16/11). The anticipated model 
of the Cuban economy will be one in which the central government plays more of a regulatory 
role, as opposed to its current administrative role (Granma, 04/16/11).  
Raul also stressed, however, that decentralization will not occur abruptly, since there are 
certain requisite institutions that must be fostered on the island first. For instance, he explained 
that a proper regime of regulations would first have to be developed, “defining the powers of and 
functions at every level, from the national to the local, invariably accompanied by the 
corresponding accounting, financial and management oversight” (Granma, 04/16/11). In other 
words, notwithstanding a move towards autonomy and the market, Cuban officials understand 
that the state will still need to perform a strong oversight role, for which the state’s capacity must 
first be improved.  
In addition to regulatory institutions, Raul also emphasized that contracts must assume a 
more prominent role in Cuban affairs. The role of contracts was initially proposed in the 2010 
Project Document’s guideline #10, which stated, “The fulfilment (sic) of contracts between 
economic entities, with regard to the quality of the negotiation process and their drafting and 
signing, will be required as a key performance indicator” (Cuba, Communist Party, 2010). The 
use of contracts is intended to replace the current habit of “reunionism” amongst Cuban entities, 
which essentially means that rather than acting according to contract-based agreements, meetings 
are frequently called on an ad-hoc basis, so that parties can discuss and negotiate new details to 
any particular agreement (Cuba, Communist Party, 2010).  
Raul argued all of the above facets of the government’s decentralization agenda would be 
implemented in a manner that allowed for the continued use of planning in the economy, albeit at 
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a more local level. Evincing the pragmatic nature of this agenda, Raul argued that economic 
planning must occur “without ignoring the current market trends” (Cuba, Communist Party, 
2010). Hence, the Cuban government is trying to find a way to reconcile its inclination towards 
economic planning with current economic trends that are favoring a larger role for the market.  
Recognition of Role of Private Businesses 
Third, Raul gave formal recognition of the role that private enterprise currently plays, and 
should play, in the Cuban economy. As Laverty states, “in a repudiation of his brother’s earlier 
branding of entrepreneurs as ‘parasites,’ he reiterated that increased self-employment has 
become ‘an active element facilitating the construction of socialism in Cuba” (2011: 27). 
Furthermore, Raul declared, “the growth of the private economy should enlist the ‘support, 
assistance and protection of all officials at all levels’” (Laverty, 2011: 27).  
This embrace of private enterprise should mainly be seen as a complement to the island’s 
general shift towards economic rationalization. As the state attempts to decrease its budget 
deficits by reducing spending, it has expressed the need to lay off many redundant workers in the 
Cuban economy. It made this agenda clear in the 2010 Project Document, which expressed the 
need to “eliminate ‘inflated payrolls’ in all economic sectors and restructure employment, 
including through non-state formulas, applying a labour and salary policy for surplus 
workers that eliminates paternalistic procedures” (Cuba, Communist Party, 2010). To absorb 
many workers who will not have jobs as a result of these rationalization measures, Cuban 
officials have recognized the integral role of the private sector to offer gainful employment. 
Moreover, Raul argued that, as the private sector absorbs employees in non-critical sectors of the 
economy, the Cuban government will be more capable of fulfilling its role in critical sectors. For 
instance, Raul argued that allowing the private sector to play a role in nonessential sectors “will 
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make it easier for the State to continue ensuring healthcare and education services free of charge 
and on equal footing to all of the people and their adequate protection through the Social Welfare 
System” (Granma, 04/16/11). Hence, the necessarily increased role of the private sector in 
coming years was justified in terms of social justice and equity – terms that Cuban citizens 
would find palatable.  
The justifications Cuban authorities have proffered for privatization measures are 
interesting because, rather than attempting to reconceptualize Cuban socialism, they have chosen 
to characterize clearly capitalist measures as necessary for the support and continuation of 
traditional socialist programs. By explaining that privatization “facilitates” healthcare and 
education, Cuban authorities have intimated the necessity of capitalist reforms, in terms of being 
ancillary to Cuban socialism, rather than a component of it. It would not be surprising to see 
Cuban officials continue to implement this approach moving forward, as further privatization 
and marketization measures are introduced on the island. 
Democracy and Legitimacy 
Third, Raul acknowledged the positive role that democratic processes have played, and 
should continue to play, in Cuba’s development process. Raul noted that nationwide debates and 
meetings had transpired since the publication of the 2010 Project Document, and that in these 
meetings, more than eight million of Cuba’s approximately eleven million citizens had been 
involved, with more than three million citizens offering contributions/proposals (Cuba, 
Communist Party, 2010). Raul Castro referred to the 2010 Project Document as a referendum, 
which allowed the government to collect feedback from the people, thus allowing the 
government to gauge the population’s desires moving forward. Raul Castro thus characterized 
the process following the 2010 Project Document as “a truly extensive democratic exercise,” in 
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which “the people freely stated their views, clarified their doubts, proposed amendments, [and] 
expressed their dissatisfactions” (Cuba, Communist Party, 2010).  
Such democratic rhetoric is presumably an attempt on the part of Cuban officials to 
increase the legitimacy of the island’s economic reforms. The Cuban government realizes that 
moving forward, economic reforms are likely to engender substantial dislocations, and as such, it 
is in the best interest of the Communist Party to take any steps possible to increase the legitimacy 
of potential reforms. As Underhill and Zhang argue, there are three main components of 
legitimacy: input legitimacy, output legitimacy, and accountability. Regarding the input 
legitimacy, these authors explain, “the input side refers to the decision-making process and the 
extent to which the interests of the broader community are included” (2008: 538). Similarly, 
Scholte argues that legitimacy is increased when there is congruence between “decision makers” 
and “decision takers”; such congruence entails that “those whose life expectancy and life 
chances are significantly affected by social forces and processes ought to have a stake in the 
determination of the conditions and regulation of these” (2008: 309). Hence, by including the 
Cuban people (even if just ostensibly) in the formation of reforms, Cuba’s government is 
attempting to increase the input legitimacy of its reforms.  
As to output legitimacy, Underhill and Zhang explain that output legitimacy concerns 
results: “the capacity of rule-makers to produce outcomes which resolve problems and achieve 
collective goals in line with accepted and shared preferences or norms of the community” (2008: 
538). Input and out legitimacy are two sides of the same coin, and Cuban officials hope to 
increase output legitimacy by including Cubans in the development of reforms. Cuban 
authorities believe that by garnering the feedback of the Cuban people, they will be more capable 
of implementing reforms that comport with the will of the general population. As Raul states, 
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“we should cultivate and preserve a fluid relationship with the masses, devoid of formality, that 
would allow for an efficient feed-back of their concerns and dissatisfactions so that the masses 
can indicate the pace of the changes to be introduced” (Cuba, Communist Party, 2010). Thus, by 
listening to Cubans, authorities will be able to introduce reforms at a socially beneficial pace, 
thus reflecting the “shared preferences” of the Cuban populace. 
Regarding the third component of legitimacy, accountability, Underhill and Zhang 
explain that governments must be “responsible to broad publics upon whose lives their decisions 
have an impact,” and that “those in authority must to some degree represent the interests of the 
ruled, or an accountability gap emerges” (2008: 538). Essentially, accountability is the third facet 
of democracy and supports input and output legitimacy: without accountability, the other two 
lose much of their relevance. This aspect of legitimacy is the one in which Cuban authorities 
have the most progress to make, since accountability requires that 1) the population is free and 
willing to express its opinion regarding policies; and 2) the government is willing to respond in a 
way that addresses the people’s demands. Hence, while the Cuban government has evinced a 
willingness to take the population’s desires into account when developing and implementing 
policies, it will need to show a willingness to extend such collaborative efforts to the post policy-
implementation stage, so that policies can be reformulated if need be, and Cuban officials who 
don’t respond to popular demand can be removed from office. Thus far, accountability has 
obtained in the Cuban government in a distinctly Cuban manner: Cuban officials have been 
removed from office when they have engaged in corrupt practices, but their removal has been 
impelled by high-ranking Cuban officials, rather than by the Cuban population. Thus, 
accountability exists in the Cuban government, but not in a distinctly “democratic” manner, since 
competitive elections do not occur on the island. 
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Although Cuba surely has a long way to go in this regard, Raul Castro has expressed his 
opinion that the Cuban media should engage in “continuous and critical reports on the progress 
of the updating of the Economic Model so that with profound and shrewd articles and reports 
written in terms accessible to all they can help building in our country a culture about these 
topics” (Granma, 04/16/11). Cuban officials hope that by encouraging the media to report on 
Cuba’s reforms, the government will better be able to gauge the people’s assessment of reforms, 
and respond accordingly. Raul Castro explicitly states his hope that such measures will create 
greater legitimacy in Cuba’s reforms when he states, “When the Party and the Government…act 
promptly and harmoniously on the concerns of the people providing (sic) clear and simple 
explanations, the people support the measure and their confidence in their leaders grows” 
(Granma, 04/16/11).  
In sum, the Cuban government, by introducing a more democratic form of policy process, 
is hoping to increase input legitimacy, output legitimacy, and, potentially, even accountability, 
all of which comprise the general legitimacy that is accorded to any particular policy by a 
population. 
Separation of Party and Government 
Fourth, during the 6th Party Congress, Cuban officials “approved a separation between 
the government’s functions of running the country and the party’s role as the political custodian 
of socialism and order” (Abrahams and Lopez-Levy, 2011: 219). Explicating the distinction 
between the Party and the state, Raul Castro stated that the authority of the Party is mainly moral, 
while the authority of the state is mainly material. As such, the Party must rely on its ability to 
gain the trust of the people, while the state can rely on more traditional political institutions 
(Granma, 04/16/11). In essence, Raul was arguing that the state, not the Party, should be the 
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entity that exercises control over governmental institutions. According to Raul, the failure to 
distinguish between the Party and the state has engendered a situation in which positions in state 
and government can only be obtained by those who are members of the Communist Party. 
Speaking rather candidly, Raul stated, “It’s really embarrassing that we have not solved this 
problem in more than half a century” (Granma, 04/16/11).   
Term Limits 
Lastly, in what Lopez-Levy refers to as “the most important development” of the 6th 
Party Congress, Raul drew attention to the need for term limits amongst Cuban politicians 
(Lopez-Levy, 2011: 219). Raul stated, “we have reached the conclusion that it is advisable to 
recommend limiting the time of service in high political and state positions to a maximum of two 
five-year terms” (Granma, 04/16/11). Lopez-Levy explains the implications and purpose of term 
limits: 
The adoption of term limits for the party and all top positions of the state would be welcomed by many 
younger party and FAR (Revolutionary Armed Forces) members because: 1) it would create a promotion 
system based more on merit and education; 2) it would create space for a more predictable upward mobility 
and intergenerational transition; and 3) it would soften the transition to a leadership with a more pragmatic 
and market-oriented approach (2011: 219).  
 
Significantly, these term limits will also apply to the presidency ("Cuba's President Raul 
Castro Term Limit to Mark End of Castro Era"). In compliance with the new limits, Raul Castro 
recently announced that he would leave office when his term is expired in 2018 (Cave, New 
York Times, 02/24/13). Hence, Raul Castro has put into motion a “shift away from a leadership 
based on personality toward a leadership based on periodic elections” (Lopez-Levy, 2011: 219).  
Reforms Since the 6th Party Congress 
Following the 6th Party Congress, the island has introduced a number of reforms, 
pursuant to the guidelines that were introduced in the 2010 Project Document, and formalized in 
the 6th Party Congress. This section will provide an overview and analysis of these reforms. The 
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major upshot to be taken away from this section is that Cuba, in contrast to the complaints of 
Cuban-American senators and radical Cuban expats, is implementing substantial reforms that are 
transforming the island. These reforms are being introduced at a cautious, incremental pace, 
which is allowing the island to adopt a model that is peculiarly Cuban. Characterizing Raul’s 
recent reforms as “gradual but… ultimately radical,” Sweig and Bustamante provide a succinct 
analysis of Cuba’s current reforms:  
Predictions that the island would undergo a rapid transformation in the manner of China or Vietnam, 
let alone the former Soviet bloc, have routinely proved to be bunk. But Cuba does look much different 
today than it did ten or 20 years ago, or even as recently as 2006, when severe illness compelled Fidel 
Castro, the country’s longtime president, to step aside. Far from treading water, Cuba has entered a new era, 
the features of which defy easy classification or comparison to transitions elsewhere (2013).  
 
Moreover, regarding where the island is headed, these authors state,  
 
Cuba might best be characterized as a public-private hybrid in which multiple forms of production, 
property ownership, and investment, in addition to a slimmer welfare state and greater personal freedom, 
will co-exist with military-run state companies in strategic sectors of the economy and continued one-party 
rule (2013).  
 
Self-Employment and Wholesale Market Liberalization 
Since the 6th Party Congress in 2011, the Cuban government has continued its 
legalization, which began in 2010, of self-employment. As of 2013, there were 181 categories of 
legal self-employment. Cuban authorities have even gone as far as to state that they want 50% of 
the island’s GDP to be in the private sector within five years (Sweig and Bustamante, 2013). As 
explained above, the agenda of self-employment legalization has largely been a strategy of the 
state to reduce its inflated payrolls. As The Havana Times states, “The government wants to 
eliminate a million and a half state jobs within five years, assuming the gradual transition to 
private work forms for those laid off” (06/25/13). By further legalizing self-employment in non-
essential sectors, the state is hoping that it will be able to provide better and more efficient 
services in Cuba’s core areas, such as education and health care. Sweig and Bustamante give an 
illustration of the degree to which private enterprise has become accepted in Cuba: “Already, the 
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representation of Cuban small-business owners in the country’s National Assembly and their 
participation in the annual May Day parade offer evidence of changes under way” (Havana 
Times, 06/25/13). These authors assert that such developments “would have been considered 
sacrilege less than ten years ago” (Havana Times, 06/25/13).  
Despite the fact that Cuban authorities have launched an earnest effort to widen the 
private sector, there are still substantial impediments that are precluding private growth. First, 
legalization of self-employment has occurred almost exclusively in the service sector, in areas 
such as restaurants and bed & breakfasts (Havana Times, 06/25/13). While this comports with 
Cuban authorities’ desire to maintain control of strategic sectors of the economy, it also 
precludes the development and growth that could be offered by private initiative in those very 
same strategic sectors. 
Second, the categories of self-employment are very narrow, thus precluding many areas 
of self-employment that one would intuitively expect to be legal, but remain illegal, because they 
have not been specifically allowed. Sweig and Bustamante state that many of the new categories 
are “senselessly specific” (2013).60 For instance, the Cuban state has legalized such particular 
employment as “clowns for kids parties” (Caruso-Cabrera, 03/26/12). As a result, many potential 
entrepreneurs are likely remaining idle, or are continuing to ply their trade in the black market, 
thus preventing the state from collecting much-needed revenue that could be collected as taxes 
from these entrepreneurs. As Philip Peters states, “the need to choose from 181 licensed lines of 
work is a limiting factor, preventing would-be entrepreneurs from choosing the activities that 
appeal to them and in which they believe they can succeed” (2012: 17).  
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Third, there have been complaints amongst Cuban entrepreneurs that the new tax system 
that has been established on the island is excessively onerous for private businesses. It should be 
made clear that many Cubans do not share this sentiment – as Laverty witnessed by interviewing 
Cuban entrepreneurs, many Cuban business owners do not see the current tax system as being 
detrimental to growth, and praise the licensing process for Cuban businesses as quick and easy 
(2011: 49). Notwithstanding these individuals, there are also many Cubans who believe that 
taxes are too high, and act as a disincentive. For instance, some businesses are required to pay 
fixed taxes, regardless of revenue, and Laverty encountered multiple Cubans who said that such 
taxes made businesses ventures unfeasible (Laverty, 2011: 51). Laverty (2011) and Peters (2012) 
both explain that the Cuban tax regime will gradually evolve, as the state continues to search for 
a proper balance between high taxes, which bring in revenue, and low taxes, which incentivize 
business initiative. 
Finally, Cubans working in the private sector have had difficulty accessing inputs. This is 
largely because, while the state has liberalized many areas of employment, it has been rather 
tentative about liberalizing private wholesalers, which often precludes Cuban entrepreneurs from 
accessing inputs (Sweig and Bustamante, 2013). As the Huffington Post states, “Analysts and 
small business owners themselves have called the lack of wholesale goods a major obstacle to 
the development of the island's budding entrepreneurial class” (Cuba Moves Towards Wholesale 
for Small Business, Huffington Post, 3-8-13). Because entrepreneurs have not been able to 
purchase inputs in private wholesale markets, they have often had to purchase supplies at very 
high retail prices (due to supply shortfalls), or rely on “mules,” who purchase inputs in other 
countries and then sell them on the island (Cuba Moves Towards Wholesale for Small Business, 
Huffington Post, 3-8-13).  
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There is a reason, historically, that input purchases have been highly regulated, and 
private wholesale markets have not been further liberalized (until recently). As Jose Luis 
Rodriguez explains, during the 1990s and early 2000s, while Cuban officials were experimenting 
with dollarization of certain sectors of the economy, in order to garner foreign exchange, they 
found that the intended goals of their experiment fell short, due to financial mismanagement of 
many entities that were attracting foreign exchange. “Many enterprises whose products were 
generating sufficient foreign currency for their own needs were failing to act with the financial 
discipline necessary to ease Cuba’s binding foreign-exchange constraint and contribute to its 
domestic production and social programs” (Campbell, 2013: 46-7). Hence, while many 
enterprises during this period were attracting foreign exchange, they were failing to properly 
allocate these resources to the government’s desired economic and social sectors. To respond to 
this issue, the Cuban government, in 2003, converted from $USD to CUCs all bank accounts 
held by enterprises that did business abroad, and then required these enterprises to receive 
approval for foreign-input purchases, which required their CUCs to be converted back to foreign 
currency (Campbell, 2013: 47). By doing so, the efficiency of Cuban enterprises was likely 
diminished, but the ability of the Cuban government and Central Bank to reduce the island’s 
foreign-exchange tensions was greatly increased (Campbell, 2013: 47). All of these changes 
were promulgated under Resolution no.92 of December 29, 2004 (Campbell, 2013: 47). 
The above analysis of the shortcomings in Cuba’s self-employment arrangement should 
not be misinterpreted as an unalloyed indictment of the state’s efforts in this regard. As Sweig 
and Bustamante explain, “the reforms are making a serious impact. Small businesses currently 
employ some 400,000 citizens, an increase of 154 percent since the liberalization of self-
employment began in October 2010” (2013). Regarding the societal impact of self-employment 
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liberalization, Peters explains, “the expansion of entrepreneurship has improved family welfare, 
boosted government revenues, and begun to provide a destination for workers laid off from the 
government’s ‘inflated payrolls’” (2012: 17). Peters continues to explain that, while “current 
regulations do not amount to an open grant of economic freedom to all who wish to start the 
business of their choice…the 2010 liberalization greatly expanded space for private economic 
initiative and is a positive human rights step” (Peters, 2012: 17).  
In early 2013, signaling its dedication to obtaining further results, the Cuban government 
decided to shutter a state-run company that exclusively supplied government institutions on a 
wholesale basis, and announced that this entity would be replaced by a new government entity 
that would also supply wholesale goods to the private sector (Cuba Moves Towards Wholesale 
for Small Business, Huffington Post, 3-8-13). In an even more significant step, the government 
recently unveiled “Cuba’s first privately run wholesale market in half a century” (Economist, 
06/29/13: 35). This wholesale market will deal in produce, thus allowing farmers to sell, and 
restaurateurs to purchase, large amounts of produce (this market allows farmers to sell output; 
the market experiment that allows them to purchase inputs at private markets is discussed below). 
Such a measure should go a long way in addressing entrepreneurs’ complaints regarding lack of 
access to inputs. However, not surprisingly, the government is liberalizing wholesale markets in 
a manner that the Economist describes as “gingerly” (Economist, 06/29/13: 35). Hence, 
entrepreneurs are still unable to purchase some inputs, such as flour, cooking oil, and soft drinks, 
in bulk. It is likely that even these goods will be purchasable at wholesale markets in the near 
future, though. According to The Economist, “the government announced in early June that it 
would gradually permit a variety of wholesale goods to be sold to state-run and privately run 
businesses” (Economist, 06/29/13: 35).  
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Hence, notwithstanding some salient lacunas regarding what forms of self-employment 
are legal (real estate brokers continue to be prohibited, for instance), flaws that obtain in Cuba’s 
tax system, and shortcomings in Cuban entrepreneurs’ access to inputs, the self-employment 
campaign has had some substantial successes, and further reforms in the near future should be 
expected. Importantly, Philip Peters argues that recent reforms are here to stay. Responding to 
concerns that past reforms had been scaled back, Peters explains that current reforms cannot be 
similarly scaled back, since doing so would substantially disrupt the state’s attempts to reduce its 
budget deficits by shifting employment from the public to the private sector. Essentially, the state 
has realized that it can no longer maintain its inflated payrolls, and it has also realized that a 
burgeoning private sector is necessary to absorb those who lose their jobs in the state sector; thus, 
“a reduction (in private employment) would disrupt other parts of the reform program and be 
politically problematic” (Peters, 2012: 17). As such, current self-employment reforms are 
unlikely to be scaled back, and the state will likely continue to reform this sector, introducing 
more categories of legal self-employment, as well as making amendments to the tax system, so 
as to find a proper balance between revenue and incentives.  
Further Agricultural Reforms, including Wholesale Market Experiment 
 As noted above, agricultural reforms have been riddled with substantial shortcomings. 
One particular shortcoming pertained to Decree-Law 259. Specifically, 259 did not grant 
sufficient amounts of land to farmers (no more than 13.42 hectares, or 33 acres). Moreover, 259 
did not allow for the building of “permanent structures” (e.g. homes) on usufruct land. 
Responding to complaints from Cuban farmers, and hoping to galvanize production, the state 
responded to, and corrected these issues. First, the state allowed farmers who “demonstrated the 
ability to produce” (Frank, 2013: 263) to lease up to 67 hectares of land. Moreover, Cubans are 
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now allowed to pass their leases along to family members. The state also allowed farmers to 
build homes on their land, and even introduced provisions that guaranteed reimbursement for 
improvements made on usufruct land, in the event that a lease is terminated. The state, in 2011, 
even took steps to make it easier for farmers to obtain bank loans (Frank, 2013: 263).  
Such measures should go far, vis-à-vis conveying the message that farmers have a 
permanent, or, at least, more permanent, stake in their land than was the case under the original 
form of Decree-Law 259 in 2008. By allowing farmers to build houses on their land, and by 
allowing them to pass their leases to family members, Cuban authorities should be able to instill 
amongst Cuban farmers a sense of ownership in their land, which should encourage increased 
production. Similarly, by guaranteeing compensation for improvements in the case of lease-
termination, Cuban authorities are sending the message to farmers that they should feel secure in 
taking the risk of investing in their land. By simplifying access to agricultural bank loans, and by 
increasing usufruct lots to 67 hectares, productivity should also increase. The efficacy of these 
measures notwithstanding, the state should increase the length of tenure leases beyond ten years, 
since this would go even further in convincing farmers that they have a personal stake in their 
land, which would encourage them to make improvements to their land. Moreover, as Linde 
argues, the state should go further in terms of leveling the playing field for individuals and 
enterprises, since, as matters currently stand, “individuals but not corporations can lose their land 
if they do not meet production contracts with the government” (2012). 
Another significant agricultural reform was the introduction of experimental wholesale 
agricultural markets, at which farmers can purchase inputs from private sellers. On June 1st of 
2014, Cuban authorities launched the program, which legalized wholesale agricultural market 
purchases for agricultural inputs (Frank, Reuters, 06-01-2014). The experimental program was 
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introduced on The Isle of Youth, off the Southwest coast of Cuba, where farmers there can now 
purchase selected agricultural inputs at unsubsidized prices. There were immediate concerns 
among farmers on the island, however. For instance, one farmer enunciated his doubts about the 
efficacy of the program, given that diesel fuel, one of the most important inputs for agricultural 
work, cannot be purchased wholesale yet (Frank, Reuters, 06-01-2014). The legitimacy of these 
concerns notwithstanding, wholesale agriculture markets are a step in the right direction, and it 
should be expected that, as authorities are able to monitor and anticipate the effects of such 
markets, further liberalization will occur in this area, and wholesale markets will likely be 
introduced to the Cuban mainland. 
As it currently stands, the state of Cuba’s wholesale markets can be characterized as one 
in which there is significant latitude for farmers to sell output at private markets, while their 
ability to purchase inputs at private markets is being experimented with on The Isle of Youth. 
Further advances in both forms of markets should be expected in the near future, as Cuban 
authorities are able to assess the efficacy of their programs, and make proper revisions. 
 In sum, although the state could go much further, and is likely to go further, in terms of 
agricultural reforms, the potential of reforms since 2011 should not be gainsaid. By injecting a 
sense of permanence in the land lease program, and by introducing measures that allow easier 
access to loans, and increased access to land, the Cuban government has sent the message that 
farmers hold a personal stake in their land. Moreover, by experimenting with wholesale markets 
where farmers can sell output and purchase inputs, the Cuban government should be able to 
substantially increase efficiency and productivity. This should spur repopulation of agricultural 
areas, and galvanize agricultural production. As one farmer stated, “Now producers will feel 
much more motivated and secure that the fruit of their labor will be theirs…These measures 
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bring farmers and their families closer to the land they work, and make them feel the land is 
really theirs” (Frank, 2013: 263). These measures, in short, according to another Cuban, are “of 
enormous importance” (Frank, 2013: 263). 
Legalization of Automobile and Home Ownership and Sales 
 In September of 2011, the Cuban government legalized the ownership and sale of 
automobiles, and in November of that year, the ownership and sale of residential real estate was 
legalized. These liberalizations were introduced in response to popular complaints that had been 
raised amongst the Cuban population during ongoing dialogues in preceding months between 
Cuban officials and the Cuban people (Frank, 2013: 255). Prior to such legalization, Cubans 
often just circumvented proscriptions on real estate and auto sales by “loaning” such property to 
others for indefinite periods of time; hence, “the reforms covering cars and homes tended to 
bring above ground the massive black-market sales of property” that were already extant in the 
Cuban economy (Frank, 2013: 255). These measures were introduced not only to foster the rule 
of law in Cuba, but also to introduce incentives for Cuban workers; because cars and homes are 
important items that many Cubans would like to purchase, it can be presumed that the use of 
these items as carrots could galvanize productivity amongst the Cuban workforce (Frank, 2013: 
256). The two measures were also introduced as an attempt to further convert Cuba’s currency 
duality, since all auto and home transactions have to be conducted in Pesos, rather than 
convertible Pesos.  
 Since these measures were introduced, there has been significant interest in buying 
residential real estate. One Cuban real estate expert explained to Marc Frank that he has been 
receiving many calls regarding how to legally purchase residential real estate in Cuba (Frank, 
2013: 256). Cubans have praised the measures, particularly the real estate measures. Prior to real 
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estate liberalization in 2011, Cubans who wanted to leave the island were required to forfeit their 
property to the state; under current laws, they are allowed to sell their property or give it to 
family members (Frank, 2013: 256). The auto ownership law has the potential to drastically 
modernize the Cuban economy, since, prior to the measure, only 600,000 cars existed on the 
island, 300,000 of which were owned by the state (and 79,000 of which dated to before 1959), 
and only one in thirty-seven inhabitants owned a car (Frank, 2013: 256). 
 The social and economic benefits of these measures notwithstanding, the reforms, 
particularly the home sale measures, have the potential to exacerbate inequalities on the island. 
According to Marc Frank, most home purchases are conducted with the assistance of families 
abroad; hence, the measures “benefit better-off Cubans and those with family abroad” (Frank, 
2013: 256). It is not unlikely that real estate prices will increase as demand for homes increases 
on the island. Increased demand, combined with the fact that Cubans without access to 
remittances from abroad are unlikely to be able to purchase homes, mean that inequalities related 
to remittance-access are likely to be exacerbated in the future.  
New Taxes 
One of the most significant indicators that recent reforms are permanent is the 
development of a legitimate tax system on the island. Cuban officials had contemplated the 
introduction of a formal tax system during the Special Period, as a strategy for bringing in 
revenue in a more structured manner. However, Cuban officials recognized that the 
administrative difficulties involved in collecting taxes from a populace that had not paid direct 
taxes since the Revolution would be prohibitive, and thus decided to increase revenues through 
increased prices, rather than through a more formalized tax base (Eckstein in Centeno and Font, 
1998: 145). Hence, the fact that Cuban officials have decided, at this point in time, to finally 
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introduce a formal tax system, should not be taken lightly: this is a very substantial step, 
indicative of large-scale change. 
The reason this development is so significant is that it is illustrative of the Cuban 
government’s determination to continue shifting their economy towards the private sector. 
“Under the old system,” as Mark Frank states, “large and small state-run companies, which 
accounted for more than 90 percent of economic activity, simply handed over all their revenues 
to the government, which then allocated resources to them” (Reuters, 11-28-2012). As the 
government continues to rationalize its economy by laying off workers in stagnant state 
enterprises (“Cuba Explains New Tax System, VOA News, 10-21-2010), it is realizing that it 
must establish a proper tax system, so as to garner portions of revenue through taxation that used 
to be automatically transferred to government coffers from state run enterprises. Under the new 
tax system, Cuban enterprises, whether cooperatives or privately-owned, will be required to pay 
a tax of 35% on profits (“Cuba Explains New Tax System, VOA News, 10-21-2010).  
 In addition to, and as part of, the new tax system’s goal of garnering revenue, it also aims 
to incentivize self-employment and small business through a number of deductions. “For 
example,” as Mark Frank notes, “farmers may deduct up to 70 percent of income as costs, and 
small businessmen, who are taxed by income not profit, up to 40 percent, plus various fees and 
secondary taxes they pay” (Reuters, 11-28-2012). Moreover, the government plans to reduce 
labor taxes from 20% to 5% by 2017 (Reuters, 11-28-2012). The government is also 
implementing its new tax system in a piecemeal, pragmatic manner, recognizing that conditions 
do not yet permit the implementation of certain measures, such as the goal of the government to 
tax all workers’ incomes by at least 2%: as it currently stands, many Cuban workers simply do 
not make enough to pay taxes (Reuters, 11-28-2012).  
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In sum, the new tax system on the island is meant to advance Cuba’s efforts to shift 
towards a semi-privatized, semi-marketized economy, and to do so in a manner that both garners 
revenue for the government and incentivizes self-employment and small businesses through a 
series of deductions. This new tax system is one of the most clear indicators that Cuban 
authorities are making an earnest effort to implement permanent economic reforms on the island. 
Healthcare, Education, and Recent Reforms 
Importantly, at no point in time have universal health care and education been on the 
table for abrogation. As Laverty explains, Cuban authorities have been shaping every policy with 
the understanding that the pillars of the Cuban Revolution – healthcare and education – must be 
retained (2011: 5). And the government has justified recent reforms by emphasizing that they 
will support, rather than subordinate, health care and education. It is likely that Cuban officials 
recognize that, given their rhetoric, the legitimacy of reforms rests, in large part, on the ability of 
the government to retain exceptional health care and education on the island. Recent outcomes, 
as they pertain to the fate of workers that have been laid off from shuttered or rationalized state 
enterprises, are illustrative of the government’s dedication to maintaining its social services: 
“Cuba’s new unemployed would not be left totally out in the cold. All citizens still received free 
health care and education, subsidized utilities, subsidized food rations, and an automatic 
adjustment of mortgages to no more than 10 percent of the top breadwinner’s income” (Frank, 
2013: 219). It would thus appear that the state is backing up its words with actions in this regard. 
 However, the dedication of Cuban authorities to retaining universal healthcare and 
education has not precluded reductions in budget allocations in these sectors. As a response to 
the recent (current) international financial crisis, Cuban authorities took substantial steps to 
reduce costs in these areas. First, “schools in the countryside, one of the revolution’s most 
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esteemed programmes (sic), was shut down” (Mesa-Lago and Vidal-Alejandro, 2010: 701). 
Moreover, enrollments in secondary and tertiary education were reduced (Mesa-Lago and Vidal-
Alejandro, 2010: 701). Lastly, higher standards, vis-à-vis entrance exams, were instituted for 
municipal universities and colleges (Mesa-Lago and Vidal-Alejandro, 2010: 701-3).  
However, these figures may not be as ominous or significant as they appear at first glance. 
The “schools in the countryside program” was shut down, and school enrollments were reduced, 
but, as Mesa-Lago and Vidal-Alejandro state, “this was partly due to population decline” (Mesa-
Lago and Vidal-Alejandro, 2010: 701). Moreover, higher test requirements can be interpreted as 
an attempt to increase the quality of students entering many college programs. This interpretation 
garners more credibility when it is taken into account that “data on the budget at the end of 2009 
show a 20 per cent (sic) increase in education expenditures, as a result of the rise in teachers’ 
salaries in that year” (Mesa-Lago and Vidal-Alejandro, 2010: 703). Hence, while expenditures 
have been reduced, it does seem that the government is attempting to increase the quality of both 
its educators and students, by implementing test standards and introducing higher pay for 
teachers.  
The healthcare sector has also sustained some negative effects of the financial crisis. In 
response to the crisis, the state reduced the 2009 healthcare budget by 8 percent (Mesa-Lago and 
Vidal-Alejandro, 2010: 705). However, it does not appear that access to healthcare has been 
significantly affected by the crisis. The most notable issues pertaining to healthcare have not 
been a result of calculated policies of the government; rather, they have been indirect effects of 1) 
the international financial crisis, and 2) the government’s dollarization of other sectors of the 
Cuban economy. Regarding the financial crisis, the current recession has caused a decrease in 
Cuba’s ability to procure medicines and inputs from abroad, since they do not have access to 
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capital markets to fund short term deficits; hence, access to some medicines has decreased for 
many Cubans61 (Mesa-Lago and Vidal-Alejandro, 2010: 704). Regarding dollarization of the 
Cuban economy, many doctors have quit, and shifted their employment to dollarized sectors of 
the Cuban economy, in an attempt to obtain hard currency (Mesa-Lago and Vidal-Alejandro, 
2010: 704). Moreover, a second economy has emerged in Cuba, in which Cuban doctors 
supplement their low state wages by providing services in a black market economy, in exchange 
for cash and favors (Kath, 2009). This arrangement, while filling certain lacunas that the state 
sector has failed to provide services for, has also led to increased concerns regarding inequality 
and unfairness in access to health care, since those who seek services through official channels, 
and those who do not have resources to exchange for services in the black market, are both at a 
disadvantage when attempting to obtain medical services (Kath, 2009). 
Healthcare problems that have directly resulted from the financial crisis should correct 
themselves – to some degree – as the global recession eventually improves; but issues pertaining 
to insufficient pay in the healthcare sector – doctors shifting to other employment and providing 
services in the black market – must be addressed through an increase in pay for doctors and other 
health workers (similar to what Cuban authorities have done in the educational sector by 
increasing educators’ remuneration). If the government fails to provide higher wages for 
healthcare professionals, then the island is likely to witness a substantial diminution in the 
number of quality doctors the population has access to. 
None of the above reductions in allocations should be misconstrued as being indicative of 
a long term abrogation of Cuban healthcare and education. Similar measures during the Special 
Period were implemented temporarily to reduce costs in education, as enrollments in higher 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61	  Given	  recent	  developments	  (December	  2014)	  in	  US-­‐Cuban	  relations,	  it	  could	  be	  predicted	  that	  Cuba	  may,	  in	  the	  near	  
future,	  regain	  access	  to	  international	  credit	  markets.	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education were cut by the government by 45% between 1991-1995, while access to books and 
other educational materials diminished in elementary schools (Dominguez in Dominguez et al., 
2004: 21). Hence, it should be expected that similar measures will be modified, and educational 
funding will return to its normal level, once the current crisis has been ameliorated. The financial 
crisis has affected these sectors, as well as all others in the Cuban economy, but Cuban officials 
are taking all possible steps to ensure that the quality of professionals in these sectors is restored. 
However, they have faced difficulty in this area because, as an attempt to protect these sectors 
from the potential negative effects of foreign involvement, they have restricted foreign 
investment in education and healthcare. However, because of this restriction, these two sectors 
have not experienced increased wages, as other foreign-invested sectors have. Hence, many 
professionals in these sectors have packed up shop and shifted their employment to hard 
currency service sectors. To remedy this issue, the Cuban government will need to offer 
increased wages in these sectors, possibly by redirecting profits from its tourist and other service 
sectors that attract hard currency. Given the status that healthcare and education hold in Cuba, it 
can be presumed that all available resources will be directed towards these sectors, once the 
financial crisis eases, and once Cuban authorities have figured out a way to direct capital to these 
sectors without making them available to foreign investment.  
Conclusion 
 In sum, recent economic reforms on the island, in general, can be characterized as 
pragmatic (marketization and privatization oriented), incremental, semi-democratic, and 
permanent. They are pragmatic insofar as they have moved the island further toward 
marketization and privatization than it has been since The Revolution in 1959. Recent reforms on 
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the island are also only being implemented insofar as they do not pose a serious threat to health 
care and education in Cuba. 
Recent reforms have also been incremental, with Cuban authorities choosing to 
experiment with measures, such as wholesale market liberalization, before they introduce such 
measures on a larger scale. The incremental nature of these reforms should not be misconstrued 
as a lack of conviction on the part of Cuban authorities; in fact, the piecemeal manner of reforms 
is a result of Cuban officials taking into account the concerns of the population when 
implementing policy: “Cubans are now nervous that, as has occurred in other transitioning 
societies, suddenly empowered or re-empowered economic groups will seek to increase their 
influence in political and economic decision-making” (Laverty, 2011: 54). Hence, economic 
reforms are being implemented in a fashion that will mollify Cubans’ concerns, and obviate 
political capture of Cuba’s nascent institutions by recently advantaged groups. It should always 
be kept in mind that when Cuban entrepreneurs complain about the incomplete nature of reforms, 
there is another side of the population that has opposite, and equally valid, concerns, and that the 
Cuban government must balance the two when introducing reform measures. 
The reforms have also been (at least) semi-democratic, to the extent that Cuban 
authorities have made an honest effort to collect feedback from the Cuban population, and 
amend reforms accordingly.  
Reforms are also only being implemented to the extent that they do not require 
unreasonable reductions in medical and educational services. While there have been reductions 
in funding in these areas, such reductions have largely been a result of budget constraints, due to 
the global recession. Once conditions improve internationally, and on the island, it should be 
expected that the Cuban government will allocate all necessary resources to these sectors.  
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Finally, recent reforms on the island are likely here to stay. The nature of the reforms 
require that they be implemented with longrun objectives in mind, and the government has 
introduced measures, such as a legitimate tax system, that are indicative of their desire to make 
sure these measures are successful. Moreover, as Marc Frank explains, Cuba’s recent reform 
plan “is not just a piece of paper. It is a life-or-death blueprint to save their revolution and it will 
be carried out with military precision” (2013: 275). Furthermore, international conditions have 
changed, thus requiring Cuba to change. Cuba no longer has the USSR to rely upon for favorable 
terms of trade and political support, and Cuba’s closest current ally, Venezuela, has a socialist 
regime whose stability is increasingly tenuous.  Also, Fidel is no longer calling the shots, which 
means Raul, who is the much more pragmatic of the two, has been able to implement market-
oriented reforms of a permanent, rather than ephemeral, nature. Laverty gives an indication of 
how recent reforms are viewed by experts: “Almost everyone involved in the process agrees that 
the changes will be permanent. ‘There’s no turning back,’ said another” (2011: 56).  
Hence, I argue that Cuba has entered a permanent pragmatist cycle. Carmelo Mesa-Lago 
has characterized past periods of economic reforms as either “idealist” (egalitarian, marked by 
unrealistic targets) or “pragmatist” (market-oriented, generating some adverse effects, such as 
inequality or unemployment) (in Ritter, 2005: 25-42). The current agenda of reforms fits this 
definition, and since current reforms are unlikely to be abrogated, they can safely be 
characterized as both “pragmatist” and “permanent.” 
Of course, there are analysts who question both the extent, and by extension, the 
permanence, of Cuban reforms. Linde (2012) argues that recent reforms are largely a maquillage, 
meant to give the impression of reform, without actually engendering real change in the Cuban 
system. One of his main arguments is that many sectors of the Cuban economy continue to be 
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controlled by the state, and that the sectors that have been reformed have not been liberalized 
enough to truly make a difference. He bases his argument largely on the shortcomings observed 
in Cuba’s agricultural sector: flaws pertaining to Decree Law 259, as outlined above, along with 
flaws in agricultural wholesale markets.  
Similarly, Jose Azel (2013) argues that reforms in Cuba have not been extensive enough, 
and that purported reforms are only acting as a patina that covers a more dysfunctional political 
economy. Azel submits that cosmetic changes are only being engaged in by Cuban authorities so 
that they can convince the international community of the political and economic legitimacy of 
Raul’s regime. By doing so, Azel believes, Cuban military authorities are seeking to ensure that 
international financial institutions will be allowed to channel capital to the island when the 
generals begin their yard sale of state enterprises (2013). 
These critics’ concerns should not be taken lightly. The military will continue to play a 
predominant role in the Cuban economy, and the international community should thus rightly 
keep an eye on Cuba’s generals, to obviate a soviet-style privatization of Cuban enterprises that 
seeks to enrich Cuba’s military elites. Moreover, there are shortcomings in Cuba’s reforms, even 
in the agricultural sector, where reforms have been most extensive. However, these critiques 
miss the mark, in two respects, one regarding the nature and pace of reforms, and the other 
pertaining to what has transpired since initial reforms were introduced in 2010.  
First, analysts such as Azel and Linde seem to be asking for too much, too quickly. 
Cuban authorities are engaging in legitimate reforms, but they are not willing to risk political 
power when doing so, nor are they willing to risk the socioeconomic disaster that is almost 
guaranteed if they categorically liberalize the Cuban economy. Reforms will continue in a 
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deliberate, piecemeal fashion, and critics such as Azel would do well to keep a long run view 
towards the island.  
Second, reforms that have transpired since the introduction of initial reforms in 2010 
would seem to indicate that Cuban authorities are indeed taking steps to ensure that reforms have 
the effect they are intended to, rather than simply acting as a cosmetic patina. For instance, since 
Linde disparaged Cuban reforms as being purely cosmetic in 2012, Cuban authorities have 
addressed shortcomings in Decree Law 259 (reimbursement for improvements and structures 
built on land, for instance) and have began an experimental process with wholesale markets for 
the purchase of agricultural inputs from private sellers. Hence, Cuban authorities are addressing 
the shortcomings that critics have pointed to as evidence that reforms are cosmetic, rather than 
real.  
 There are many recent reforms that have not been included in this chapter. For instance, 
the Cuban government has taken many steps to liberalization its migration policy, and there have 
been significant steps towards religious tolerance on the island. However, these are not within 
the scope of this thesis, and should thus be the topic of further study. Many potential reforms on 
the island will be contingent on Cuba’s position in the larger global political economy, and such 
a position is largely contingent on Cuba’s relation with the United States, which brings us to our 
final chapter on US-Cuban relations. 
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Chapter Eight:  




William Doyle, in his authoritative account of the French Revolution, stated, “I have not 
wavered from my judgment that the Revolution was a tragedy. Some readers have interpreted 
this as a hostile verdict. But to call something tragic is not necessarily to condemn it. It is to 
lament wasted promise” (2002: vii). There may be no other historical relationship that this quote 
applies to more felicitously than the strained relations between the United States and Cuba. The 
two countries, separated by only 92 miles of ocean, have been separated by politically 
synthesized barriers that have precluded the two nations from engaging in the economic and 
cultural interactions that would be mutually beneficial to citizens of both states.    
Because of the tragic nature of this relationship, and the foregone benefits that both 
parties have experienced as a result of the Embargo, any academic work on Cuba would be 
unacceptably incomplete without a section on Cuba-US relations. The economic and political 
fate of the Caribbean island is inalterably affected by, and somewhat dependent upon, its 
relations with its neighbor. And the United States is affected, both economically and politically 
(particularly in international terms), by its relationship with Cuba. One of the most interesting 
aspects of the relationship between the two states is that there is very little debate amongst 
scholars and analysts of Cuban affairs – it is very well understood that the United States 
maintains a policy that is a relic of the Cold War, to the detriment of citizens of both states.  
Because there is so little debate as to the (in)appropriateness of the United States’ 
continued embargo with Cuba, a thesis such as this would usually have little to offer regarding 
the relationship between the two states. However, while this chapter was being written, Cuba and 
the U.S. took a laudable, and surprising, step, by exchanging three Cuban intelligence officers 
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for an American prisoner, and by making the announcement that both states would attempt to 
fully normalize diplomatic relations. All of this constituted what Jorge Castaneda (2014) 
characterized as “the most important moment in the countries’ bilateral relationship in decades.” 
Thus, I was granted the opportunity to overview and analyze the nature of this step, and 
its implications. This chapter opens with an overview and analysis of the history of the 
relationship between the two states, and ends with an overview and analysis of recent 
developments under the Obama administration. It should be emphasized that the Obama 
administration did not end the embargo – only Congress has the authority to do so. However, the 
announcement of the move towards diplomatic normalization does portent many important 
developments, including easier travel for non-Cuban Americans to Cuba, along with 
improvements in financial and commercial relations between the two states. The importance of 
these recent developments cannot be overstated. 
The move by Cuban officials towards normalized relations with the United States should 
be understood as part of Cuba’s more general pragmatic shift since Raul Castro became president 
on the island. As has been argued throughout this thesis, Raul is the more pragmatic of the 
Castro brothers, and, as such, he has been attempting to take a more pragmatic (market-oriented) 
approach to economic policy in Cuba. But such pragmatism has not been restricted to Raul’s 
policies within Cuba; the island’s pragmatic shift has been externally-oriented as well, as Cuban 
officials attempt to integrate Cuba more completely into the world economy. And such 
integration cannot be sufficiently accomplished unless Cuba normalizes its relations with the 
United States, since not only is the U.S. Cuba’s most important single trade partner, but the 
United States’ embargo also affects Cuba’s relations with third countries as well. Hence, as part 
of Cuba’s shift towards external, market-oriented policies, Raul, for years, has exhibited his 
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desire and willingness to normalize relations with the United States. It was thus the United States, 
not Cuba, who was lagging behind in this regard, until December of 2015, when the U.S. decided 
that it was willing to play ball. 
Cuba-US relations since The Revolution: The Embargo 
 Relations between the United States and Cuba disintegrated rather quickly after the 
Revolution of 1959. The speed with which the relationship became so fraught is interesting, 
since the degree to which Fidel’s 1959 regime could be characterized as socialist or communist 
was contested at the time, and continues to be debated. On one side, many analysts and scholars 
argue that the United States, through actions that ostracized Cuba from the Western economy, 
pushed Fidel towards socialism. Prior to that, the Castro regime could not be categorically 
labeled as socialist or communist. As Lamrani explains, in 1959, “…it was impossible to build 
anything resembling a strong link between Fidel Castro and the communists of the Popular 
Socialist Party” (2013: 18). Lamrani continues, “The first provisional government was composed 
of rather conservative members of civil society” (2013: 18). Blackburn concurs with this opinion, 
arguing that the Cuban Revolution was largely a “bourgeois” or “middle class” revolution (1963: 
52). These arguments are in accord with Che Guevara’s opinion during the time, that all 
economic reforms on the island, aside from land reform, were direct responses to US aggression 
(Lamrani, 2013: 18). 
In contrast, it is argued by some that Fidel Castro was a communist long before the 
United States compelled him to be. For instance, Salvador Díaz-Versón, who was a Cuban 
journalist during the time, claimed he had files that documented Fidel Castro’s communism and 
communist ties prior to the 1959 Revolution, but that they were destroyed on July 26th, 1959 
(Communist Threat to the United States, 1960). Díaz-Versón was an ardent anti-communist, and 
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the veracity of his claims is dubious. Anyhow, he represented one side of this debate, which 
claimed that Fidel Castro had a long history of ideological devotion to communism. 
Regardless of whether Fidel Castro was a communist prior to the Revolution of 1959, 
substantial changes to Cuba’s political economy were a foregone conclusion once Fidel’s forces 
assumed control. And because beneficial treatment of US business interests by the Batista 
regime62 had allowed US multinationals to garner substantial control of Cuban economic 
resources, it was unavoidable that any changes to the political and economic landscape, in the 
direction toward more equitable distribution of resources on the island, would be unpalatable to 
US business interests, which had very close ties with the United States government. As John F. 
Kennedy stated during a speech in 1960: 
In a manner certain to antagonize the Cuban people, we used the influence of our Government to 
advance the interests of and increase the profits of the private American companies, which 
dominated the island's economy. At the beginning of 1959 U.S. companies owned about 40 
percent of the Cuban sugar lands - almost all the cattle ranches - 90 percent of the mines and 
mineral concessions - 80 percent of the utilities - and practically all the oil industry - and supplied 
two-thirds of Cuba's imports. 
Of course, our private investment did much to help Cuba. But our action too often gave the 
impression that this country was more interested in taking money from the Cuban people than in 
helping them build a strong and diversified economy of their own (Kennedy, 1960). 
 
Hence, as Lamrani states, “The stranglehold that U.S. multinationals held over the Cuban 
economy was so strong that it became impossible to undertake any reforms without affecting 
their interests” (2013: 18).  
 Julia Sweig, one of the foremost authorities on Cuba, concurs with the argument that the 
communism or lack of communism in Fidel’s ideology was incidental to the much more 
important agenda of US control of the island’s affairs. In fact, the United States had imposed an 
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  As	  Lamrani	  (2013:	  19)	  explains,	  “U.S.	  investments	  in	  Cuba	  were	  carried	  out	  under	  conditions	  often	  favorable	  to	  the	  
multinationals.	  Thus,	  for	  the	  exploitation	  of	  nickel,	  the	  Batista	  regime	  had	  granted	  a	  concession	  to	  the	  Moa	  Bay	  Mining	  
Company.	  This	  contract	  was	  so	  profitable	  that	  in	  just	  five	  years	  Moa	  Bay	  was	  able	  to	  obtain	  a	  return	  of	  $120	  million	  on	  its	  
initial	  investment.	  These	  enterprises	  were	  often	  exempted	  from	  paying	  taxes	  and	  were	  allowed	  to	  repatriate	  their	  profits.	  
They	  therefore	  contributed	  little	  to	  the	  development	  of	  the	  Cuban	  economy.	  Between	  1950	  and	  1960,	  the	  balance	  of	  
payments	  was	  favorable	  to	  the	  United	  States	  to	  the	  tune	  of	  one	  billion	  dollars.”	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arms embargo on the Batista regime in March of 1958 (Sweig, 2009: 75), evincing more of a 
concern for stability and protection of US economic interests on the island than any concern 
about communism or capitalist ideology of the respective factions in The Revolution (though, 
one could also argue that the arms embargo imposed on the Batista regime serves as further 
evidence that the United States government was not convinced of the communist credentials of 
Fidel Castro’s movement). More importantly, Sweig makes the more relevant point that, 
regardless of which side emerged victorious from the Cuban Revolution, the US was taking 
necessary precautions to ensure that its assets were protected; thus, the revolution, with its 
emphasis on nationalism, would ineluctably run afoul of US economic interests. As she states, 
“on a much more fundamental level, the revolution’s quest for independence and its strong grain 
of nationalism cut directly into the traditional patronage of Cuba’s economy and domestic 
politics;” and, “given the degree of influence that the United States exerted over Cuba’s domestic 
politics and culture, once Fidel triumphed, a clash with Washington on some level was perhaps a 
foregone conclusion” (2009: 75-6). Hence, in Sweig’s opinion, it was not so much the 
communism, but rather the nationalism, of the Revolution, that was anathema to the United 
States. 
 Once Fidel’s forces took control, the most significant of reforms occurred on May 17, 
1959, with the initiation of agrarian land reform, which aimed to allocate land to Cuban farmers, 
thus ending the latifundia system that had obtained on the island, and allowing Cuban farmers to 
provide for their own subsistence (Lamrani, 2013: 19). It is very important to note, as Lamrani 
explains, that these nationalizations were based on Cuba’s 1940 constitution, and were in accord 
with international law, which “grants any nation the sovereign right to nationalize companies 
operating on its territory in exchange for compensation,” and that, “in case of nationalization, 
210	  
	  
compensation will be paid in accordance with the norms in force in the country that proceeds 
with the nationalizations” (2013: 20-1). The unfortunate fact of the matter for U.S. multinationals 
during agrarian reform was that compensation was based on the most recent tax returns for 
nationalized entities, and due to creative bookkeeping by the Batista regime, these companies’ 
returns were, “for obvious reasons, often less than the real value of the assets” (Lamrani, 2013: 
20). In other words, U.S. multinationals were more than happy to benefit from unreasonably low 
taxes on their assets while they were operating on the island, but cried foul when those low taxes 
were used against them during the compensation process, following nationalization. Regarding 
the compensation that was offered by the new Cuban regime, Sweig notes, “some companies 
accepted, others did not, but most received insurance payments to cover their losses” (2009: 77).  
Regardless of such insurance coverage for these losses, the U.S. was inclined to respond 
adversely to these reforms. The first signs of such a response came in June of 1959, shortly after 
Cuba’s agrarian reform was initiated, when the Eisenhower administration suggested that the 
United States should end the sugar quota that it had maintained with Cuba since 1948. The 
United States has maintained tariffs on sugar since 1789, with the goal of garnering 
governmental revenue, and since 1842, with the goal of fostering and protecting domestic 
production and refinement of sugar (Alvarez and Polopolus, 2012). The First Sugar Act was 
legislated in 1934, with the goal of protecting domestic producers from cheap foreign 
competitors. In 1948, the Act was amended, and Cuba was granted preferential treatment63, 
“because of its response in increasing output during World War II to supply sugar to the U.S. at 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63	  The	  nature	  and	  significance	  of	  this	  preferential	  treatment	  is	  detailed	  by	  Alvarez	  (2004):	  “As	  shown	  above,	  sugar	  was	  
the	  main	  Cuban	  export	  to	  the	  United	  States.	  Until	  1960,	  Cuba	  provided	  over	  one-­‐third	  of	  the	  total	  U.S.	  sugar	  requirements,	  
playing	  the	  role	  of	  an	  "ever-­‐normal	  granary"	  for	  U.S.	  sugar	  needs.	  One	  aspect	  of	  the	  preferential	  treatment	  it	  received	  in	  
return	  is	  contained	  in	  the	  Sugar	  Act	  of	  1948,	  which	  allocated	  to	  Cuba	  an	  import	  quota	  equivalent	  to	  98.64%	  of	  the	  
difference	  between	  U.S.	  consumption	  requirements	  and	  the	  sum	  of	  the	  fixed	  tonnage	  quotas	  for	  the	  domestic	  areas	  and	  
the	  Philippines,	  with	  the	  remaining	  1.36%	  going	  to	  other	  foreign	  countries.	  Thus,	  this	  arrangement	  allocated	  nearly	  all	  of	  




prices far below those that would have prevailed in a free market” (Alvarez and Polopolus, 2012). 
Cuba’s economy, following this amendment in 1948, grew increasingly reliant on sugar exports, 
particularly to the United States; as Alvarez states, “Not only was Cuba's foreign trade (prior to 
1959) dominated by exports, and exports dominated by sugar, but the predominant buyer and 
seller was the United States” (2004). Moreover, “sugar accounted for 80 percent of all exports to 
the United States, Cuba’s natural and historical market, and employed almost 25 percent of 
Cuba’s population” (Lamrani, 2013: 24). Thus, eliminating the sugar quota was certain to prove 
drastically problematic for the Cuban economy, which the State Department readily 
acknowledged when it stated, “The sugar industry will suffer a rapid and abrupt decline that will 
entail general unemployment. Many persons will be without work and go hungry” (quoted in 
Lamrani, 2013: 19). The United States, in such a statement, illustrated the alacrity with which it 
would employ economic warfare to foster political discontent on the island.  
In 1960 Cuba asked U.S.-owned oil refineries to process Soviet oil, thus antagonizing the 
U.S. State Department, which refused to give these refineries such permission. In response to this 
refusal, Cuban authorities nationalized refineries owned by Standard Oil, Texaco, and Shell on 
the island. It should be emphasized that these private entities were amenable to the processing of 
soviet oil, but could not garner the State Department’s approval (Sweig, 2009: 77). In response to 
these nationalizations, and to agrarian reforms, the sugar quota for 1960 was officially abolished 
by the Eisenhower administration on July 5, 1960, thus antagonizing Cuba, on July 6, 1960, into 
legalizing the nationalization of all United States properties64 (in addition to land that had been 
nationalized during agrarian reform) (Lamrani, 2013: 24). When all nationalizations had been 
completed, “Cuba had expropriated over 300,000 acres of U.S. property, all U.S.-owned tobacco 
enterprises, all U.S. banks, and all other U.S. business interests” (Sweig, 2009: 77).  
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  Through	  Act	  861.	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Subsequently, in December of 1960, Eisenhower abolished the sugar quota for 1961, and 
on January 3, 1961, the United States broke off diplomatic relations with Cuba, and prohibited 
American citizens from traveling to Cuba (Lamrani 2013, 24). Relations between the two nations 
have not been normalized since. 
 It was also during the Eisenhower administration – which placed anticommunism at the 
center of its agenda – that the Bay of Pigs Invasion was conceived (Haney and Vanderbush, 2005: 
15-6). Haney and Vanderbush proffer that Eisenhower was not particularly concerned that Fidel 
Castro’s regime posed an immediate threat to U.S. security interests in the region, but that such 
threat would eventuate if Castro were left unchecked. In this regard, these two authors stress that 
experts on Cuba were saliently absent when Eisenhower was being advised on the Bay of Pigs 
invasion – in their place were military and intelligence experts (2005: 16-7). 
 Upon taking office, Kennedy inherited Eisenhower’s policy towards Cuba, including 
plans for the forthcoming Bay of Pigs Invasion, and the failed invasion took place in April of 
1961. Following the Bay of Pigs Invasion, Congress sought to pass a trade embargo bill against 
Cuba, and on September 4, 1961, passed the Foreign Assistance Act, which “prohibited foreign 
aid to the government of Cuba and authorized the president to impose a total embargo on trade 
with the island” (Lamrani, 2013: 24). On February 3, 1962, Kennedy used Executive Order 3447 
to impose a total embargo on the island (Lamrani, 2013: 24).  
  One of the most notable aspects of Kennedy’s institution of the Embargo was the extent 
to which Congress had become involved in foreign policy. Haney and Vanderbush explain that, 
during the Eisenhower administration, as would be expected in the area of foreign policy, “The 
initiative behind U.S.-Cuba policy clearly rested in the White House” (2005: 15). But a shift 
towards congressional power in U.S.-Cuba policy began during the Kennedy administration, as it 
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was largely due to Congressional pressure that Kennedy gave the executive order that introduced 
the Cuban Embargo. For instance, when White House officials argued that an embargo bill 
would impede the president’s ability to conduct foreign policy, James Eastland, chairman of the 
Senate Judiciary Committee, warned that he “was prepared to use his subcommittee as a rival 
foreign office to the State Department” (Haney and Vanderbush, 2005: 17-8). Thus, although 
Haney and Vanderbush argue that “important decisions were…still in the hands of Kennedy and 
his advisers,” (Haney and Vanderbush, 2005: 18), it was during this administration that U.S-
Cuban relations began their shift towards becoming the most congressionally dominated are of 
bilateral U.S. foreign policy. This shift would culminate with the emergence of the Cuban 
American voting bloc as a formidable lobbying force, the Torricelli Act of 1992, and the Helms-
Burton Act of 1996. 
The Nature of the Embargo Since Kennedy 
 By 1962, the Kennedy administration had succeeded in imposing a “total embargo” on all 
trade with Cuba. Sweig notes that a single exception was made for “licensed sales of food and 
medicine,” but that this exception was abandoned by the mid-1960s (2009: 88). Lamrani argues 
that, once the food and medicine exceptions were removed, the Embargo became notable for its 
neglect of international humanitarian law, since according to Article 23 of the Geneva 
Convention,  
Each High Contracting Party shall allow for the free passage of all consignments of medical and 
hospital stores and objects necessary for religious worship intended only for civilians or another 
High Contracting Party, even if the latter is its adversary. It shall likewise permit the free passage 
of all consignments of essential foodstuffs, clothing and tonics intended for children under fifteen, 
expectant mothers and maternity cases (Lamrani, 2013: 25).  
 
Under the Embargo, American companies could not invest on the island or purchase Cuban 
goods (Sweig, 2009: 88). Moreover, in March of 1962, the Embargo was expanded to include 
“all products that contain Cuban materials, including those manufactured in other countries Also, 
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Cuba was prohibited from purchasing American products (or any products containing more than 
5% U.S. content (Sweig, 2009: 89)), Cuban citizens could not invest in the United States, and 
Cuban holdings in United States banks were frozen (Sweig, 2009: 88). Moreover, as Haney and 
Vanderbush explain, Kennedy tightened the Embargo in 1963 by “prohibiting travel to or 
financial transactions with Cuba by U.S. citizens” (2005: 18).  Thus, the embargo was 
categorical in its prohibition of commercial and financial transactions between citizens and 
entities of the two states. 
 Moreover, the Embargo, beginning with the Kennedy administration, was exceptional in 
one very important facet: its extraterritoriality. Beginning in August 1962, “every nation 
providing assistance to Cuba was automatically excluded from the USAID program” (Lamrani, 
2013: 25). Also, beginning in September 1962, Kennedy banned ships from entering U.S. ports 
that had commercial relations with Cuba, “regardless of their country of origin” (Lamrani, 2013: 
25). The extraterritoriality of the Embargo was further illustrated as U.S. companies merged with 
international companies, thus expanding the number of goods that qualified as containing more 
than 5% U.S. content, as companies that were now subsidiaries of U.S. companies were banned 
from doing business with Cuba (Sweig, 2009: 89). The effect (and goal) of such 
extraterritoriality was to prevent as many parties as possible from engaging in trade with Cuba. 
The irony was that this policy pushed Cuba further towards the USSR to obtain commercial 
goods and inputs, since “it became harder and harder to find parts for Cuba’s pre-1959 
infrastructure that were free of U.S. content” (Sweig, 2009: 89).  
 Lamrani (2013) and Sweig (2009) both stress that the effects of the Embargo, almost 
immediately, can not be understated, as every sector of the Cuban economy was dependent on 
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inputs that were now banned by the Embargo, and Soviet parts were almost never adequate 
surrogates (Sweig, 2009: 89). 
 In sum, the Embargo during the Kennedy administration was characterized by its 
extraterritoriality and its status as a policy controlled by the executive branch, but significantly 
influenced by threats within Congress, should executive orders fail to sufficiently isolate the 
island65.  
 The Johnson administration largely continued the policies of the Kennedy administration, 
as Johnson retained Kennedy’s foreign policy advisers upon taking office (Haney and 
Vanderbush, 2005: 19). There were two main developments during the Johnson administration. 
First, in 1964, Johnson “registered a notable success” (Haney and Vanderbush, 2005: 19) by 
compelling OAS member states to vote to break all diplomatic and commercial relations with 
Cuba. All voted in favor, with only one abstention, Mexico (Sweig, 2009: 90). Cuba was thus 
further isolated from commercial relations with the West, and pushed further towards the USSR. 
 Second, Johnson signed the Cuban Adjustment Act in 1966, a “landmark law that granted 
all Cuban migrants the right to ‘adjust’ their status to that of U.S. permanent resident after 
residing one year within the United States” (Sweig, 2009: 89). Haney and Vanderbush note that 
Johnson actually chose to enact this policy through “the attorney general’s authority on 
immigration matters,” which allowed him to keep control of U.S.-Cuban policy in the Executive 
Branch (though, similar to the Embargo, it should be understood that the initial impetus for this 
policy originated in Congress, with the Cuban Adjustment Act). The Cuban Adjustment Act has 
been one of the most contentious facets of U.S.-Cuban relations since its inception, as Cuban 
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authorities have identified it as one of the major factors responsible for Cuba’s brain drain 
problem. 
 Following Johnson, the Embargo under the Nixon administration was notable only for the 
absence of any remarkable developments. Nixon and Kissinger both exhibited little interest in 
the island, and in Latin America in general. As Haney and Vanderbush explain, “Kissinger was 
brutally honest in conceding that he neither knew very much about Latin America nor worried 
about that lack of information” (2005: 21).  
 Although the Nixon administration was somewhat unremarkable regarding the Embargo, 
developments in the international and regional climate during the 1970s were anything but 
negligible. The international environment became much more favorable towards Cuba, and many 
countries, including Chile, Argentina, and Peru restored, to varying degrees, their diplomatic and 
commercial ties with Cuba (Sweig, 2009: 90). Also, Canada pushed back against some of the 
extraterritorial aspects of the Embargo, regarding restrictions that affected “U.S. subsidiaries in 
third countries” (Sweig, 2009: 90). Perhaps most importantly, the OAS, in 1975, voted to retract 
all sanctions against Cuba, thus allowing each state to “maintain diplomatic and trade ties with 
Havana” (Lamrani, 2013: 28).  
 There was also a shift in domestic sentiments during the 1970s, in favor of a more liberal 
approach to the Embargo. As Sweig states, “the U.S. Congress and business communities began 
to express a disposition toward improving the bilateral relationship with Havana” (2009: 90). In 
response, in 1975, Gerald Ford relaxed some aspects of the Embargo. He allowed businessmen 
to travel to Cuba if they obtained special licenses; allowed payment of fees to Cuba for planes 
landing on its territory; and allowed “certain commercial transactions” (Lamrani, 2013: 28). 
Moreover, in 1975, in response to domestic and international pressure, the U.S. ended its ban on 
217	  
	  
subsidiary trade with Cuba (Sweig, 2009: 91). The significance of these steps is explained by 
Sweig: 
As a result, after an effective dry spell of 10 years, Cuba was able not only to resume trade and 
economic ties throughout the hemisphere but also to purchase goods produced by third-country 
subsidiaries of American companies. American enterprise quickly took advantage. Indeed, by the 
beginning of the 1990s, American companies primarily in the pharmaceutical and agricultural 
sectors were selling about $700 million a year in U.S. products to Cuba (2009: 91). 
 
 It is very important to note that, although responding to Congressional pressure, control 
in U.S.-Cuban relations still resided in the executive branch during the Ford administration, as 
Henry Kissinger took strategic initiative to ensure that decision-making authority did not shift to 
Congress. For instance, anticipating the OAS vote to remove the trade ban on Cuba, Kissinger 
“signaled that the United states would stand back were the OAS to lift its collective diplomatic 
and commercial embargo of the island,” a move that Sweig characterizes as an attempt to 
“maintain executive privilege over foreign policy” (2009: 91-2). Kissinger also intimated that he 
would be willing to abrogate the ban on U.S. subsidiary trade with Cuba (Sweig, 2009: 91). 
Sweig stresses that these steps, which retained effective control of U.S.-Cuba policy within the 
executive branch, should be understood as part of Kissinger’s more general geopolitical strategy, 
since he understood individual countries within the region were already in the process of 
breaking their sanction agreements with Cuba anyway. Thus, by entertaining a more liberalized 
approach to the island, Kissinger hoped to improve the United States’ position in Latin America. 
Such tactics by Kissinger suggest that his ostensible lack of interest in Latin America, alluded to 
above, may have been more of a tongue-in-cheek patina than a genuine misunderstanding of the 
region’s geopolitics. 
 In short, the Ford administration can be characterized by its retrenchment on the Embargo, 
largely impelled by a shift in the international political climate, as well as a domestic shift in 
business sentiment towards the island, which was relayed as Congressional pressure. 
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  The international environment remained favorable to Cuba in 1977-8, and the Carter 
administration continued the Ford administration’s policy of rapprochement with the island. 
Under Carter, food and medicine sales to Cuba were authorized, and U.S. citizens were allowed 
to make trips to Cuba, beginning in 1977 (Lamrani, 2013: 29). Also, the policy of blacklisting 
ships that had trade relations with Cuba was discontinued (Lamrani, 2013: 29). Perhaps most 
notably, it was under Carter that the two nations opened interests sections in each other’s capitals 
(Sweig, 2009: 94). According to Haney and Vanderbush, “these moves were significant enough 
that Wayne Smith, director of the Office of Cuban Affairs in the State Department, assumed that 
the president would shortly proceed in the near future to end the embargo entirely” (2005: 27).  
 According to Sweig, this policy of rapprochement was part of Carter’s broader agenda, 
which placed human rights, rather than anticommunism, at the center of his foreign policy 
agenda. In this sense, seeking rapprochement with Cuba’s leadership, and shifting away from 
some of the right wing military dictatorships that had previously garnered U.S. support, made 
strategic and political sense (Sweig, 2009: 93). Pursuant to the Carter administration’s main 
demand, the Cuban government released 3,000 political prisoners, which Sweig characterizes as 
“the biggest single gesture of this sort since the revolution had taken power” (2009: 94).  
 Despite these positive steps, the international environment became less favorable to 
further rapprochement in 1979, as Carter dealt with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the 
Iranian hostage crisis, and the deployment of an increasing number of Cuban troops into Angola 
(Sweig, 2009: 95). This led to a recrudescence in anticommunist fervor amongst Republicans 
and some Democrats, and Carter’s advisors, including Zbigniew Brzezinski, cautioned against 
further rapprochement in relations with Cuba (Sweig, 2009: 95). Indeed, it was during the Carter 
administration that two very substantial and related shifts reached their critical stage: the 
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increased aggressiveness of Congress on foreign policy towards Cuba, and the emergence of a 
nascent Cuban exile community as a lobbying force. These two factors would completely alter 
the bilateral foreign policy landscape between the two countries; as Haney and Vanderbush 
explain, “a number of trends in the way U.S-Cuba policy was made were becoming apparent. 
Members of Congress were becoming more assertive on issues of foreign policy,” and “the 
Cuban exile community...began to emerge as a political force as its exile community recognized 
that they needed to rethink their strategy from covert forceful acts against Castro (and each other) 
toward Washington lobbying” (2005: 29). Regarding the latter development, it was during this 
period that the group that would come to be known as the Cuban American National Foundation 
(CANF) became closely associated with Ronald Reagan’s forthcoming presidency (Haney and 
Vanderbush, 2005: 30).  
 If the Carter administration can be characterized by its rapprochement with Cuba, and 
shift away from anticommunism in the region, then the Reagan administration can be 
characterized in diametrically opposite terms. The Reagan administration, concerned about 
security threats in the region (e.g. El Salvador and Nicaragua), once again placed 
anticommunism at the center of the U.S.’ foreign policy agenda. Problematically, though, 
Congress had become much more involved in foreign policy since Vietnam, and was 
Democratically dominated. Hence, to achieve his more bellicose foreign policy objectives in the 
region, and against Cuba in particular, Reagan had to garner the support of a like-minded, 
domestically powerful interest group. Hence the emergence of the Cuban American National 
Foundation (CANF) in American politics and foreign policy, a group Sweig characterizes as “the 
most effective and formidable Cuban American lobbying organization in the United States, from 
its founding in 1981 until the end of the 20th century” (2009: 101).  
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 The degree to which the Reagan administration helped foster the incipient CANF has 
been debated. Jorge Mas Canosa, CANF’s most prominent founding member, claims that the 
foundation was an organic movement, the creation of himself and “a few Cuban Americans” 
(Haney and Vanderbush, 2005: 35). However, Sweig argues that the Reagan administration 
played a crucial role in supporting and steering CANF at its early stages, and advised CANF to 
study and model itself after the American-Israel Political Action Committee (AIPAC) (2009: 
101). Raul Masvidal, one of CANF’s founding members, gives an account that concurs with this 
argument, claiming that the Reagan administration advised it to lobby both branches of 
government, thus putting pressure on a Democratically dominated congress and garnering 
political popularity for Reagan’s foreign policy agenda (Haney and Vanderbush, 2005: 35).  
 The role that CANF played during Reagan’s administration, and the role it has continued 
to play in U.S.-Cuba policy, cannot be understated. As Sweig explains,  
Very quickly, and with a wide open door from the administration, CANF became a membership 
organization with a donor base drawing on contributions of as little as $5 from pensioners in 
Hialeah to hundreds of thousands of dollars from wealthy scions of the exile community in South 
Florida, New Jersey, and elsewhere around the country. Under Mas Canosa’s charismatic and 
often intimidating leadership, CANF lobbied Democrats and Republicans alike while launching 
aggressive public and media advocacy campaigns on behalf of the cause of liberating Cuba from 
Castro’s clutches. A public action committee, or PAC, was also formed to reinforce CANF’s 
lobbying activities with campaign finance contributions on both sides of the aisle. By the end of 
Reagan’s second term, CANF could claim responsibility for making the views of the Cuban 
American anti-Castro hard line, then the majority of the community, strongly felt in Congress and 
in the executive branch. Legislative victories – such as Radio Marti and the new funds for 
advancing the cause of human rights and democracy in Cuba – would not have been approved 
were it not for the new political, financial, ideological, and media space that CANF came to 
occupy over the course of the 1980s (2009: 101-2). 
 
 With CANF’s political partnership, the Reagan administration was able to scale back 
most of the advances the Carter administration had made. U.S. citizens were once again 
prohibited from traveling to Cuba (Lamrani, 2013: 30), and the Reagan administration renewed 
the emphasis on sanctions on third-country entities that traded with Cuba (Sweig, 2009: 99; 
Lamrani, 2013:30-1).  
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 What is so fascinating about the emergence of CANF is the perverse and ironic manner in 
which CANF came to operate after its inception, and the manner in which policy and politics in 
the area of U.S.-Cuban relations became fused (Haney and Vanderbush, 2005: 50). The goal of 
the Reagan administration’s alliance with CANF was to retain control of Cuba policy in the 
White House by applying pressure to a Democratically controlled Congress. In this regard, and 
as evidence by such achievements as Radio Marti (the propaganda broadcaster that began 
receiving federal funding in 1983), Reagan and CANF were highly successful. “But,” as Haney 
and Vanderbush state, “this would end up to be a short-term win for President Reagan, and 
perhaps a longer-term loss for the presidency, in terms of being able to exercise control over 
Cuba policy” (2005: 51). The political convenience of CANF for the presidency was contingent 
on a continued alignment of CANF’s and the executive branch’s interests. But CANF was very 
quickly able to garner sufficient resources to operate independently of the executive branch 
(Haney and Vanderbush, 2005: 51). Moreover, with the election of Cuban Americans to 
Congress in 1989 (Ileana Ros-Lehtinen) and 1992 (Bob Menendez), U.S.-Cuba policy became 
deeply tied to domestic politics, as Cuban Americans constituted a powerful voting bloc that 
could sway elections (Haney and Vanderbush, 2005: 51-2). Thus, a strategy and alliance that 
began with the intention of securing Cuba policy in the White House ended with Cuba policy 
being captured by CANF and Congress.  
 With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the United States was presented with an 
opportunity to perhaps seek rapprochement with Cuba, since its traditional justification of Cold 
War geopolitical strategy could no longer be employed. However, with the CANF sufficiently 
ensconced as a lobbying force, the US instead chose to implement “another argument designed 
to justify the intensification of sanctions: the violations of human rights in Cuba” (Lamrani, 2013: 
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31). This continued policy of aggression towards Cuba was manifested in The Cuban Democracy 
Act of 1992, also known as the Torricelli Act. 
 George H.W. Bush signed the Torricelli Act in 1992, thus renewing many sanctions 
against Cuba that had remained relatively dormant in previous years. In most basic terms, the 
Torricelli Act “banned subsidiaries of US corporations (based in third countries) from trading or 
investing in Cuba and banned foreign ships used in Cuban trade from entering US ports” (Mesa 
Lago and Perez-Lopez, 2013: 13). Regarding the former provision, Sweig notes that the ban 
against third-country subsidiaries had, in effect, been lifted since 1975. Regarding the latter 
provision, ships were prohibited from entering US ports if they had entered Cuban ports within 
the six preceding months (Sweig, 2009: 163). The measure against third-country trading was 
“quite effective,” Lamrani argues, as “after a year, all of these companies had severed their 
business transactions with the island” (2013: 32).  
 Sweig emphasizes that, although signed as legislation, the “bill retained nearly full 
executive privilege over the embargo; if he saw fit, the president could still do away with most 
sanctions with the stroke of a pen” (2009: 165). Hence, as represented by the Torricelli Act, the 
George H.W. Bush administration’s Cuba policy can be characterized by its renewed emphasis 
on extraterritoriality and its effective retention of Cuba policy within the White House, though 
substantially influenced by CANF and Congress. 
 With the Clinton administration came the passing of the most important piece of 
legislation pertaining to Cuba since the Revolution: The Helms-Burton Act of 1996. The 
legislation was drafted in 1995, and, according to Lamrani, “Washington waited for the most 
opportune moment to put it to a vote” (2013: 33-4). That moment came on February 24th, 1996, 
when a plane operated by the anti-Castro group, Brothers to the Rescue, was shot down by the 
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Cuban military, “after repeatedly violating Cuban airspace to drop leaflets urging the population 
to insurrection” (Lamrani, 2013: 33). According to Sweig, enough Brothers to the Rescue flights 
had impinged on Cuban airspace that “Cuba was on solid ground” when claiming that the 
organization’s flights represented “a clear provocation, (and) an encroachment upon its 
sovereignty” (2009: 170).  
 Despite the legitimacy of these claims, Congress chose to exploit the opportunity, and 
very shortly afterwards, on March 12th, 1996, passed the Helms-Burton Act. In basic terms, 
Helms-Burton codified “all standards, regulations, and presidential orders passed since 1962, 
thereby elevating to the rank of law the whole arsenal of measures against Cuba that had been 
approved in the past” (Lamrani, 2013: 34). As Lopez-Levy explains, the Embargo, prior to 
Helms-Burton, had been “a wall built of differently shaped bricks stacked loosely together. 
There were statutes and executive orders and administrative regulations and guidelines,” but 
“under Helms-Burton, the president would need a jackhammer for the mortar” (Abrahams and 
Lopez-Levy, 2011: 600.  
In addition to codifying previous sanctions, Helms-Burton also expanded the 
extraterritorial aspects of the Embargo, and had three main provisions of note. First, Title III 
introduced a right of action for individuals and entities that had lost property in Cuba during the 
1960s to sue any foreign investors or entities who “trafficked in that property,” including the 
Cuban government itself (Sweig, 2009: 172).  
Second, in a similar effort to discourage investment, Title IV required the US government 
to deny entry visas to foreign businessmen, particularly executives and board members, whose 
companies are responsible for trafficking in such confiscated properties (Sweig, 2009: 172).  
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 Third, Helms-Burton outlined certain conditions that must be met before U.S. sanctions 
against Cuba could legally be abrogated. Sweig characterizes these conditions, because of their 
unlikelihood, as “fantastical” (2009: 172). These conditions included Fidel and Raul’s absence 
from office; the elimination of multiple government institutions, and “movement toward free 
elections, a free press, free labor unions, and the release of all political prisoners” (Sweig, 2009: 
172). Such measures clearly expanded the extraterritoriality of the Embargo, thus why Lamrani 
characterizes Helms-Burton as “a legal aberration because of its retroactive and extraterritorial 
reach” (2013: 33). 
Given the draconian and extraterritorial nature of all these provisions of Helms-Burton, 
particularly Title III, the Clinton administration sought, and obtained, a waiver authority that 
allowed the president to, every six months, suspend enforcement of Title III (Sweig, 2009: 172). 
Clinton chose to suspend Title III’s suits and sanctions throughout the entire rest of his 
presidency, “a practice that subsequently has been continued by all US presidents through the 
end of 2012” (Mesa Lago and Perez-Lopez, 2013: 13). Such a course of action is practical, to say 
the least, since, as Sweig argues, legal claims under Title III would expose the US to 
international ridicule and “clog” the court system (2009: 173).  
It should be noted that Clinton exploited what little executive latitude remained to gain 
some minor openings with the island. For instance, under the Torricelli Act of 1992, the US is 
allowed to provide assistance “to individuals and organizations working for nonviolent change 
on the island through relevant NGOs and external partners” (Sweig, 2009: 164). Clinton chose to 
interpret this provision in a manner that allowed him to introduce 13 licenses66 that Americans 
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could use to travel to Cuba for “people-to-people” exchange (Sweig, 2009: 175). The Clinton 
administration also lifted the ban on family travel, though only one visit was allowed annually 
(Sweig, 2009: 175). One other achievement of note during the Clinton administration was the 
Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act, passed in October of 2000, after Cuba 
had been ravaged by several hurricanes. The act allowed US entities to sell food to Cuba for 
humanitarian reasons, as long as such food is paid for in advance with a non-dollar currency, and 
through a third-country financial institution (Lamrani, 2013: 37). This legislation has allowed the 
U.S. to become Cuba’s main supplier of agricultural products (Lamrani, 2013: 36).  
Despite the Clinton administration’s success in obtaining a waiver for Title III, and 
although the president still has some latitude to act independently of Congress (for instance, 
when engaging in direct diplomacy or licensing travel categories (Abrahams and Lopez-Levy, 
2011: 60)), Helms-Burton should still be considered a substantial defeat for the executive branch 
in the area of foreign policy. In fact, Sweig states that not even Jesse Helms, the bill’s main 
author, anticipated the success of the legislation in vitiating presidential authority, vis-à-vis the 
Embargo (2009: 173). After Helms-Burton, the president’s hands were, for the most part, tied, 
leaving the Executive Branch impotent to lift sanctions (Sweig, 2009: 173).  
In sum, the Clinton administration should be characterized by its increased 
extraterritoriality in the Embargo, as well as the diminution it experienced in Cuba policy, 
relative to Congress. However, the Clinton administration should also be remembered for taking 
advantage of what latitude was left in the executive branch to increase the number of legally 
acceptable travel categories between the U.S. and Cuba. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
institutes;	  exportation,	  importation,	  or	  transmission	  of	  information	  or	  informational	  materials;	  and	  exportation	  of	  
licensable	  products	  (Sullivan,	  2014).	  
226	  
	  
The George W. Bush administration set out to undo the meager openings that had been 
achieved by the Clinton administration. Bush had campaigned, in part, on an anti-Castro 
platform, in an attempt to please George W. Bush’s and Jeb Bush’s business associates in the 
Cuban exile community (Sweig, 2009: 183). The Bush administration, following the attacks of 
September 11, 2001, attempted to construct a case that Cuba was developing biological weapons, 
with the capability of exporting them (Sweig, 2009: 182). Such allegations were curious, given 
the support Fidel Castro personally voiced for the United States following September 11, 
offering the U.S. use of its airspace, and medical support for victims of the attacks (Sweig, 2009: 
181). Fortunately, as Sweig states, “cooler heads prevailed,” and the Bush administration 
dropped the allegations (2009: 182).  
However, the decision to invade Iraq drew a backlash against dissidents in Cuba from 
Cuban officials. The Cuban government had previously brooked activities of a number of 
dissident groups, in an attempt to appease Washington (Sweig, 2009: 189). But when the U.S. 
invaded Iraq in 2003, Cuba became suspicious that dissident groups may provide an entry point 
for a US government that was becoming increasingly belligerent (Sweig, 2009: 189). Hence, 75 
dissidents were arrested by Cuban authorities in March 2003, “the day before Bush formally 
declared war on Iraq” (Sweig, 2009: 189).  
Although abandoning its allegations of biological weapon development on the island, the 
Bush administration did not abandon its goal of scaling back the openings of the Clinton 
administration. Beginning in 2003, obtaining a people-to-people exchange travel visa became 
prohibitively difficult, effectively closing all travel categories (Sweig, 2009: 188). Bush also 
launched the Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba (CFAC) in 2003. The Commission was 
responsible for finding a way to return nationalized properties worth more than $50,000 to their 
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original owners on the island (Lamrani, 2013: 39). Pursuant to a 2004 report by the Commission, 
the Bush administration drastically reduced family travel and remittance allowances, only 
allowing family travel to Cuba once every three years, and reducing the amount of money that 
could be sent daily from $164 to $50, and money could only be sent to “family” who are not 
members of the Communist Party (Lamrani, 2013: 39; Sweig, 2009: 190).67 Moreover, the 
definition of “family” was narrowed to only include immediate family, but not “uncles, nephews, 
(or) cousins” (Lamrani, 2013: 39). 
 In an attempt to tighten already extant sanctions against Cuba, the Working Group for the 
Implementation of Sanctions Against Cuba was created in October of 2006 (Lamrani, 2013: 43). 
Pursuant to the group’s suggestion, those who were proven guilty of violating embargo sanctions 
“would risk penalties of up to ten years in prison and a million dollars in fines” (Lamrani, 2013: 
43). Hence, as Lamrani explains,  
Any Cuban residing in the United States who visited his sick mother in Cuba without first having 
obtained Treasury Department permission to leave the country, or who might stay on the island for 
more than the fourteen days allowed every three years, or who might spend over $50 a day during 
his stay of fourteen days, or send financial assistance to his cousin or aunt, or his father if he is a 
member of the Communist Party, could receive a penalty of ten years in prison and a million 
dollars in fines. Similarly, any American tourist who spends a weekend in Havana could receive 
the same punishment (2013: 43). 
 
In sum, although Helms-Burton had substantially vitiated executive authority in the area 
of Cuba policy, the Bush administration exploited what prerogatives still remained for the 
executive to scale back travel and remittance allowances, thus reversing the meager advances 
that had been made during the Clinton administration in these areas. 
The Obama Administration, and Cuba’s Pragmatic Approach to Policy with the United 
States 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67	  As	  to	  how	  remissions	  are	  sent,	  cubacurrency.com	  suggests	  that	  money	  be	  sent	  through	  cash	  transfer	  agencies	  such	  as	  
Western	  Union	  or	  Cash2Cuba.	  Dollar	  transfers	  are	  taxed	  at	  10%,	  so	  some	  people	  choose	  to	  send	  Canadian	  dollars	  or	  Euros	  
instead,	  which	  avoids	  this	  tax	  (Cuba	  Currency	  &	  Money	  Guide).	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 The Obama administration is allotted its own section in this chapter because, although it 
seemed that only minor openings, particularly in travel and remittances, would be achieved 
during his administration, events in late 2014 and early 2015 would prove to be the most 
momentous since the Embargo was implemented in 1962. 
 Hopes were high for a thawing of relations between the United States and Cuba when 
Barack Obama won the 2008 presidential election, and such hopes were not without base. During 
a primary debate in 2007, Barack Obama said that he would be willing to, without preconditions, 
meet with Cuba’s leaders (Sweig, 2009: 239). And during his presidential campaign, he 
renounced the Embargo, recognizing it as a policy that does little but harm the Cuban people 
(Lamrani, 2013: 43).  
 Hence, it was not surprising that the Obama administration moved quickly, in April of 
2009, to scale back travel and remittance restrictions that had been imposed by the Bush 
administration in 2004. Cuban Americans were allowed unlimited travel to the island, and the 
cap on remittances to family members was removed, thus allowing Cuban Americans to send an 
unlimited amount of cash to family on the island (Lamrani, 2013: 44). Obama also widened the 
categories of products that could be sent to Cuba, allowing “clothing, hygiene products, and 
fishing equipment” (Lamrani, 2013: 44). Such steps were not groundbreaking, as they simply 
exploited the same loopholes that the Clinton and Bush administrations had exploited in their 
travel and remittance modifications. However, they were indicative of the intent of the Obama 
administration to open relations with the island.  
 But developments seemed to stall after those initial moves. In September of 2009, Obama 
even extended the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, an action taken by all presidents since 
1962 to legally extend the Embargo (Lamrani, 2013: 44). As Lamrani explains, the move was 
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only symbolic, since Helms-Burton removed the necessity of annual extension of the Embargo, 
but it was still a missed opportunity for the Obama administration to send a symbolic message 
that it was willing to open up with the island. By extending the Trading with the Enemy Act, the 
Obama administration sent a message that, perhaps, analysts such as Sweig were getting ahead of 
themselves, vis-à-vis their predictions regarding Obama’s rapprochement with Cuba. Hence, 
Cuba analysts returned to their skeptical views towards relations between the two states, until 
December of 2014, when Cuba and the U.S. would make announcements, and engage in talks, 
that signified, for the first time in decades, a genuine intent on both parties’ part to restore 
commercial and diplomatic relations. 
 Major amendments to U.S. policy towards Cuba were announced by Barack Obama on 
December 17th, 2014. Obama announced, “In the most significant changes in our policy in more 
than fifty years, we will end an outdated approach that, for decades, has failed to advance our 
interests, and instead we will begin to normalize relations between our two countries” (White 
House, 2014). Such a move was long overdue, and comports with democratic sentiments in the 
United States, with 60% of Americans supporting Obama’s policy shift towards normalization 
with Cuba (Dann, 1/19/15), and 55% of Cuban Americans in Miami-Dade County, as of 
December 2008, supporting an end to the Embargo (Lopez-Levy, 2010).  
Towards this end, Obama ordered three main policy changes towards the island: first, he 
ordered Secretary of State John Kerry to begin discussions with Cuba to reestablish diplomatic 
relations with the island. He also ordered an embassy to be re-established in Cuba, along with 
visits by high-ranging U.S. officials (White House, 2014). Second, he ordered Kerry to review 
Cuba’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism. Lastly, Obama ordered that steps be taken to 
increase “travel, commerce, and the flow of information to and from Cuba” (White House, 2014). 
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Obama stressed that the above actions are his prerogative as President, but that further actions in 
the direction of repealing the Embargo must be taken by Congress, since the Embargo was 
codified by Helms-Burton in 1996 (White House, 2014).   
 The first step towards rapprochement came with the successful release and exchange of 
prisoners between the two states. Cuba released Alan Gross, along with a U.S. intelligence agent 
who had been jailed in Cuba for twenty years, while the U.S. released three Cuban intelligence 
agents. This initial step was followed by Cuba’s release of 53 political prisoners that it had 
promised to release in exchange for the U.S.’ movement towards diplomatic normalization (Ford, 
2015). 
 These steps were followed by a meeting between diplomats of the two countries on 
January 21 and 22 of 2015. Assistant Secretary of State for the Western Hemisphere, Roberta 
Jacobson, led the U.S. delegation. Reuters notes that this was the first time in 38 years that an 
official of her rank from the U.S. had visited the island for talks (Wroughton, 2015). Josefina 
Vidal, director of U.S. affairs at the Cuban foreign ministry, led the Cuban delegation.  
 The meeting mainly served as a platform for both states to enunciate what conditions 
must be met for further diplomatic normalization to occur. The U.S. delegation mainly raised 
concerns about Cuba’s human rights record, while Cuba raised concerns about the U.S.’ own 
human rights problems and race relations; demanded that it be removed from the United States 
list of state sponsors of terrorism, and requested that the U.S. “wet foot, dry foot” policy (The 
Cuban Adjustment Act) be ended (Wroughton, 2015).  
 There are some positive portents for the latter two of Cuba’s demands. Regarding the first, 
the U.S. has launched a review of Cuba’s status as a state sponsor of terrorism, which will be 
completed within five months (Cuba Central News Blast, 1/23/2015). Regarding the second, 
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“wet foot, dry foot” is indeed an immigration policy, which means the Executive Branch has the 
prerogative to decide how, and if, to administer it. Robert Muse, a D.C. attorney with experience 
on U.S.-Cuba relations, argues that “wet foot, dry foot” can be ended with a directive from the 
President to the Attorney General “ordering him or her to cease granting permanent residence 
to Cubans who enter the U.S. without visas” (Cuba Central News Blast, 1/23/2015).  
 The momentous nature of these developments notwithstanding, The Miami Herald notes 
that anti-Castro Republicans are already assessing their options to block Obama’s new policies 
towards the island, and states, “The most likely targets are funding for new diplomatic operations 
in Havana, as well as the requirement for Senate confirmation of the ambassador” (Kane, 2014). 
However, there is also a substantial degree of division amongst Congressional Republicans, with 
Republicans such as Rand Paul arguing that the Embargo has been a fiasco (Kane, 2014). 
Congressional hearings were held for three days in early February, and despite expected 
complaints by hardliners such as Ileana Ros-Lehtinen and Marco Rubio, Obama’s policy 
emerged “largely unscathed” (Padgett, 2/5/15). Moreover, a bill was introduced by Republican 
Jeff Flake of Arizona and Democrat Patrick Leahy of Vermont, which would categorically 
abrogate all restrictions on travel to Cuba (Lift the Cuba Travel Ban Already, 2015). Hence, it 
seems that even a Republican Congress will not be enough to reverse Obama’s recent actions. 
 Perhaps even more significant than the above bill that was introduced to end travel 
restrictions, was a bill introduced by a bipartisan group of senators on January 12, 2015, which 
would effectively end the Embargo. The bill would end the categorical ban on trade with Cuba, 
as well as roll back Helms-Burton, thus ending the Embargo’s status as codified law (Itkowitz, 
1/12/15). While the potential of these two bills passing is dubious, they do represent an attitude 
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towards the island that obtains in Congress, which is likely to become more salient as a growing 
number of interests in the United States demand normalization with Cuba. 
 The recent meeting between officials from the two countries is only the very beginning of 
a very long discussion that will involve different degrees of give and take over the forthcoming 
years. The U.S. could do much to help the process along by removing Cuba from its list of state 
sponsors of terrorism, while Cuba could facilitate the process of rapprochement by continuing 
and expanding its recent economic openings. Given the divide amongst Congressional 
Republicans, and given the pressure coming from US business interests to commercially engage 
with the island, it is unlikely that a reversal will occur in the United States’ new policy turn 
towards the island, barring any catastrophic, unforeseen event.  
 It would seem that the Obama administration might have begun a shift towards regaining 
initiative on foreign policy with Cuba for the first time since Kennedy was in office. Obama 
requested, during his State of the Union Address, that Congress end the Embargo. If they do so, 
and repeal Helms-Burton, then prerogative on Cuba policy would once again reside in the 
Executive Branch, though that is a very big “if.” As is explained below, though, Congressional 
moves are being made in that direction.  
 What explains the recent thawing in relations between the two states? On the Cuban side, 
the explanation lies in Raul Castro’s strategy of shifting the island in a more pragmatic, market-
oriented approach, regarding economic policy. As has been argued elsewhere in this thesis, the 
island has entered a permanent pragmatist shift. As part of this shift, Cuban officials, including 
Raul, are making a concerted effort to more deeply insert Cuba into the world economy. As part 
of this insertion, they have recognized the necessity of normalizing relations with the United 
States, since 1) the United States is the island’s most important trade partner, and a normalization 
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of relations would mean much easier and more efficient commercial relations; and 2) because the 
U.S. embargo, as an extraterritorial policy/law, deleteriously affects Cuba’s economic relations 
with third countries and U.S. subsidiaries in third countries. Hence, in 2012, Raul Castro, of his 
own volition, said that he was willing to hold talks with the United States, and that “no topic was 
off limits, including US concerns about democracy, freedom of the press and human rights on 
the island, as long as it was a conversation between equals” (“Cuban President Raúl Castro 
Willing to Hold No-limits Talks with America,” The Guardian, 1/26/12). It should thus be 
understood that the United States was lagging behind Cuba since 2012, vis-à-vis willingness to 
come to the table and make an earnest attempt to mend the fence between the two states.  
 On the U.S. side, a number of factors explain the move towards normalization. The single 
most important factor was likely the pragmatic shift by Cuban officials in recent years. One of 
the major demands amongst right wing Cuban Americans has always been that the Cuban 
government liberalize its economy. While they have also demanded that the Castros be removed 
from power, economic liberalization has likely been a sufficient condition for many Cuban 
Americans to relax their attitudes towards the Embargo. In 2008, shortly after Raul Castor 
engaged in his program of economic reforms, Cuban Americans in Miami Dade County were 55% 
in favor of ending the Embargo; this was the first time a majority had been in such favor since 
this poll began in 1991 (Lopez-Levy, 2010). In 2007, only 42.5% of Cuban Americans were in 
favor of ending the Embargo (“Cuba Policy Enters the Presidential Race,” Latin American 
Working Group, 2009).  
This shift in sentiment is also explained by the changing demographic that composes 
Cuban Americans. As Lopez-Levy (2010) explains, a majority of Cuban Americans arrived in 
the United States in the last twenty years. Thus, their most salient memory and experience was 
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the Special Period, and the aggressive and harmful role Cuban American ex pats played during 
the Special Period, particularly in their attempts to block remittances to the island during a time 
when such material assistance was direly needed (Lopez-Levy, 2010). As a result, the current 
majority of Cuban Americans favor a different approach to Cuba, one that emphasizes economic 
opening and assistance, rather than hardline aggression and demands for political change (Lopez-
Levy, 2010).  
Finally, there seems to be growing division amongst Congressional Republicans 
regarding the Embargo. Recent bipartisan bills to end travel restrictions and de-codify the 
Embargo are evidence of Republican dissatisfaction with the Embargo. Given these sentiments 
amongst Cuban Americans and Congressional Republicans, the Obama administration likely saw 
a change to finally normalize relations with Cuba, and seized the opportunity.  
Purpose and Substance of Forthcoming Changes 
The purpose of the forthcoming changes, according to the U.S. Treasury, is to “chart a 
new course in U.S. relations with Cuba and to further engage and empower the Cuban people” 
(Press Center. FACT SHEET: Treasury and Commerce Announce Regulatory Amendments to the 
Cuba Sanctions. 1/15/15). The changes will be implemented through revisions to the Treasury’s 
Cuban Assets Control Regulations (CACR) and the Commerce Department’s Export 
Administration Regulations (EAR). The former is administered through the Treasury’s Office of 
Foreign Assets Control (OFAC); the latter is administered through the Commerce Department’s 
Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) (Press Center. FACT SHEET: Treasury and Commerce 
Announce Regulatory Amendments to the Cuba Sanctions. 1/15/15). These changes took affect 
on January 16th, 2015. 
 The changes to CACR, according to the Federal Register,  
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Facilitate travel to Cuba for authorized purposes, facilitate the provision by travel agents and 
airlines of authorized travel services and the forwarding by certain entities of authorized 
remittances, raise the limit on certain categories of remittances to Cuba, allow U.S. financial 
institutions to open correspondent accounts at Cuban financial institutions to facilitate the 
processing of authorized transactions, authorize certain transactions with Cuban nationals located 
outside of Cuba, and allow a number of other activities related to, among other areas, 
telecommunications, financial services, trade, and shipping. These amendments also implement 
certain technical and conforming changes (Cuban Assets Control Regulations: A Rule by the 
Foreign Assets Control Office).  
 
The changes to the EAR, according to the Federal Register, are meant to 
 
Create License Exception Support for the Cuban People (SCP) to authorize the export and 
reexport of certain items to Cuba that are intended to improve the living conditions of the Cuban 
people; support independent economic activity and strengthen civil society in Cuba; and improve 
the free flow of information to, from, and among the Cuban people. It also amends existing 
License Exception Consumer Communications Devices (CCD) by eliminating the donation 
requirement, thereby authorizing sales of certain communications items to eligible end users in 
Cuba. Additionally, it amends License Exception Gift Parcels and Humanitarian Donations (GFT) 
to authorize exports of multiple gift parcels in a single shipment. Lastly, this rule establishes a 
general policy of approval for exports and reexports to Cuba of items for the environmental 
protection of U.S. and international air quality, and waters, and coastlines (Cuba: Providing 
Support for the Cuban People A Rule by the Industry and Security Bureau).  
 
Regarding travel to Cuba for authorized persons, it is important to note that “ordinary” tourism is 
still illegal (Baker and Randall, 2015). There are still 12 categories68 of travelers that are legally 
allowed to travel to Cuba, and these categories will remain in effect (Sherman, 2015). Only 
Congress has the authority to categorically end restrictions on travel to Cuba. In this regard, the 
“Freedom to Travel to Cuba Act,” primarily sponsored by Senator Jeff Flake, a Republican from 
Arizona, would remove all travel restrictions that currently impede travel to the island. Senator 
Flake believes that free travel to Cuba could be a reality “within the year” (Levy, Gabrielle, 
1/29/15). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68	  These	  categories	  are:	  “family	  visits;	  official	  business	  of	  the	  U.S.	  government,	  foreign	  governments,	  and	  certain	  
intergovernmental	  organizations;	  journalistic	  activity;	  professional	  research	  and	  professional	  meetings;	  educational	  
activities;	  religious	  activities;	  public	  performances,	  clinics,	  workshops,	  athletic	  and	  other	  competitions,	  and	  exhibitions;	  
support	  for	  the	  Cuban	  people;	  humanitarian	  projects;	  activities	  of	  private	  foundations	  or	  research	  or	  educational	  
institutes;	  exportation,	  importation,	  or	  transmission	  of	  information	  or	  information	  materials;	  and	  certain	  authorized	  
export	  transactions”	  (Press	  Center.	  FACT	  SHEET:	  Treasury	  and	  Commerce	  Announce	  Regulatory	  Amendments	  to	  the	  Cuba	  
Sanctions.	  1/15/15).	  Under	  the	  Clinton	  administration,	  there	  were	  13	  categories	  of	  legal	  travel.	  The	  language	  of	  the	  
categories	  under	  Clinton	  and	  Obama	  is	  different,	  though,	  so	  it	  is	  most	  likely	  that	  the	  difference	  in	  number	  of	  categories	  is	  




Regardless of whether Flake’s bill passes, the recent changes by the Obama 
administration allow travelers within the 12 legal categories to Travel to Cuba with a “general” 
license, rather than a “specific” license, which means they will not need to seek approval and 
apply for a license prior to traveling to the island (Press Center. FACT SHEET: Treasury and 
Commerce Announce Regulatory Amendments to the Cuba Sanctions. 1/15/15). Moreover, travel 
agents and airlines will no longer be required to seek specific licenses before providing services 
for such travel (Sherman, 2015). The implications for ease of travel cannot be overstated, as the 
New York Times states that “If airlines begin regular service between the United States and Cuba, 
as they quickly moved to do, it could soon be as simple as logging on to a computer to order a 
ticket and checking a box to say the trip serves a legitimate purpose” (Baker and Randall, 2015). 
Commercial airline flights may not be abundant initially, since airlines have to determine if there 
is enough commercial demand for travel to the island, but the ease with which travelers will be 
able to travel to and from Cuba will be substantially increased by these new rules. Likely 
representative of more general interest, United Airlines has already announced that they plan to 
seek approval for running flights to Cuba from Newark and Houston (Baker and Randall, 2015). 
 In addition to removing license requirements for airlines and individuals, the new rules 
also remove the cap on per diem expenditures for travelers to Cuba, and also allow travelers to 
Cuba to use credit and debit cards (FACT SHEET: Treasury and Commerce Announce 
Regulatory Amendments to the Cuba Sanctions. 1/15/15), thus introducing conditions that should 
allow Cuban businesses to experience a substantial increase in revenue from tourism. However, 
there is still a cap on the value of products that travelers are allowed to bring back with them 
from Cuba. Travelers are only allowed to bring back $400 worth of goods purchased in Cuba, 
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which includes no more than $100 worth of alcohol or tobacco (FACT SHEET: Treasury and 
Commerce Announce Regulatory Amendments to the Cuba Sanctions. 1/15/15).  
 Regarding remittances, travelers to Cuba will now be allowed to bring $10,000 in 
remittances for “family remittances, periodic remittances, remittances to religious organizations 
in Cuba, and remittances to students in Cuba pursuant to an educational license” (FACT SHEET: 
Treasury and Commerce Announce Regulatory Amendments to the Cuba Sanctions. 1/15/15). 
General remittance allowances for Cuban nationals were raised from $500 to $2,000 per quarter. 
However, such remittances are still prohibited from being sent to Cuban government officials or 
members of the Communist Party (FACT SHEET: Treasury and Commerce Announce 
Regulatory Amendments to the Cuba Sanctions. 1/15/15). 
 Regarding the allowance for U.S. financial institutions to open accounts in Cuba, it’s 
important to note that this does not apply to individuals. Accounts can be opened at Cuban 
financial institutions, but they “are in the name of the U.S. depository institution, not in the name 
of a specific U.S. individual” (Sherman, 2015).   
 Some of the most impressive changes pertain to support for Cuban businesses. A new 
commerce license exception was created, “Support for the Cuban People,” (SCP). The SCP, in 
an effort to “improve living conditions and support independent economic activity,” authorizes 
the sale of:  
(1) building materials, equipment, and tools for use by the private sector to construct or renovate 
privately-owned buildings, including privately-owned residences, businesses, places of worship, 
and building for private sector social or recreational use; (2) tools and equipment for private 
agricultural activity; and (3) tools, equipment, supplies, and instruments for use by private sector 
entrepreneurs (FACT SHEET: Treasury and Commerce Announce Regulatory Amendments to the 
Cuba Sanctions. 1/15/15). 
 
The implications of this change for the private sector in Cuba cannot be understated. The 
language is very vague, and thus seems to legalize a breadth of economic activity that not even 
the most optimistic of Cuba watchers were anticipating. Moreover, the vague language was no 
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mistake; as one lawyer who deals with trade regulation stated, “These are fairly careful people 
who drafted these (rules), so they didn't do it blindly. They did it with an eye to leaving them 
vague” (Gomez, 2015). Hence, Cuban businesses will have access to a wide variety of American 
goods, though it should be kept in mind that the significance of this development will be 
contingent on the degree to which the Cuban government allows input purchases from American 
companies by Cuban entrepreneurs. 
 In another move to ease commercial relations between the two islands, the Obama 
administration also changed the “cash in advance” requirement for transactions between Cuban 
and American entities. Before, Cuban entities could purchase a number of goods, including 
agricultural goods, from the United States, but had to pay for all goods with cash in advance. But 
with the new changes, “the regulatory interpretation of ‘cash in advance’ is being redefined from 
‘cash before shipment’ to ‘cash before transfer of title to, and control of,’ the exported items to 
allow expanded financing of authorized trade with Cuba” (FACT SHEET: Treasury and 
Commerce Announce Regulatory Amendments to the Cuba Sanctions. 1/15/15). This move 
allows Cubans to pay for products upon their receipt, thus avoiding the financial hassle of having 
to pay for goods before they are shipped.  
 The significance of these changes notwithstanding, it must again be emphasized that 
recent developments have not put an end to the Embargo. Helms-Burton codified the Embargo, 
and only Congress has the authority to repeal it. Hence, many facets of the Embargo remain in 
full effect, along with the punishments that they entail. Moreover, the extraterritoriality of the 
Embargo still obtains, to the extent that subsidiaries of US companies in third countries are still 
prohibited from doing business with Cuba. However, the new changes do allow U.S. subsidiaries 
to provide goods or services to Cuban nationals outside of Cuba (FACT SHEET: Treasury and 
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Commerce Announce Regulatory Amendments to the Cuba Sanctions. 1/15/15). Also, language 
was included that will allow ships from other countries to enter U.S. ports, regardless of whether 
they entered Cuban ports in the preceding six months, which had been prohibited by the 
Torricelli Act in 1992 (FACT SHEET: Treasury and Commerce Announce Regulatory 
Amendments to the Cuba Sanctions. 1/15/15).  
Effects of the Embargo 
The effects of the Embargo are difficult to assess, because it is a policy that has very 
often not been actively enforced. Rather, because foreign entities understand the extraterritorial 
nature of the Embargo, it has served as a general deterrent. Hence, assessing the effects of the 
Embargo would require a counterfactual analysis of what level of trade and investment would 
have occurred if the Embargo were not in place, and such an analysis is not within the scope of 
this thesis. However, for context, and for a general grasp of the Embargo’s effects, this section 
will provide estimates that varying sources have arrived at regarding the Embargo’s effects. 
 It should be emphasized right away that, although the Embargo serves as a general 
deterrent, and thus need not always be actively enforced, it is still a policy that the US 
government has actively enforced when the opportunity has arisen, and an example was needed 
to be set. For instance, Siegalbaum recounts in instance in 2010 when the US government fined 
the Dutch Bank ABN Amro $500 million for "having carried out unauthorized financial 
transactions in which Cuba or Cuban Nationals had interests” (2011). In another case, UBS was 
fined $100 million in 2004 for receiving remittances from Cuba in US dollars (“UBS Fined $100 
Million,” 2004). Such cases illustrate the extraterritorial nature of the Embargo.  
 Enforcement of the Embargo has not always been focused on large financial institutions, 
though; the Embargo has also been enforced in what can only be described as a petty, cynical 
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nature, with effects that are indisputably detrimental to human well-being. In one instance, $4.2 
million was seized from the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, simply because some funds were 
earmarked for projects in Cuba (Siegelbaum, 2011). Lamrani gives an even more cynical account: 
In April 1996, Kip Taylor, 73, and Patrick Taylor, 58, a couple from Traverse City, Michigan, 
went to Cuba aboard a sailboat. Aware that U.S. law forbids any expenditure on the island 
(without specific authorization), they took with them the necessary provisions for a three-month 
stay. When they returned they were caught by a storm and the mast of their boat was badly 
damaged. Rescued by the Cuban Coast Guard in international waters, they were returned to Cuba. 
When they approached the Treasury Department to ask permission to repair their sailboat, they 
found themselves up against a refusal. The U.S. authorities ordered them to abandon their boat and 
their two dogs and return to the United States by air, something that the couple refused to do. With 
the help of foreign sailors, the Taylors were finally able to repair their boat and return safely 
without violating the regulations on travel to Cuba. Upon their return, they were interrogated by 
U.S. authorities to whom they revealed having provided gauze and tape to a Cuban cook who had 
burned his hand. The Treasury Department then accused them of having ‘provided medical 
services to a Cuba national’ and ordered the couple to pay a fine that amounted to tens of 
thousands of dollars” (2013: 51-2). 
 
 These are just a few examples of the enforcement of the Embargo, which serve to 
illustrate a more general point: the US government has, historically, implemented the Embargo 
in a manner that is both extraterritorial and petty.   
 The caveat of how difficult it is to assess the material effects of the Embargo 
notwithstanding, different sources have proffered estimates, which span a very wide range, in 
monetary terms. At the low end, in its report to the UN in 2006, the Cuban government 
submitted that the Embargo, since its promulgation, had caused, at its most conservative estimate, 
$86 billion in damage to the Cuban economy (United Nations General Assembly, 2006: 17). The 
Cuban government itemized the damages as follows: $29.427 billion due to lost income from 
exports and services; $9.592 billion due to losses from geographical relocation of trade; $2.866 
billion due to impact on production and services; $8.483 billion due to technological embargo; 
$1.565 billion due to impact on service to the population; $8.640 billion due to financial and 
monetary impact; and $5.533 billion due to impact of brain drain (United Nations General 
Assembly, 2006: 17). Cuban officials stress that this 2006 report “does not include the more than 
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$54 billion in direct damage caused…by the acts of the sabotage and terrorist activities 
encouraged, organized and financed from the United States, nor the value of the products whose 
production ceased or the damage resulting from the onerous conditions imposed on Cuba for 
obtaining credit” (United Nations General Assembly, 2006: 17).  
 At the high end, estimates put the cost of the Embargo on the Cuban economy anywhere 
between $750 billion and $1 trillion. In 2010, Cuban Foreign Minister, Bruno Rodriguez 
estimated the damage of the embargo to be $750 million (Acosta, 2010), and Vice Foreign 
Minister, Abelardo Moreno estimated the cost of the Embargo to be close to $1 trillion 
(Siegelbaum, 2011). The major reason for the disparity in these estimates and the lower end 
estimates pertains to adjustments “for inflation and the changing value of the dollar” (Acosta, 
2010). When not adjusting for inflation and dollar value, the above $1 trillion estimate by 
Moreno falls to $104 billion (Siegelbaum, 2011).  
Another reason for the disparity in estimates likely pertains to what factors are taken into 
account when assessing the damage of the Embargo. For instance, one of the major effects of the 
Embargo has been to limit Cuba’s access to long-term, and thus relatively inexpensive financing. 
As a result, Cuba has been forced to rely on expensive, short-term capital to finance any 
government deficits (Vallejo in Campbell, 2013: 75). This reliance on short-term capital is 
relevant for two reasons. First, there is the direct cost of the higher cost of short-term, rather than 
long-term, capital, which should be accounted for in an estimate of the cost of the Embargo. 
Secondly, there are the indirect, and probably more substantial, costs related to investment and 
deficits that have probably been avoided due to lack of access to long-term capital. In other 
words, because Cuba has lacked access to traditional avenues of capital to fund government 
deficits, there have probably been cases in which investments were needed, and government 
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deficits would have been necessary and beneficial, but such investments were foregone, since 
access to necessary capital was unavailable. Hence, if such deficit-funded investment would have 
led to economic growth in the longrun, the longrun costs of not having access to capital, in terms 
of foregone economic growth, must be taken into account.  
It should also be noted that the costs of the Embargo are not limited to Cuba; entities 
within the United States are also deleteriously affected. In monetary terms, the US International 
Trade Commission “estimates American losses alone from the embargo as much as $1.2 billion 
annually” (Bandow, 2012). Such estimation explains why business interests in the United States 
have been pushing for an end to the Embargo for decades. In addition to the monetary costs 
associated with the Embargo, there are obviously opportunities for political and cultural 
exchanges that have been foregone as a result of the Embargo.  
Regarding the efficacy of the Embargo, in terms of whether it has been able to achieve its 
goal of isolating and dismantling Cuba’s government, the policy has been a categorical fiasco. 
The Embargo has economically isolated the island’s population, but it has most likely actually 
been counterproductive, in terms of destabilizing the Cuban government, for two reasons. First, 
the Embargo has not affected the island deeply enough to destabilize the government, because 
the Embargo is a unilateral policy by the United States, and has not been supported 
internationally. Thus, the Embargo has not sufficiently isolated the regime for it to topple. 
Second, because Cubans understand that the United States has acted alone to impose its policies 
on the island, and because the Embargo has had deleterious effects on the general Cuban 
population, the Cuban government has been able to impute much of the island’s economic 
hardship to the Embargo and the United States. This has allowed to the Cuban government to 
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justify many of its economic and political rigidity as attempts to protect the island against 
impositions by the United States. 
 Given the utter failures of the Embargo, it is a piece of legislation that should, though not 
necessarily will, be repealed. If it were to be repealed, there are two main benefits that would 
accrue to both states. First of all, the amount of economic gain for individual Cubans and 
Americans would be substantial. 400,000 Americans already travel to Cuba each year, and if the 
Embargo were lifted, this number would likely increase to approximately one million Americans 
(Lift the Cuba Travel Ban Already, 2015). If travel restrictions were ended, along with caps on 
how much is allowed to be spent while on the island, Cuban entrepreneurs would acquire many 
more dollars, and thus experience an improved standard of living. As one trade specialist 
explains, “American tourists would boost the earnings of Cubans who rent rooms, drive taxis, 
sell art, and operate restaurants in their homes. Those dollars would then find their way to the 
hundreds of freely priced farmers markets, to carpenters, repairmen, tutors, food venders, and 
other entrepreneurs” (in Bandow, 2012).  
Americans would also gain, as the Embargo currently costs American businesses $1.2 
billion annually (Tymins, 2014). Hence why American business interests, mainly in agriculture 
and telecommunication, have been requesting an end to the Embargo for years (Tymins, 2014).  
 Second, lifting the Embargo could compel the Cuban government to engage in further 
economic reforms. As explained above, the Cuban government has attributed many of the 
island’s economic shortcomings to the Embargo, and if it were to be lifted, Cuban authorities 
would be compelled to recognize the internal distortions that are responsible for a large portion 
of the island’s economic woes. Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton recognized as much 
when she stated, “It is my personal belief that the Castros do not want to see an end to the 
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embargo and do not want to see normalization with the United States, because they would lose 
all of their excuses for what hasn’t happened in Cuba in the last 50 years” (in Bandow, 2012). 
Such a quote clearly goes too far, in terms of exculpating the U.S. Embargo for any blame in 
Cuba’s economic problems, but it is an accurate assessment, insofar as it recognizes that the 
Cuban government would no longer have the Embargo to blame for economic problems that 
remain on the island after the Embargo were lifted.  
 This list of benefits is clearly not exhaustive. There are myriad cultural, political, social, 
and economic benefits that are not listed here, because they are not within the scope of this thesis. 
Further work should focus on the gains that could be made in health care research between the 
two parties, for instance. For the purposes of this thesis, though, it should be understood that 
immediate gains, vis-à-vis travel and further economic opening, compose two of the potential 
benefits of lifting the Embargo. 
Conclusion 
 The Cuban Embargo has undergone varying degrees of intensification and retrenchment 
since its promulgation under Kennedy in 1962. From its initial stages, it has always been 
exceptional in its extraterritoriality, vis-à-vis its imposition of sanctions on foreign vessels and 
subsidiaries of U.S. companies that engage in commercial relations with the island. Relations 
between the U.S. and Cuba have also been exceptional in the extent to which Congress has 
influenced foreign policy towards the island. Foreign policy is traditionally under the purview of 
the Executive Branch, but beginning with Congressional pressure for the Embargo after the Bay 
of Pigs, continuing with the Cuban American National Foundation’s pressure of the Executive 
Branch and Congress during the Reagan administration, and culminating with the passage of 
245	  
	  
Helms-Burton in 1996, U.S. foreign policy towards Cuba has been, increasingly over the years, 
the most Congressionally dominated area of bilateral U.S. foreign policy.  
 The Obama administration’s move towards diplomatic and commercial normalization 
with the island signifies the most substantial move towards ending Cold War policies since the 
institution of the Embargo in 1962. The administration has acted within legal boundaries, only 
adjusting areas of policy that it has legal authority to modify, according to Helms-Burton. 
Notably, the U.S., until this recent action by the Obama administration, has been the party that 
was lagging behind, vis-à-vis a willingness to act pragmatically and put an end to Cold War 
sentiments. Raul Castro has, for years, expressed a desire to normalize relations with the United 
States, as part of his more general shift towards pragmatic economic policy, both internally and 
externally. Such sentiment on Raul Castro’s part should is representative of his generally 
pragmatic approach, as he has transitioned the island into a permanent pragmatist period. 
The move by the Obama administration to normalize relations portends well for further 
positive developments between the two states. The potential for further and deeper normalization 
with the island is illustrated by the sponsorship by Senator Jeff Flake of a bill that would 
categorically lift travel restrictions for American citizens wishing to visit the island. Even more 
significantly, a bipartisan bill has been introduced in Congress that would end Helms-Burton’s 
codification of The Embargo and end the categorical ban on trade with the island (Itkowitz, 
1/12/15). 
 In addition to – or perhaps more appropriately, as a prerequisite to – ending the Embargo, 
further steps by both states could be taken towards rapprochement. For starters, the United States 
should remove Cuba from its list of state sponsors of terrorism, a list whose only other entries are 
Iran, Sudan, and Syria. Not only has Cuba not sponsored acts of terrorism, but the island nation 
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actually went out of its way to voice it support for the United States after the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001.  
 The U.S. should also end its “wet foot, dry foot” policy, which was introduced with the 
Cuban Adjustment Act in 1966. This law allows Cubans who arrive on U.S. soil to apply for 
permanent U.S. residency one year and one day after their arrival. This policy (it is a policy, and 
can be ended by Executive order – see Cuba Central News Blast, 1/23/2015) has contributed to 
Cuba’s problem of brain drain, and is a perpetual target of Cuban officials’ umbrage. Ending the 
policy would go far in helping to improve relations between the two countries. 
 The United States should also recognize that the desire of Cuban Americans to regain 
property lost during the Cuban Revolution is simply a pipe dream. Such property was 
nationalized in accord with international law, and the U.S. government should abandon any 
future plans to pursue legal action to regain such property. 
 On the Cuban side, the Cuban government should abstain from jailing political prisoners, 
and continue its campaign of economic opening. This should, of course, be done at the island’s 
own pace, and should not be done in such a way that would compromise political stability in 
Cuba.   
 It seems that, at this point, the repealing of the Embargo is just a matter of time. There is 
no longer support for the Embargo amongst a majority of Cuban Americans (Lopez-Levy, 2010), 
and there is a substantial division amongst Republicans in Congress as to the desirability and 
efficacy of the Embargo, with Republicans such as Senator Rand Paul voicing their dissent 
against the Embargo. The bipartisan nature of recent bills in the U.S. Congress to repeal travel 
restrictions and end the Embargo is evidence that Congress is moving in the direction of ending 
the United States Cold War policies against the island. On Cuba’s side, the island has entered a 
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permanent pragmatist period, and it is very unlikely that officials on the island will see any 




Chapter Nine:  
Conclusion 
 
 This thesis covered a wide range of topics pertaining to the Cuban political economy. My 
goal at the outset of writing was to provide a concise yet thorough account of recent economic 
reforms on the island. Hence, this entire thesis was originally supposed to be contained within 
Chapters Six and Seven, pertaining to reforms since 2007. However, upon writing, I soon 
realized that, since Cuba had undergone similar periods of reform in the past, current 
developments in Cuba could not be understood without providing a sufficient historical 
background on those periods. As such, it became necessary to write Chapter Two as an overview 
of periods of reform.  
 Then, when writing Chapter Two, the singular significance of The Special Period, as the 
deepest and most market-oriented period of reforms until the recent reforms of 2007, became 
readily apparent, so it was necessary to write Chapter Three. And because a constant theme 
throughout Cuba’s varying reform periods, including the Special Period, was a dynamic, 
ambivalent, yet surprisingly integrated relationship with the international economy, I was 
inclined to write Chapter Five, which covered Cuba’s insertion into the world economy. 
Moreover, when researching different aspects of the Cuban economy, a recurring theme 
in various sources was the peculiarly Cuban issue of monetary duality, which necessitated 
Chapter Four. 
Finally, as Dr. Velasco pointed out, a thesis on the Cuban political economy would be 
unforgivably incomplete without a chapter pertaining to U.S.-Cuba relations, as the United States 
has such a salient effect on the Cuban economy, specifically through the Embargo. Hence, it was 
necessary to include Chapter Eight, on U.S.-Cuba relations. 
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As the above account suggests, this thesis snowballed, and became a somewhat more 
ambitious endeavor than I had originally anticipated. Given the myriad and complex topics 
covered, I will provide a brief recap in this conclusion, in an attempt to both summarize, and to 
some extent synthesize, the various concepts and findings that were covered.  
The main purpose of Chapter One was to provide the theoretical framework through 
which previous periods of reform in Cuba should be viewed. This chapter implemented Carmelo 
Mesa-Lago’s theory of pragmatist (market-oriented) and idealist (anti-market) policies. 
According to this framework, reform cycles in Cuba, between 1959 and 2007, proceeded along 
the following lines. Material exigencies, whether budget deficits or foreign exchange 
shortcomings, compelled Cuban authorities to engage in a pragmatist cycle of economic reforms. 
Such reforms can be characterized in their most general terms by a general shift towards 
marketization and privatization. Often, such reforms necessitated what I refer to as a 
“reconceptualization of socialist ideology,” to avoid the cognitive dissonance that obtains when 
formal policy does not comport with socialist rhetoric. This reconceptualization often entails the 
re-definition of what “socialism” actually means in the context of Cuba’s economy.  
Market-oriented policies of pragmatist cycles were implemented for as long as was 
necessary for the material exigencies that necessitated such policies to become ameliorated. 
Once this occurred, pragmatist policies were halted or scaled back, and a new idealist cycle was 
initiated, which entailed a shift towards centralized economic planning and collectivization of 
ownership. The economic outcomes of such idealist cycles were, on balance, negative, and thus 
caused another round of material exigencies to emerge on the island.  
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As Chapter One emphasized, this theoretical framework only applies to reforms prior to 
Raul’s campaign of reforms that was launched in 2007. A number of factors have changed in 
recent years that make this theoretical framework inapplicable to Cuba’s recent round of reforms. 
Chapter two provided an overview and analysis of previous periods of reform in Cuba. 
By implementing Mesa-Lago’s theory of “pragmatist” (market-oriented) and “idealist” (anti-
market) cycles, this chapter identified six major periods of reform prior to the island’s most 
recent round of economic reforms. First, there was the idealist cycle of reforms between 1959 -
1971, which included a large-scale campaign of agricultural collectivization, along with an 
emphasis on moral, rather than material, incentives in the Cuban economy.  
The results of this of this idealist cycle, as far as can be deduced from what little 
economic data is available, were negative, and in response, the Cuban government launched a 
pragmatist cycle in 1971, which lasted until 1985. The policies of this pragmatist cycle were 
highly successful, with economic indicators improving across the board, but with inequality 
rising. 
This cycle was followed by the “Period of Rectification of Errors and Negative 
Tendencies,” an idealist cycle that lasted from 1986-1990. The Cuban government engaged in a 
campaign of significant anti-market reforms, mainly targeted at the agricultural sector, shutting 
down farmers markets and requiring farmers to shift their efforts to state farms. Rectification 
policies resulted in economic disaster, with every single economic indicator declining (mesa-
Lago in Ritter, 2004: 35).  
The economic crisis that ensued in the late 1980s compelled Cuban officials to launch the 
island’s most deeply market-oriented and austere pragmatist cycle since the Revolution: the 
Special Period, which lasted from 1990-1996. This cycle, which was impelled by domestic 
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economic decline, and accelerated/deepened by the collapse of the USSR, was characterized by 
extreme marketization and policies that were meant to attract foreign investment. This cycle was 
singularly important because it played a very large role in shaping the conditions in Cuba’s 
current economy, since it was during this time that U.S. dollar transactions were legalized, and 
attraction of foreign investment became a major focus of the Cuban government. The 
legalization of dollar holdings has caused lasting distortions in the Cuban economy, since low-
skilled but dollarized sectors (e.g. waiting tables, prostitution) of the economy garner higher 
earnings than highly-skilled, but non-dollarized sectors (medical doctors, PhDs). This has caused 
a serious devaluation of traditionally esteemed areas of the Cuban economy, particularly medical 
careers and academia. 
According to Mesa-Lago, Special Period policies halted Cuba’s economic decline (Mesa-
Lago in Ritter, 2004: 38) (though, at the cost of extreme austerity imposed on the Cuban 
population). Improved economic conditions, along with renewed fears of U.S. intervention, 
which were catalyzed by the Helms-Burton Act of 1996, led Cuban authorities to decelerate 
Special Period reforms during the period from 1996 to 2001. This period was not an idealist 
cycle, because Special Period reforms were not scaled back; rather, they were simply halted or 
decelerated. 
Then, from 2001-2007, the island was in a holding pattern, with no reforms of note, 
whether idealist or pragmatist, occurring. Patronage from Venezuela, particularly Hugo Chavez, 
allowed Cuba to avoid much-needed market reforms during this period. However, because of the 
tenuous nature of Venezuela’s socialist regime, Cuban authorities were unwilling to engage in 
another idealist cycle, choosing rather to opt for a Plan B, which straddled the line between 
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market and planning, thus allowing them to be prepared, should their favorable terms of trade 
with Venezuela cease to be a reality. 
The details of these reform cycles have been covered in previous chapters, so they are not 
extensively covered here. The important point to take away is that all of the reform cycles 
between 1959-2007 exhibited the traits laid out in this thesis’s theoretical framework. Pragmatist 
cycles were initiated to ameliorate the material exigencies that were the result of idealist cycle 
policies, and socialist ideology was usually reconceptualized, so as to comport with necessary 
reforms. Once economic conditions had improved to a level that Cuban officials deemed 
adequate, pragmatist policies were halted, decelerated, or scaled back. 
However, as is detailed in Chapters Six and Seven, Cuba entered a phase of reforms 
beginning in 2007 that broke away from the above theoretical model. As Chapter Six detailed, 
Raul Castro, who assumed control in 2006, initiated a campaign of economic reforms between 
2007 and 2010 that were geared towards marketization and privatization. These reforms were 
most substantial in the agricultural sector. Reforms in this sector included: the legalization of 
some input purchases by farmers, the granting of usufruct use of idle land to private farmers and 
cooperatives (through Decree-Law 259 and Regulatory Legal Decree 282), and increases in 
prices offered by the state for farmers’ agricultural products. Reforms that privatize and 
marketize the agricultural sector are significant because privatization measures have, in the past, 
catalyzed output in countries such as China and Vietnam, as well as within Cuba itself. Moreover, 
the agricultural sector is one area where Cuba could be producing domestically a large portion of 
what it currently imports, particularly from the United States. Notably, these agricultural reforms 
were shaped according to concerns that had been voiced by farmers in discussions between the 
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Cuban government and the island’s population, thus allowing these reforms to be characterized 
as semi-democratic. 
Another major reform during this period was the shift towards a monetary policy that 
operates independently of Cuba’s fiscal policy. In the past, Cuba’s monetary policy was 
subordinated to its fiscal policy, and fiscal deficits were thus passively monetized, resulting in 
excess liquidity and inflation on the island. The specific goal of Cuba’s new monetary policy is 
to reign in inflation in private markets, where inflation is most pronounced and most visible 
(since prices in state outlets are controlled). This shift is significant because it indicates that 
Cuban authorities are acknowledging the importance of private markets, and the increasingly 
prevalent role that they will continue to play in Cuba’s economy.  
Chapter Four covered an area of monetary policy in Cuba that still needs to be addressed: 
monetary duality. The island continues to effectively use three different currencies: the Peso, the 
Convertible Peso (CUC), and the U.S. Dollar. This has led to multiple distortions in the Cuban 
economy, including the underestimation of how much imports cost, and the underestimation of 
the value of exports. To correct this issue, the Cuban government should: devalue the Peso; unify 
enterprise and general population exchange regimes; convert CADECA prices, currently in CUC 
prices, to Peso prices, thus eliminating the CUC; and then convert institutional bank accounts 
held in CUCs to Pesos, in that order. 
The reforms between 2007 and 2010 were illustrative of the general shift that Raul Castro 
has launched towards a pragmatist economic model on the island. Importantly, the reforms 
occurred, and continue to occur, at a gradual, deliberate pace, so as to obviate political and 
economic instability that would be likely to occur under an alternative campaign of shock 
therapy capitalism. The effects of the reforms, as of about 2010, were mixed, as there were still 
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many distortions in the Cuban economy that needed to be addresses, such as flaws in the process 
by which idle land was granted for usufruct use for agricultural uses. To address these flaws, the 
Cuban government introduced deeper reforms beginning in 2010. 
Chapter Seven covered the reforms that have occurred since 2010. These reforms were 
introduced with the Communist Party’s release of the Project of Economic and Social Policy 
Guidelines for the Party and the Revolution in November of 2010. The document clearly lays out 
a plan for moving the island more deeply in the direction of a pragmatist economy that relies 
more on privatized and marketized factors, in an attempt to ameliorate deficiencies in the Cuban 
economy related to past and present inefficiencies. Many of the reforms were stated in a rather 
vague, ambiguous manner, which is clearly a deliberate attempt on Cuban officials’ part to 
ensure they have plenty of legal latitude in implementing reform measures.  
Once the 2010 Project Document was released, Cuban officials held a number of 
meetings with the general population, fielding comments and criticism throughout the process. 
This feedback was addressed by the Cuban government in 2011 when the Communist Party 
convened for the 6th Party Congress, the first such meeting since 1997. This meeting was meant 
to formalize and amend reforms of the 2010 Project Document, largely in response to feedback 
that was proffered by the Cuban population subsequent to the Document’s release. In this sense, 
the recent program of reforms on the island can be characterized as semi-democratic, as the 
Cuban government has sought out feedback from the Cuban population, and implemented such 
feedback when amending its reform policies. 
Illustrating the pragmatist nature of recent reforms, Raul Castro, during the 6th Party 
Congress, went so far as to indict the egalitarian nature of Cuba’s ration book, one of the major 
symbols of Cuban socialism (Cuba, Communist Party, 2010). Speaking in what has become a 
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characteristically pragmatic fashion, Raul castigated the ration book for its benefits that have 
been distributed categorically to all Cubans, regardless of need, thus causing the hoarding of 
items by Cubans who do not need the benefits. Raul emphasized that categorical benefits 
contravene Cuban socialism, since socialist policies should actually benefit those who need them, 
as well as those who have earned them. Regarding this latter point, Raul reiterated that the 
distributional tenet of socialism should be, “from each in accordance with his ability and to each 
in accordance with his labor” (Cuba, Communist Party, 2010 – italics mine), which contrasts 
with the traditional Marxist tenet of, “…to each according to his need.” This shift in rhetoric 
perhaps sums up, better than any piece of policy could, the rationalized, pragmatist direction 
towards which the island is moving under current reforms on the island. Moreover, this statement 
by Raul also illustrates the fact that, regardless of the nature and implication of current and future 
reforms, homage will continue to be paid to Cuban socialism, even if that means redefining 
Cuban socialism so as to comport with necessary reform measures. Hence, this aspect of the 
Cuban reform process is similar to reforms of the past, under which Cuban socialism was often 
reconceptualized to avoid incongruities with contemporary reforms.  
While socialism on the island has been reconceptualized to be more agreeable with 
pragmatist policies, it should be noted that the benchmarks of the Revolution, universal 
healthcare and education, are not on the table for complete removal. In fact, current reforms are 
being endorsed by Cuban officials as measures that support, rather than damage, health care and 
education. 
Where current reforms and past reforms differ is in the permanent nature of current 
reforms, whereas previous reforms were ephemeral. In the past, as has been reiterated throughout 
this thesis, pragmatist policies were halted, scaled back, or decelerated once material conditions 
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had been sufficiently improved by such policies. Cuban authorities could, and did, engage in this 
pattern of reform (pragmatist cycles) and retrenchment (idealist cycles) for multiple reasons.  
First, historically the island had an international patron in the USSR. The economic 
support of the USSR ensured that the island had a safety net, and could engage in idealistic 
reforms when it had made certain adjustments to improve deteriorating material conditions, 
where were often the result of previous idealist cycles. The necessity of such a patron for the 
initiation of idealist cycles is illustrated by the fact that Special Period reforms were halted, 
rather than scaled back, in 1996, likely because Cuban officials were unsure as to the viability of 
further idealist cycles without the support of the recently collapsed Soviet Union. While Cuba 
still has Venezuela as an ally and patron, the viability of Venezuela’s socialist regime under 
Nicolas Maduro has grown increasingly tenuous. Hence, Cuba’s leaders have been reluctant to 
engage in idealist policies. 
  Another reason Cuba engaged in this cycle of reform and retrenchment was that Fidel 
was simply more doctrinaire in his socialist convictions than his brother Raul, and thus choose to 
return to idealist policies when the opportunity presented itself. In contrast, Raul has exhibited 
his desire and willingness to engage in long run pragmatist reforms since he assumed control in 
2006. He has moved the island further towards the market and towards privatization than its 
economy has been at any point since 1959. 
There are a few factors that suggest current reforms are permanent in nature. First of all, 
as was explained above, the absence of an international patron means that current reforms are 
unlikely to be scaled back. There may be times that current reforms are temporarily halted in the 
future, similar to the halting of Special Period reforms in 1996, but another idealist cycle is very 
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unlikely, simply because Cuba no longer has an ally that could subsidize potential idealist cycle 
policies through favorable terms of trade.  
Second, the pragmatist nature of Raul Castro means that reforms are unlikely to be scaled 
back. Since Raul has introduced term limits, there may be concerns that a future president may 
choose to scale back reforms and initiate another idealist cycle. But any successor is unlikely to 
scale back his reforms, since such a successor will be hand-picked and groomed by Raul and his 
cadre.  
Lastly, recent reforms are engineered to require longterm adjustments in the Cuban 
economy. Such is the case with Cuba’s nascent income tax system, which has been designed and 
introduced to allow a much more substantial role for private actors in the Cuban economy. Such 
a system will take years to implement, and even longer to be amended as Cuban officials and 
citizens familiarize themselves with how an income tax system works in practice.  
Raul Castro’s pragmatist approach has not been restricted to the domestic political 
economy. Raul Castro has recognized the necessity of inserting the island more completely into 
the international economy, and Chapter Five covered Cuba’s continued campaign of 
international insertion. The main findings of this chapter were that Cuba’s comparative 
advantage lies in its highly educated population, and that such an advantage should be exploited 
by continuing to develop the island’s biotech/biomedical industry.  
While Chapter Five analyzed Cuba’s most lucrative industries that should be exploited as 
it continues to integrate into the world economy, Chapter Eight covered a particular facet of its 
diplomatic approach to such integration: rapprochement with the United States. As Cuba’s most 
important economic partner, Raul Castro has recognized the importance of reconciling with the 
United States. He has thus voiced his willingness to come to the table and discuss matters, 
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without precondition. To the extent that this recent move subordinates politically and historically 
motivated animosity towards the United States to more immediate economic necessity, such a 
move should be understood as part of Raul’s larger campaign of shifting the island towards a 
pragmatist economic model. 
The United States seemed unwilling to come to the negotiating table until late in 2014, 
when the Obama administration announced that diplomatic relations with Cuba would be 
restored. This move by the U.S. can likely be explained by three main factors: the latitude the 
Obama administration has been afforded by the market-oriented shift of the Cuban government; 
the similar latitude it has been afforded by the changing demographics amongst Cuban 
Americans, a majority of which is now in favor of diplomatic rapprochement with Cuba; and by 
the divide amongst Congressional Republicans, vis-à-vis the desirability of the Embargo.  
In short, the main conclusion that should be drawn from this thesis is that Cuba has most 
likely entered a permanent pragmatist period in its political economy. This is not a shift that is 
happening overnight, though. Analysts who criticize the pace of Cuban reforms are failing to 
understand that these reforms are supposed to be gradual and deliberate. Cubans, both officials 
and citizens alike, are wary of the destabilizing effects of shock therapy capitalism, and are thus 
engaging in reforms in an experimental, tentative manner. Moreover, reforms have to be 
implemented in a manner that does not compromise universal healthcare and education on the 
island. As such, current reforms will continue in a steady but deliberate manner, or, in the words 
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